




Mountain View  
Whisman  
School District

## ASSESSMENT SUMMARY



# Purpose

---

# *Our Guiding Principles*

*Safety - Equity - Excellence*

# Who is Joffe Emergency Services?

---

We are safety experts and educators. But most importantly, we are partners in protecting schools and communities.

We have been working with schools across the country since 2007.

We founded - and have grounded - our safety work in schools because we believe they are the most important places we can possibly protect. Fifteen years later, we've worked with thousands of schools to help protect millions of lives.



International School  
Los Angeles  
Lycée International



THE HAMLIN SCHOOL  
EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION FOR GIRLS

# WHAT WE DO

---

We help schools and school systems strengthen their health, safety, and security practices, so they're **confident in their approach and coordinated in their response.**

Our school program options are designed to help schools implement best practices and create strong, resilient systems that allow schools and students to thrive.



**Emergency  
Planning &  
Response**



**Campus  
Security**



**Campus  
Health**



**Technology &  
Cybersecurity**

# AGENDA

- Review Assessment Process
  - Objectives
  - Methods
  - Areas of Focus
  - Work Products
- Hazard Analysis
  - Community
  - Region
- Highlight Assessment Outcomes
  - Observations
  - Feedback from Staff and Families
  - Solutions and Recommendations

# THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

# ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES

---

- **Comprehensive review of each site**
- **Identify safety and security vulnerabilities**
- **Recommend strategic changes**
- **Assessment timeline: January 2023 - February 2023**

# ASSESSMENT METHODS

---

- **Review existing policies and procedures**
- **Review district-wide initiatives**
- **Collect stakeholder input via ThoughtExchange**
- **Physical walk-through**
- **Interviews with staff and parent groups**
- **Discussions with district-wide teams**

# AREAS OF FOCUS

---

**Review of safety and security capabilities across five categories:**

- **Physical and Environmental**
- **Current Protocols and Communications**
- **Psychological and Social-Emotional**
- **Health and Wellness**
- **Technology and Cyber Security**

# ASSESSMENT WORK PRODUCTS

---

- **Assessment Spreadsheet**
  - Detailed audit of each site
  - Items assigned impact categories
  - Notes and recommendations
- **Assessment Summary Report**
  - Overarching district themes and recommendations
  - Overview of each site
  - Hazard Analysis
  - Timeline for recommended course of action

# HAZARD ANALYSIS

# HAZARD ANALYSIS - COMMUNITY - CRIME DATA

---

- Crime rates are higher in Mountain View than average compared to other U.S. cities
  - 18% higher than national average
  - 1 in 37 chance of becoming a victim of crime
- Mountain View has a lower average crime rate than cities across California
  - Overall, 52% safer than other California cities
  - Violent crimes are 7% higher than other California cities
- Crime rates in Mountain View are declining
  - Decreased by 11% since 2019

# HAZARD ANALYSIS - REGION

---

- Fire
  - Lower risk of wildfire than other portions of the Bay Area
  - High risk of air quality issues during fire season
- Earthquake
  - High likelihood of damaging earthquake due to proximity to San Andreas Fault System
  - 76% of 7.0 magnitude earthquake within next 21 years
  - Significant risk of liquefaction
- Flooding
  - Moderate risk of flooding due to location and elevation

# ASSESSMENT DATA

Overarching District-Wide Themes

# ACCESS CONTROL: GATES

---

- Concern: Sites are not able to secure the perimeter
  - Installation of locking devices on gates has been delayed due to supply issues
  - Even if locked, gates can be opened from the inside due to building/fire code
- Goal: Improve enforcement of access policies and reduce elopement risk
  - Additional staff to monitor gates
  - Motion sensors or alarms
  - Passive monitoring of gates via security cameras
  - Third-party security services to monitor cameras and perimeter

# ACCESS CONTROL: GATES - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Staff:
  - “Locked gates as well as screened gates create fewer access points throughout campus, acting as a deterrent to any unwanted visitors.”
- Students:
  - “People can easily walk into our school by opening the unlocked gate. This could be dangerous to the students”
  - “Gates won’t keep out people who actually want to hurt you.”
- Parents:
  - “More people around the school. It is important because if we don’t have enough people to survey the school, there might be more fights or more people skipping class.”
  - “More fenced gates, more security cameras. The school is adjacent to a public park and has many easy entry points for outsiders.”

