Mountain View Whisman School District

Board of Trustees - Special Meeting Minutes

1400 Montecito Avenue
January 8, 2022
9:00 AM

Remote Meeting Notice

Dial in Phone Number: (669) 900 6833 US (San Jose)
Meeting ID: 898 2235 5415
Passcode: 733939
There is no participant ID

Members of the public who call in to the meeting will be placed in a waiting room until the appropriate time to address the Board. During that time in the waiting room, the caller will not be able to hear the meeting. Callers can view and hear the meeting here: youtube.com/mvwsd

Members of the public who wish to address the Board during the Board of Trustees meeting may email comments to publiccomments@mvwsd.org. In order to expedite the meeting, please send your comments by the Wednesday before the meeting. Staff will make all attempts to share and record any submissions received, however, depending on timing, late submissions will be provided to the Board after the conclusion of the meeting.

(Live streaming available at www.mvwsd.org)

As a courtesy to others, please turn off your cell phone upon entering.

Under Approval of Agenda, item order may be changed. All times are approximate.

I. CALL TO ORDER (9:00 a.m.)

The meeting was called to order at 9:05 a.m.

A. Pledge

Trustees President Laura Blakely led the Pledge of Allegiance.

B. Roll Call

Present: Berman, Blakely, Chiang, Conley, Wheeler
Absent: None

C. Approval of Agenda

A motion was made by Devon Conley and seconded by Ellen Wheeler to approve the agenda, as presented.

Ayes: Berman, Blakely, Chiang, Conley, Wheeler

II. REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

A. Study Session on Enrollment Lotteries

Equity Director Megan Henderson led Trustees through a study session; Equitable Access to Choice Schools. Trustees would like the following brought back at a future meeting:

1. What are the criteria that qualify schools for Title 1 funds?
2. What are the demographics of families that apply for choice schools?
3. What percentage of our choice school students are students with disabilities?

The following member of the community addressed the Board of Trustees:

- Steven Nelson

The meeting was adjourned to lunch at 11:58 a.m. and resumed at 12:34 p.m.

III. ITEMS FOR FUTURE AGENDAS

No items.

IV. FUTURE BOARD MEETING DATES

A. Future Board Meeting Dates

January 13, 2022 Special Meeting
January 20, 2022
February 10, 2022
March 10, 2022

V. ADJOURNMENT (2:00 p.m.)

The meeting was adjourned at 1:58 p.m.

NOTICES FOR AUDIENCE MEMBERS

1. **RECORDING OF MEETINGS:**
The open session will be video recorded and live streamed on the District's website (www.mvwsd.org).

2. **CELL PHONES:**

As a courtesy to others, please turn off your cell phone upon entering.

3. **FRAGRANCE SENSITIVITY:**
Persons attending Board meetings are requested to refrain from using perfumes, colognes or any other products that might produce a scent or chemical emission.

4. **SPECIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ENGLISH TRANSLATION/INTERPRETATION:**
The Mountain View Whisman School District is dedicated to providing access and communication for all those who desire to attend Board meetings. Anyone planning to attend a Board meeting who requires special assistance or English translation or interpretation is asked to call the Superintendent's Office at (650) 526-3552 at least 48 hours in advance of the time and date of the meeting.

El Distrito Escolar de Mountain View Whisman esta dedicado a proveer acceso y comunicacion a todas las personas que deseen asistir a las reuniones de la Junta. Se pide que aquellas personas que planean asistir a esta reunion y requieren de asistencia especial llamen a la Oficina del Superintendente al (650) 526-3552 con por lo menos 48 horas de anticipacion del horario y fecha de esta reunion, para asi poder coordinar los arreglos especiales.

5. **DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY:**
Documents provided to a majority of the Governing Board regarding an open session item on this agenda will be made available for public inspection in the District Office, located at 1400 Montecito Avenue during normal business hours.

Los documentos que se les proveen a la mayoria de los miembros de la Mesa Directiva sobre los temas en la sesion abierta de este orden del dia estaran disponibles para la inspeccion publica en la Oficina del Distrito, localizada en el 1400 Montecito Avenue durante las horas de oficinas regulares.

Mountain View Whisman School District

Agenda Item for Board Meeting of 1/8/2022

Agenda Category: Remote Meeting Notice

Agenda Item Title: Remote Meeting

Estimated Time:

Person Responsible:

Background:

Dial in Phone Number: (669) 900 6833 US (San Jose)
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Fiscal Implication:

Recommended Action:

Mountain View Whisman School District

Agenda Item for Board Meeting of 1/8/2022

Agenda Category: REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

Agenda Item Title: Study Session on Enrollment Lotteries

Estimated Time: 5 hours

Person Responsible:
Dr. Ayindé Rudolph, Superintendent
Megan Henderson, Director of Equity

Background:
This study session is being convened in order to explore enrollment lotteries in depth. A greater understanding of the complexity of enrollment lotteries will help the Board of Trustees make an informed decision about Equitable Access to Choice Schools in the future.

Fiscal Implication:
None at this time.

Recommended Action:
None at this time.

ATTACHMENTS:

Description	Type	Upload Date
Enrollment Lotteries Study Session Slide Deck	Backup Material	12/13/2021
Advancing Integration and Equity Through Magnet Schools	Backup Material	12/9/2021
Simulation Models of the Effects of Race and SE-based Affirmative Action Policies	Backup Material	12/9/2021
The Forgotten Choice? Rethinking Magnet Schools in a Changing Landscape	Backup Material	12/9/2021

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Equitable Access to Choice Schools:

Board of Trustees Study Session

Mountain View Whisman School District

Goals and Objectives

Today's Objectives:

- ❑ Explore research related to meaningful integration of choice programs
- ❑ Explore multiple lottery designs: tiered lottery, weighted lottery, quotas, and extra entries
- ❑ Explore which student demographics can/should be considered within a lottery
- ❑ Explore examples of how other district's in our community are handling enrollment lotteries
- ❑ Discuss what kind of outside supports will be necessary to execute and communicate changes to our lottery

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Choice Schools in MVWSD

An Equity Challenge

Diminish the underrepresentation of our underserved student populations* at our choice schools while considering the legal, social, logistical, and fiscal implications.

(*Particularly with regards to students who are classified as EL and/or SED)

Connections to SP2027 and Equitable Access

- Goal Area #5: Equitable distribution of resources that support student success
  - Ensure facilities and resources equitably serve all students

- Goal Area #3: Inclusive and Supportive Culture
  - Expand stakeholders' access to the systems and strategies used to support student learning

Current Demographics

PowerSchool Data Pull, October 29, 2021											
School Name	Total Enrollment	Foster Placement	Homeless		FRPL		EL		RFEP		
Stevenson Elementary	440	0	0	0%	27	6.14%	39	8.86%	41	9.32%	
Gabriela Mistral Elementary	346	0	18	5.20%	164	47.40%	150	43.35%	19	5.49%	
District Total	4645	3	185	3.98%	1231	26.50%	972	20.93%	704	15.16%	

PowerSchool Data Pull, October 29, 2021											
School Name	Total Enrollment	Hispanic/Latino		Asian		White		Black/African American		Multiple	
Gabriela Mistral Elementary	346	237	68.50%	11	3.18%	62	17.92%	0	0%	36	10.40%
Stevenson Elementary	440	43	9.77%	171	38.86%	145	32.95%	3	1.00%	74	16.82%
District total	4645	1680	36.17%	1056	22.73%	1122	24.16%	60	1.30%	563	12.12%

Neighborhood School Analysis

STEVENSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL			
	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
% from BB	4%	3%	4%
% from CA	8%	7%	8%
% from AI	4%	4%	4%
% LN	19%	17%	17%
% ML	15%	14%	14%
% TH	32%	33%	31%
% VA	17%	20%	20%

Neighborhood School Analysis

MISTRAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL			
	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
% from BB	7%	10%	10%
% from CA	37%	36%	38%
% from AI	4%	4%	3%
% INTER	3%	2%	2%
% LN	21%	21%	21%
% ML	12%	10%	8%
% TH	9%	10%	10%
% VA	7%	8%	7%

Sibling Prevalence

		2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
ST	% Siblings in K	36%	51%	56%
	% Siblings in 1-8	59%	58%	62%
	% Siblings TOTAL	54%	57%	61%
MI	% Siblings in K	44%	47%	41%
	% Siblings in 1-8	52%	55%	49%
	% Siblings TOTAL	51%	53%	48%
CA	% Siblings in K	45%	33%	42%
	% Siblings in 1-8	42%	41%	37%
	% Siblings TOTAL	43%	40%	38%
IM	% Siblings in K	46%	43%	47%
	% Siblings in 1-8	57%	58%	53%
	% Siblings TOTAL	55%	55%	53%

Waitlist Analysis

Stevenson Elementary School, 2021

Grade Level	Total	% Asian	% Hisp/Latino	% White	ELA status (%)	% SED	Enroll. Zone
K	49	55%	10%	35%	EO 51% TBD 43% IFEP 4%	N/A	LN 27% VA 18% ML 16%
1	62	47%	3%	45%	EO 52% TBD 10% IFEP 18% RFEP 8% EL 10%	11%	TH 31% VA 21% LN 19%
2	21	67%	0%	29%	EO 57% TBD 0% IFEP 38% RFEP 0% EL 5%	5%	ML 29% VA 29% TH 19%

MVWSD Enrollment Priorities for Choice Schools [Tiered Lottery]

1 - Students who reside in district and were enrolled in the same program during the prior school year
2 - Children of salaried district employees and were enrolled in same program during prior school year
3 - Students from interdistrict transfer who were enrolled in same program during prior school year
4 - Students who live in the district who have siblings enrolled in program during prior school year
5 - Children of salaried district employees (site specific)
who live within the district and are new to the program
6 - Children of salaried district employees (site specific), interdistrict transfers, are new to the program
7 - Children of salaried district employees (not site-specific), live within the district, and are new to the program
8 - Children of salaried district employees (not site-specific), interdistrict transfers, and are new to the program (don't live in district)
9 - All other students who live in district and new to the program
10 - All other students who are interdistrict transfers and are new to the program