# ACCESS CONTROL: SHARED SPACES - DURING SCHOOL HOURS

---

- Concern: Members of public use the shared spaces during school hours
  - Staff have reported unleashed dogs and individuals becoming confrontational
  - Students have reported feeling uncomfortable or unsafe
  - Frequency of trespassing prevents rapid threat assessments
- Goal: Decrease public presence during school hours and reduce risk to staff
  - Concise signage at all entrances
  - Additional fencing between fields and recess areas/classrooms
  - Incident log of public use and clear guidelines for contacting MVPD
  - De-escalation training for staff supervising perimeter
  - Third-party security services to reduce staff/public interactions

# SHARED SPACES - DURING SCHOOL HOURS - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Staff:
  - “With many of the schools being connected to “public parks”, it is important to ensure we are regulating how many people can enter the campus during the day!”
- Students:
  - “Not letting random people walk onto campus during the school day.”
  - “I think we need more security cameras where some people can come in after school. It is important because they might be doing something inappropriate.”
- Parents:
  - “The most important thing is who is entering the property. Who is interacting with students. I don’t want my child to be put in contact with strangers.”
  - “Fences do not make campuses safer, just make more cut off from the community. Fences are no deterrent to serious criminals, just regular people.”

# ACCESS CONTROL: SHARED SPACES - AFTER PARK CLOSURE HOURS

---

- Concern: Members of the public have unsupervised access to campus after dark
  - Not all public areas are visible from roadways
  - Sites report instances of vandalism and trespassing
  - Cameras and lights do not cover recess areas open to the public
- Goal: Improve monitoring and physical security of campus after park closure hours
  - Amended JUAs - exclude enclosed areas, lock field gates after hours
  - Third-party security services to patrol and respond
  - MOUs with MVPD to increase surveillance
  - Additional cameras and lighting in recess/lunch areas
  - External motion sensors for timely alert

# ACCESS CONTROL: VISITOR MANAGEMENT

---

- Concern: Staff are unable to ensure compliance with visitor policies
  - Family members access classrooms with or without checking-in with office
  - Members of the public use campus areas as a throughway
- Goal: Enable enforcement of visitor policies through environmental and procedural controls
  - Secured and monitored gates
  - Clear, permanent posting of visitor policies on interior and exterior buildings
  - Clear signage indicating location of office
  - Obvious visitor badges or vests
  - Training for staff on visitor policy enforcement
  - Early dismissal procedural changes

# ACCESS CONTROL: VISITOR MANAGEMENT - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Staff:
  - “I sometimes see unknown adults without the name tag.”
- Parents:
  - “Keep all school doors locked, and enter only through the office. Because most of the time they are always open and anyone can enter, without using the front door.”

# ACCESS CONTROL: FRONT OFFICE

---

- Concern: Public-facing access doors are kept unlocked during school hours
  - Screening must occur with individual inside the Front Office
  - There are many doors granting access to campus from the Front Office
- Goal: Reduce access to staff and campus by screening individuals before allowing admittance to Front Office
  - Remote-operated lock systems with good camera capabilities and two-way communication
  - External Raptor stations with user input systems
  - Badge-entry systems such as SchoolPass

# ACCESS CONTROL: FRONT OFFICE - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

- Staff:
  - “Gates are propped open by the staff because that is the only way to access the Front Office.”
- Students:
  - “Automatically locks door from the office.”

# EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT: FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

---

- Concern: Classrooms and offices are not equipped with fire sprinkler systems
  - Evacuation must occur at a very rapid pace
  - Higher likelihood of personal injury or damage to property during a fire
- Goal: Reduce severity of fires by installing fire sprinkler systems in all campus areas
  - MURs, Auditoriums, and buildings built or remodeled in last few years have them. Not all campus areas do.

# EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT: EMERGENCY POSTINGS

---

- Concern: Abbreviated emergency procedures are not readily accessible by all individuals
  - Visitors, students, and substitutes may not be aware of procedures or where to find them
- Goal: Improve knowledge of and adherence to emergency procedures by posting critical information in all classrooms and workspaces
  - At-A-Glance procedures
  - Evacuation maps

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: EARTHQUAKE DRILLS

---

- Concern: Additional earthquake or drop, cover, hold drills are needed
  - Currently only one drill is planned each year
- Goal: Improve earthquake readiness and compliance with California ED Code Section 32282(a)(2)(B)(i)
  - Accomplish one earthquake drill per quarter for elementary schools
  - Accomplish one earthquake drill per semester for secondary schools