Current work to date

	Activity	Timeframe
Pre-Engagement	Superintendent Coffee w/Stevenson	October 2020
	Meeting with Stevenson PACT	October 2020
	Meeting with Stevenson Equity Group	December 2020
	Initiate Choice School Inquiry	November 2020
	Board Presentation on Equitable Access to Choice Schools	February 2021
School and Community Engagement	Thought Exchange: Stevenson	March 2021
	Parent Engagement: Focus Groups	March 2021
	Staff Engagement: Focus Groups	March 2021
	Leadership Engagement: Focus Group	March 2021
	Focus Group Data Synthesis	April 2021
	1:1 with Principal Santiago and Director Henderson bi-monthly	Ongoing
Board Engagement		
	Update to BOT about Focus Group Analysis	October 2021
	Update to BOT about Timeline and Ramifications	November 2021

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What the Research Tells Us

About the academic benefits of an integrated education

- higher achievement in math, science, language, and reading
- school climates supportive of learning and studying
- increased likelihood of graduating from high school and entering and graduating from college
- higher income and educational attainment
- increased access to highly qualified teachers and leaders who are less likely to transfer to other schools
- enhanced classroom discussion
- more advanced social and historical thinking

*Ayscue, J. Frankenberg, E., & Siegel-Hawley, G. (2017), National Coalition on School Diversity

About the social benefits of an integrated education

- Reduces, prejudice, negative attitudes and stereotypes
- increases positive relationships and friendships across racial lines
- improved critical thinking and problem solving skills
- increased civic participation in a diverse global economy
- more likely for students to hold jobs in integrated workplaces as adults

*Tropp, L.R., & Tropp, L. (2006). Intergroup Attitudes and Relations in Childhood Through Adulthood

Considerations on racial integration

- U.S. DOE, DOJ *Guidance on Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity*
  - Since rescinded by Trump Administration but under review by Biden Administration
- **Approaches that DO NOT rely on race**
  - First determine if goals can still be met without using race
  - Factors considered could include SES, parent education, students' household status (dual or single parent), neighborhood SES, geography lines, and composition of area housing (subsidized, single-family, high-density public, or rental)

Considerations on racial integration

- **Approaches that SOMEWHAT rely on race**
  - Generalized race-based approaches -- may employ expressly racial criteria, such as overall composition of neighborhoods, but do not involve decision making on the basis of an individual student's race (i.e. a school district could draw attendance zones based on racial composition of neighborhoods, but all students within those zones would be treated the same regardless of race
- **Approaches that DO rely on race**
  - meets a compelling interest that closely fits goals of achieving diversity, not avoiding it
  - can be used as a 'plus' factor but not the other way around
  - cannot be used as sole factor in student profile

About best practices for increasing diversity in choice/magnet programs

- Enrollment practices
  - Implementation of inclusive enrollment practices
    - Using race and income factors together in choice school lotteries is best approach

*Reardon, S.F. Yun, J.T, & Kurlaender, M. (2006) “Simulation Models of the Effects of Race- and Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action Policies”, Center for Education Policy Analysis, Stanford University

About best practices for increasing diversity in choice/magnet programs

- Recruitment and Communication
  - effective outreach
    - information sessions or fairs in different locations in community, publications, dedicated employees for outreach, mailings, websites, visits to feeder schools
  - integration embedded into school design, mission, structure, focus, and set of clear desegregation goals
    - Example: The City School

*Learning Policy Institute, Advancing Integration and Equity Through Magnet Schools (2021)

*Frankenberg and Siegel-Hawley (2008)

Considerations on finding what is right for MVWSD

- Student population and future projects
  - What will the demographics of students look like in 5 years? 10 years? How does this impact the way we craft policy around the enrollment lottery?
- Short- and long-term goals of district related to school integration
  - As we look at future growth, what kind of integration are we looking for in our schools? How does this impact the way we craft policy around the enrollment lottery?
- Flexibility
  - What kind of flexibility do we want to have in our lottery? Do we want the lottery to be responsive to shifting demographics and needs yearly? Every 5 years?

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Levers for Change: Enrollment Practices

Lottery Designs

Lottery Design	Description
Tiered Lottery	Showcases a tiered (numerated) lottery including multiple priorities that rank against each other
Weighted/Scored Lottery	Uses points per priority which are then added together to rank students by total score
Quotas	Allows administrators to set a quota for students in specific priority groups (eg. no more than 25% of seats for siblings as part of the 1st priority group). Can be set with percentage limits or minimums but also by total seats
Tiered Lottery - Multiple Priorities Single Group “OR”	Showcases a tiered lottery (numerated) including multiple priorities that rank against each other with more than 1 priority in a single sub lottery group where students can meet EITHER priorities to be ranked accordingly
Tiered Lottery - Multiple Priorities Single Group “AND”	Showcases a tiered lottery (numerated) including multiple priorities that rank against each other with more than 1 priority in a single sub lottery group where students MUST meet both priorities in the single group or tier
Extra Entries	Uses entries for each priority group. Provides additional entries based on these priorities assigned, which doesn’t guarantee placement but provides higher odds based on entries.
Extra Entries Cumulative	Uses entries for each priority group. Provides additional entries based on these priorities assigned, which doesn’t guarantee placement but provides higher odds based on entries. This version adds together the entries if a student meets more than 1.