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: DISTRICT AND SITE SAFETY PLANS

---

- Concern: Sites need support in the development and implementation of safety plans
  - Not all plans are updated promptly
  - Protocols and procedures are not standardized
  - Distribution and training plans are not uniform
- Goal: Improve site emergency response capabilities through effective training and planning with an emphasis on challenging or high-likelihood situations
  - Allergic reactions
  - Emergencies during arrival and departure
  - Off-campus evacuation
  - Staff attendance procedures during emergencies
  - Emergencies during field trips

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: SAFETY PLANS - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Parents:
  - “Provide a simulation of the safety procedures and share with parents and the community since these individuals do not participate in the drills.”
  - “Proactively communicate about safety plans and procedures.”
- Students:
  - “In case of a dangerous intruder or related emergency, there’s not too many places to hide.”
  - “I think we should have more privacy like blinds on windows. I also thought there should be a self-defense unit in P.E.”

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: SITE SAFETY COMMITTEES

---

- Concern: Sites do not have dedicated site safety committees
  - Some site councils regularly delegate and perform duties related to safety
- Goal: Address a wider range of issues and develop specialized knowledge by establishing site safety committees
  - Address occupational health concerns
  - Include certificated and classified staff
  - Invite external stakeholders
  - Collaborate with emergency responders and CERT representatives

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

---

- Concern: Sites do not have a strong understanding of the emergency notification system
  - District Communications Department may not always be available in an emergency
- Goal: Increase site response capabilities by providing training on the emergency notification system
  - Basic principles of emergency communication
  - System characteristics and operation
  - Accessing contact lists and templates

# EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS: CERT

---

- Concern: Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) are not utilized during the planning and training processes.
  - CERT representatives are available in each neighborhood in partnership with the City of Mountain View
- Goal: Coordinate community-wide emergency response plans in partnership with CERT representatives.
  - Joint training opportunities
  - Coordinated response plans
  - Site-based ambassador programs

# MENTAL HEALTH: HOTLINE FOR ANONYMOUS REPORTING

---

- Concern: Students and staff do not currently have a method for anonymously reporting safety and security concerns.
  - Particularly important in middle schools
  - Increasing documentation to ensure follow-up
- Goal: Improve prevention efforts by establishing an anonymous reporting method
  - Google Form with QR code, widgets, and links
  - App-based systems such as Say Something or Vector LiveSafe
  - Helpline services such as Safe School Helpline

# MENTAL HEALTH: HOTLINE FOR ANONYMOUS REPORTING- THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Staff:
  - “We are losing more and more students to other schools, since we have no consequences for negative behavior. Many students tell me they are bullied.”
  - “Many students at the middle school only go to the bathroom in pairs because they are concerned about running into other people who might harass them.”
- Students:
  - “People at school constantly see kids vaping and doing other things, especially in the bathrooms. It makes people feel really unsafe.”
  - “Make teachers be more aware of the bullying that takes place at school.”
- Parents:
  - “Keep an eye out for bullying and address it seriously.”
  - “Students, staff, and parents should be able to confidentially report safety concerns.”

# MENTAL HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT AND CRISIS RESPONSE TEAMS

---

- Concern: The functions of the BTAT and CRT are carried out informally by all schools
  - Capacity and training are not uniform
  - Teams rely heavily on limited personnel who may not be present on-site
  - Sites have varying understanding of and experiences with external partnering organizations
- Goal: Improve the effectiveness of BTATs and CRTs, as well as increase support for staff, by establishing formalized teams
  - Multi-disciplinary approach
  - Time and resources for specialized training and dedicated meetings
  - Clearly defined roles and scopes of duty
  - Increased reliance on on-site staff in immediate response plans
  - Formalized systems of non-disciplinary, long-term monitoring post-intervention

# MENTAL HEALTH - BTAT & CRT - THOUGHT EXCHANGE

---

- Staff:
  - “Supporting teachers when they have students with at-risk behavior with extra support”
  - “Unsafe situations happen when support teams do not listen to teachers asking for support for themselves and for students”
- Students:
  - “We need more education on mental health and less ‘Just be positive and everything will be okay!’”
- Parents:
  - “I think the most likely safety threat to a student is another student at the school, NOT an external threat.”
  - “Detection of and intervention in mental health crisis to prevent suicide. Suicide by firearm, suffocation, or drugs is a leading cause of death in children and adolescents.”