Tiered Lottery

- Showcases a tiered (numerated) lottery including multiple priorities that rank against each other
- Our current preferences list is a tiered lottery
- Tiered lotteries can contain groups within the tiers. Within each group on the tier, district can utilize ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ conjunction (can meet 1 of several criteria to qualify under tier [OR]; have to meet all criteria to qualify for tier [AND]
- Tiered lotteries can also utilize quotas to ensure at least a basic number of students of a certain demographic will be offered seats

Tiered Lottery Approach (Example)

- Run a random number series for the entire list first then sort by preferences
- Sort first by preferences in order, then assign randomized numbers for each group
- Sort by preference and then by school design (i.e. dual immersion) before assigning randomized numbers
- Create a set-aside (quota) to ensure at least a basic number of students who met a certain school design preference will be offered seats
    - If seats remain after all applicants in this category are admitted, they are not released to the next level of priority, but held until more students in this category apply

Quotas

- Allows administrators to set a quota for students in specific priority groups (eg. no more than 25% of seats for siblings as part of the 1st priority group). Can be set with percentage limits or minimums but also by total seats
- Can be used alone or as a part of either a tiered or a weighted lottery system

Extra Entries

- Uses entries for each priority group. Provides additional entries based on these priorities assigned, which doesn't guarantee placement but provides higher odds based on entries.
- Tiered lotterties with extra entries has a few versions -- one version adds together the entries if a student meets more than 1 [cumulative]

Weighted Lottery

- Uses points per priority which are then added together to rank students by total score
- Can consider multiple student demographics without needing to have a ranking system
- Can adapt to district's integration goals from year-to-year
- Requires mathematical justification for weights that respond to integration goals

Establishing mathematical justification for weights (Example)

Formula to assist in determining a mathematical rationale for weights utilized

Calculating Mathematical Justification:

x= # of educationally disadvantaged students estimated

y= # of expected total applicants

z= % chance in lottery

a= # of additional chances
(weight minus one)

b= revized % chance in lottery

$$\frac{x+(ax)}{y+(ax)} = b$$

Example: 22% educationally disadvantaged applied, seeking target of 50% enrollment. Consider weight of 3.

$$\frac{22}{100} = 22\% \text{ chance}$$

3 chances would mean an additional 2 chances, so ax = (2)(22) = 44

$$\frac{22+(44)}{100+(44)} = \frac{66}{144} = 45.8\%$$

Establishing a mathematical justification for weights (Example)

If there was an open lottery with no priorities, and 7 of the 124 applicants for ST were SED, the chance of an SED applicant getting accepted into the school would be 6%. With a desired enrollment of at least 20% SED for ST, the characteristics of a student who is SED should be weighted 4.

If there was an open lottery with no priorities, and 75 of the 124 applicants for ST were siblings, the chances of an SED applicant getting accepted into the school would be 60%. With a desired enrollment of siblings no greater than 50%, the characteristics of a student who is a sibling should be weighted 1 (if that is still desired).

*students who were enrolled at ST previous year would be exempt from lottery

Student characteristics in a lottery

- Race (can be used when race-neutral proxies are not reasonable)
- Socioeconomic Status
  - FRPL is only one of three measures utilized to determine socioeconomic disadvantage and is dichotomous (you either qualify or you don't)
  - SED is a designation given to students who meet at least one of three of these criteria: (1) FRPL-eligible, (2) parent education (high-school or less), (3) foster youth
- ELL status
- Academic achievement
- Special education status
- Geography (geographic census block)

Other [possible] race-neutral proxies

- Other examples of alternatives measures to SES include neighborhood income or residence, whether a student attended pre-school, whether families receive income-based governmental assistance, parental educational attainment
- ELL status, academic achievement, and special education status are also used but in combination with one or more of the above

Can socioeconomic diversity plans produce racial diversity in schools?

- Integration plans that incorporate SES can take several forms, including:
  - plans that use SES to achieve socioeconomic integration only
  - race conscious plans that use SES factors to achieve racial and socioeconomic integration,
  - race conscious plans that use racial factors (neighborhood or school makeup, etc.) and socioeconomic factors to achieve racial (and socioeconomic) integration
- Success of integration using SES as a factor depends at least in part on how extreme residential segregation by race is, how many students you want to reach and how you define SES

Drawbacks of using simple SES measures to promote integration

- FRPL eligibility is dichotomous: you are or aren't poor, which ignores highly meaningful variations in income levels, but recent alternatives are not widely studied
- While there is a strong relationship between race and poverty, it is imperfect and it varies across communities (recent study of U.S. metros found that the racial and economic segregation work independently of one another; in a district where racial groups are separated by substantial geographic distances regardless of income, it may be more difficult to draw attendance zones that are integrated by race as well as SES
- SES plans that used more nuanced measures of SES beyond binary FRPL measure would likely be associated with higher racial integration --

Examples in our community

- SFUSD “diversity index lottery” -- race neutral proxies
  - 5 factors: extreme poverty (in public housing, foster care, homeless), SES (FRPL status), CalWORKS, and/or public housing programs, home language (whether other than English), the academic performance rank of student’s prior school, students most recent prior test score (whether below 30th percentile)

Examples in our community

- Oakland Unified School District
  - "Equitable Enrollment Priority" -- uses prioritized, geographic census block groups
  - Used American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates by census block group
    - Median household income from 2017, 2018, and 2019
    - Latina/o and African-American population from 2019; AND
    - OUSD's free- or reduced-priced lunch (FRPL) rate by census block group from Fall 2019

Considerations for Board Policy

When seeking to utilize a **weighted** lottery, the BP/AR must include and address the following:

- Categories and Sets/Subsets of students to receive weights in lottery
- Amount of weights to be applied to each category/set/subset
- Rationale/justification for amount of weight to be applied to each category/set/subset (the amount of weight proposed needs to be based on actual circumstances of the school/district and include an explanation and justification of how that particular weight is decided/justified)

Considerations for Board Policy (cont.)

- Description of mechanisms and/or processes that will be utilized to carry out weighted lottery, including district oversight of process
- Sign-off from district and school certifying description provided adequately captures mechanisms that will be used to carry out the weighted lottery

Considerations on finding what is right for MVWSD

- Student population and future projects
  - What will the demographics of students look like in 5 years? 10 years? How does this impact the way we craft policy around the enrollment lottery?
- Short- and long-term goals of district related to school integration
  - As we look at future growth, what kind of integration are we looking for in our schools? How does this impact the way we craft policy around the enrollment lottery?
- Flexibility
  - What kind of flexibility do we want to have in our lottery? Do we want the lottery to be responsive to shifting demographics and needs yearly? Every 5 years?

Next Steps

- Stakeholder analysis and community engagement planning to ensure policy changes are informed by parent and community feedback
- Setting goals for new enrollment process (e.g. demographic changes in applicant pool and ultimately in the incoming Kindergarten class)
- Options and recommendations for enrollment policy and process changes (e.g. options for implementing a weighted lottery, process changes to create equitable access to the process)
- Technical recommendations for implementation: Suggest a path forward to implement policy changes such as a tool or software to manage the lottery

Advancing Integration and Equity Through Magnet Schools

Janel George and Linda Darling-Hammond

LEARNING POLICY INSTITUTE

MAY 2021

Advancing Integration and Equity Through Magnet Schools

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External Reviewers

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This report can be found online at https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/magnet-schools.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

Executive Summary

The long-standing effort to desegregate schools in the United States has been fostered, in part, by the development of magnet schools, which were launched in the 1960s to offer appealing choices of educational programs that could attract an integrated population of families. Magnet schools are public elementary or secondary schools that seek to achieve voluntary desegregation through parental choice rather than through student assignment by offering specialized instruction and innovative academic offerings. They are often situated in urban centers, with the goal of drawing students from surrounding areas—like a magnet—to attend the school. Some magnet schools operate on a regional basis in order to address interdistrict desegregation.

This report draws upon research findings regarding the components found in magnet schools that are both diverse and educationally effective and outlines evidence-based policy recommendations that can inform federal, state, and local efforts to help to design, implement, and sustain effective magnet schools that can foster integrated learning and positive student outcomes.

Why Integration Matters

Well-established research outlines the benefits of school integration, including increased civic participation in a diverse global economy and increased likelihood of living in integrated neighborhoods and holding jobs in integrated workplaces as adults. Studies have found that the academic benefits of attending integrated schools include:

- higher achievement in math, science, language, and reading;
- school climates supportive of learning and studying;
- increased likelihood of graduating from high school and entering and graduating from college;
- higher income and educational attainment;
- increased access to highly qualified teachers and leaders who are less likely to transfer to other schools;
- enhanced classroom discussion; and
- more advanced social and historical thinking.

Students attending schools that are highly segregated by race and poverty—known as "hypersegregated" schools—are deprived of the benefits of integrated education. Most significantly, hypersegregated schools are characterized by resource inequities that translate into large proportions of inexperienced and underprepared educators and a lack of rigorous coursework, which have negative consequences for students' academic outcomes as measured by performance on standardized achievement tests and high school graduation rates.

The Changing Face of School Segregation and Magnet Schools

Despite the evidence of the harm of segregated schools, research shows that schools are resegregating at alarming rates. One study found that during the quarter century since the high point of integration in 1988, the share of intensely segregated non-white schools (defined as those schools with fewer than 10% white students) more than tripled, increasing from 6% to 19% of all public schools. And another study found that white and Latino/a students are the most segregated subgroups of students.

A confluence of factors, including the drawing of district boundary lines, district secessions and annexations, and white flight, among other issues, have contributed to deepening contemporary segregation, most often between school districts.

Limitations of Race-Conscious Approaches to Integration and Magnet Schools

District demographic changes have been compounded by legal and political developments that have impacted voluntary desegregation programs, including magnet schools and their ability to foster school diversity. For example, legal challenges to race-conscious voluntary desegregation programs, including in the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case of *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*, created uncertainty about the extent to which student race could be considered in developing voluntary desegregation programs. As a result of the widespread uncertainty about ways to promote school diversity, many magnet schools and other desegregation programs departed from their original integrative missions.

Congressional prohibitions on the use of federal funds for transportation—an attempt to reduce busing in the 1970s—have also slowed desegregation. Further, changes to the federal Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP), the primary source of federal funding for magnet schools, have impacted the ability of magnet schools to expand. The MSAP has shifted its selection criteria to consideration of other factors in addition to school diversity and has not added incentives to address the evolving nature of school segregation. In addition, funding of the MSAP has declined in real dollar terms and has not kept pace with the demand for magnet schools nationwide. These changes have negatively affected the expansion of magnet schools as well as magnet schools' focus and goals.

The issuance of federal guidance by the Obama administration in 2011 sought to provide clarity to states and districts about permissible voluntary integration strategies by outlining legally permissible, evidence-based school diversity strategies, including magnet schools. However, that guidance was rescinded by the Trump administration in 2018, depriving districts of useful information for advancing school desegregation.

In this context of deepening school segregation, it is important to examine the evidence on the conditions in which magnet schools can innovate, improve the quality of education, boost the achievement of students, and promote integrated learning environments.

Components of Diverse Magnet Schools That Promote Positive Student Outcomes

Because magnet schools vary so significantly in theme, pedagogy, design, and implementation, it can be difficult for researchers to draw generalized conclusions about their effectiveness. As described in detail in the report, many, but not all, studies show positive effects of magnet schools on student outcomes. For example, a recent synthesis of research on magnet school effectiveness found positive effects in most studies on student achievement, attendance, and graduation rates. "Whole school" magnets and those without selective admissions policies have been generally found to be more effective at integration that supports achievement gains.

Research shows that diverse magnet schools that support positive social and academic outcomes share some common features. These components can be categorized as "first door" components,

which help to bring students from different backgrounds to magnet schools, and "second door" components, which help to foster inclusive environments and promote shared success for students of color within diverse magnet schools, without tracking them into separate classes that depress their opportunities for success.

First door components include:

- incorporation of integration into school design, mission, structure, and goals;
- intentional and ongoing family outreach and engagement;
- implementation of inclusive enrollment practices; and
- provision of free transportation.

Second door components include:

- access to the magnet school curriculum that is culturally responsive and program elements for all students throughout the school;
- culturally responsive curriculum and instruction;
- staff who are prepared to teach students from different backgrounds and cultures in heterogeneous classrooms;
- ongoing professional development opportunities for staff; and
- nondiscriminatory, restorative discipline practices.

Magnet schools need support to effectively implement evidence-based components. The following recommendations outline approaches at the federal, state, and district/local levels that can be taken to create and foster diverse and effective magnet schools.

Considerations to Help Create and Foster Diverse Magnet Schools

Diverse magnet schools that incorporate these components can be created and fostered through policies at the federal, state, district, and school levels, including:

At the federal level:

1. **Reinstating federal guidance to states and localities about evidence-based approaches to support school diversity, including magnet schools.** The guidance was a valuable resource for states and districts interested in accessing best practices for advancing voluntary integration efforts. To ensure that states and districts have access to evidence-based best practices, the guidance should be updated before it is reissued so that it can include current research on magnet schools and other school integration efforts to help inform voluntary school diversity programs.

2. **Expanding federal investments in magnet schools and using them to leverage school diversity and student success.** The MSAP was funded at just $107 million in 2020, compared to $440 million provided to charter schools, which research shows are often more segregated. The federal government can increase investment in the MSAP and strengthen the program, including by expanding eligibility for the program and prioritizing applicants that embed evidence-based components, like family outreach, into their school design. Further, the federal government can create another grant program to support local voluntary desegregation programs.

At the state level:

3. **Expanding strategic state and local investments in magnet schools in ways that support school diversity.** States can provide targeted grant funding, similar to the federal MSAP, to districts to create and sustain magnet schools. States can also ensure that state law permits interdistrict transfers that facilitate opportunities for students from surrounding districts to attend magnet schools and allocate funding, as Connecticut has, to support and incentivize student transfers to achieve diversity.

At the district level:

4. **Supporting school-level strategies that promote both integration and student success.** Districts can support first door practices, or those practices that will help to ensure that a diverse group of students walks through the front door of a magnet school together, including:

   - supporting ongoing outreach to diverse families through multiple platforms;
   - supporting schools in implementation of open and inclusive enrollment practices, such as lotteries, interviews, and essays, to attract students of color, English learners, and students from low-income families along with white and more affluent families to magnet schools; and
   - making strategic decisions about school siting and feeder patterns to optimize diversity and accessibility.

At the school level:

5. **Schools can implement second door efforts** that ensure that students within magnet schools are supported in positive, culturally affirming, and inclusive environments, including:

   - focusing on whole school magnet programs, which have been found to better foster diversity than "in-school" programs in otherwise diverse schools, and, to support this approach, supporting and preparing magnet school teachers to deliver instruction aligned with the school theme that is embedded in the curriculum, including through the provision of professional development opportunities;
   - providing innovative and culturally responsive curriculum to all students; and
   - implementing nonexclusionary, restorative school discipline policies and social and emotional learning in schools and supporting educators through ongoing training on implicit bias and anti-racism to aid educators in addressing bias and understanding how it may manifest in the school and classroom.

Introduction

As the nation reckons with the large and growing racial inequalities in health, employment, and education exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, it also confronts a history in which "separate but unequal" education was enshrined in law. Termed "slavery's sequel" by scholar Carter G. Woodson, segregation—including the persistence of segregated education—continues to stain our democracy.[1] Even decades after "separate but equal" was legally invalidated, racially segregated and unequal educational opportunities are still prevalent in the nation's public schools, with students of color and students from low-income families disproportionately attending racially isolated and underfunded public schools. The past instructs how imperative it remains to meaningfully integrate our nation's public schools and expand access to quality equal educational opportunities for all students. Not only do all students gain the academic and social benefits of integrated education, but the nation benefits from an informed and engaged citizenry.

This report examines how magnet schools—one important approach to achieving school integration—emerged among various efforts to combat segregation and how this approach can be strengthened in the years to come. Given the deepening resegregation of the nation's schools, examining the emergence and efficacy of magnets is both timely and useful, as the nation cannot continue to risk the educational futures of children to segregated and unequal educational opportunities.

This report begins by highlighting the research on the harms of segregation and the benefits of school integration for all students, along with the consequences of the status quo of segregation for students' short- and long-term educational outcomes and for our democracy. It then explores the federal government's role in advancing, and at times stymying, the progress of school integration and the implications for magnet schools. It outlines the evidence on magnet school components that are fostering school diversity and positive academic and social outcomes for students. This evidence is instructive of what can be done to promote the implementation and maintenance of magnet schools that are effective at achieving their original desegregative purpose. Finally, drawing upon this evidence, it outlines policy recommendations at the federal, state, and local levels to help to design, implement, and sustain effective magnet schools that can help to foster integrated learning and positive student outcomes.

Why Integration Matters

The negative effects of segregation

Considerable evidence over many decades shows that students graduating from racially segregated, high-poverty schools have poor achievement and long-term life outcomes. A number of studies have found strong relationships between racial segregation and racial achievement gaps; indeed, the racial composition of a school has educational impacts for students even after accounting for socioeconomic status, particularly due to resource inequities characterizing racially isolated schools.[2]

In a case that challenged school desegregation efforts in Jefferson County, KY, and Seattle, WA, more than 550 scholars signed on to a social science report filed as an amicus brief, which

summarized extensive research showing the persisting inequalities of segregated minority schools. The scholars concluded that:

> More often than not, segregated minority schools offer profoundly unequal educational opportunities. This inequality is manifested in many ways, including fewer qualified, experienced teachers, greater instability caused by rapid turnover of faculty, fewer educational resources, and limited exposure to peers who can positively influence academic learning. No doubt as a result of these disparities, measures of educational outcomes, such as scores on standardized achievement tests and high school graduation rates, are lower in schools with high percentages of nonwhite students.[3]

Data trends over time illustrate both the large reduction in the Black–white achievement gap during the era of desegregation and school finance reforms in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the gap decreased by more than 50%, and the large increase in the gap when desegregation efforts were ended during the 1980s. On the National Assessment of Educational Progress, Black 13-year-olds have gained only 4 points in reading since 1988, whereas white 13-year-olds have gained 9 points, leaving a gap that is nearly 30% larger today than it was 30 years ago.[4] Further, a 2019 study of every district in the United States found that racial school segregation is strongly associated with the magnitude of achievement gaps in 3rd grade, and with the rate at which gaps grow from 3rd to 8th grade.[5]

The academic benefits of integrated education

A substantial body of research has found that racially integrated learning environments have positive impacts on academic achievement for students of all races.[6] A synthesis of 4 decades of research demonstrates the academic benefits of attending diverse schools,[7] including:

- higher achievement in math, science, language, and reading;
- school climates supportive of learning and studying;
- increased likelihood of graduating from high school and entering and graduating from college;
- higher income and educational attainment;
- increased access to highly qualified teachers and leaders who are less likely to transfer to other schools;
- enhanced classroom discussion; and
- more advanced social and historical thinking.

Another recent research synthesis found that Black student achievement is improved by less segregated schooling, particularly in the earlier grades.[8] And for white students attending racially diverse schools, there is no negative impact on academic achievement. For example, in a large-scale study of the effects of court-ordered desegregation on students born between 1945 and 1970, economist Rucker Johnson found that graduation rates climbed by 2 percentage points for every year a Black student attended an integrated school.[9] Black students exposed to court-ordered desegregation for 5 years experienced a 15% increase in wages, an 11 percentage point decline in annual poverty rates, and a 22 percentage point decline in the probability of adult incarceration.[10]

These gains are tied to the fact that schools under court supervision benefited from higher per-pupil spending and smaller student–teacher ratios, among other resources. Alongside the positive outcomes for Black students, court-ordered desegregation caused no harm for white students.

As Johnson's study suggests, many of the benefits of desegregation occur as Black students gain access to additional school resources. Reinforcing this point, a national study of school finance reforms over 40 years found that, for students from low-income families who had 20% more spent on them over the 12 years of school, graduation rates increased by 23 percentage points, and their rates of adult poverty were so significantly reduced that the gap between them and their more affluent peers was eliminated.[11]

Magnet schools are generally designed to offer programs that are particularly innovative and often more costly than those of non-magnet schools. These offerings are attractive to many families of color because their goal has been to attain access to quality educational opportunities. In this context, some magnet schools have offered a way to achieve quality resources along with advancing integration goals.

The social benefits of integrated education

While much research focuses on the benefits that accrue to students of color who attend diverse schools, research has also documented the benefits for white students who attend diverse schools. A meta-analysis of more than 500 studies of intergroup contact across many kinds of organizations found that increased intergroup contact can have positive impacts on all groups by reducing prejudice, negative attitudes, and stereotypes.[12] Another analysis found that the intergroup contact theory operates in schools the same way it does in other environments, increasing positive relationships and friendships across racial lines.[13]

While much research focuses on the benefits that accrue to students of color who attend diverse schools, research has also documented the benefits for white students who attend diverse schools.

Furthermore, research shows that students' exposure to other students from different backgrounds and the new ideas and challenges that such exposure brings leads to improved critical thinking and problem-solving skills. Other benefits of attending diverse schools include increased civic participation in a diverse global economy and increased likelihood of living in integrated neighborhoods and holding jobs in integrated workplaces as adults.[14]

It follows that students attending diverse magnet schools should also reap the academic and social benefits associated with attending diverse schools, and the evidence, as described below, indicates that this is largely true. However, not all magnet schools have been effective in promoting school diversity. As described in more detail, district demographics along with magnet school design, structure, and focus—particularly the centering of school integration in the school mission and the design for family outreach—matter for school diversity.

Magnet Schools' Integrative Origins

While magnet schools can vary widely in design and structure, they were developed to fit the federal definition of "a public elementary school, public secondary school, public elementary education center, or public secondary education center that offers a special curriculum capable of attracting substantial numbers of students of different racial backgrounds."[15] The goal of magnet schools has been to achieve voluntary desegregation through parental choice rather than mandatory student assignment by offering unique and innovative specialized instruction and rigorous academic offerings designed to draw students to the school from various surrounding geographic areas.

One of the first official magnet schools is believed to be McCarver Elementary School in Tacoma, WA, which was established in 1968[16] as part of a controlled choice program designed to draw families to the school, which offered high-quality instruction and resources.[17] The school still exists—although it has experienced some academic challenges—and serves approximately 420 students, from preschool through 5th grade, from diverse backgrounds.[18] It was followed in 1969 by the William Monroe Trotter School in Boston (also focused on decreasing racial isolation) and others in Buffalo, NY; Houston; Minneapolis; and other major cities.[19] These districts worked to spur integration through innovative offerings. Their distinctive offerings, featuring unique curriculum and teaching methods, continue to draw students to magnet schools located in urban areas.[20] Facing less vocal opposition than race-based mandatory integration measures, magnet schools expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, as they were often identified as remedies in school desegregation cases.

Magnet schools have often been situated in urban districts with the goal of drawing white students into urban centers to attend them. This closely mirrors the federal definition.[21] Magnet schools can also operate to draw students from segregated city school districts to better-resourced suburban districts in whiter, more affluent suburbs, as Boston's Metco program and a regional choice program in Milwaukee (known as Chapter 220) have done.[22] Enrollment at magnet schools is completely voluntary, but the ability of students to exercise the choice to attend magnet schools depends on a variety of factors, including whether the magnet school operates on a regional basis and offers transportation.[23]

Research underscores a few distinguishing characteristics of magnet schools, including:

- a distinctive school curriculum organized around a specific special theme or method of instruction, such as a specific focus or themed curriculum centering on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) or the arts, or a specific emphasis, such as language immersion or specific learning techniques;
- voluntary enrollment elected by students and their parents; and
- choice across neighborhood, and sometimes district, boundaries (magnet school students are often drawn from many attendance zones, unlike other schools to which students are drawn because of the school's proximity).

Estimates of how many magnet schools are currently operating in the country depend, in part, on how one chooses to define a magnet school. While the definition outlined above is generally accepted, there are varying positions on whether to include in the definition of magnet schools those programs operating within schools (in-school programs) or whether only those magnet

programs embedded in the entire school (whole school magnets) should officially be considered magnet schools. Recent estimates of operating magnet schools range from 3,285 magnet schools (in 2014–15)[24] to as many as 4,340 magnet schools, educating over 3.5 million students nationwide.[25] The wide variation in estimates of magnet schools highlights the necessity for a widely agreed upon definition (particularly for policy and research purposes).

The integrative mission at the heart of the original magnet school concept differentiates magnet schools from other forms of school choice.

The integrative mission at the heart of the original magnet school concept differentiates magnet schools from other forms of school choice. However, due to a variety of legal and political developments—including demographic changes, absence of needed funding incentives to support integrated magnet schools, and limitations on mechanisms to accomplish desegregative goals—many magnet schools have departed from their integrative missions.[26] However, the demand for magnet schools has remained consistent over the decades. Magnet schools have expanded to comprise the largest sector of choice in the United States.[27]

These schools are needed more than ever today, given the resegregation of America's school systems that has been growing ever worse since the 1980s and the emergence of a growing sector of hypersegregated schools that are under-resourced and serve high concentrations of children in poverty.

The Nation's Ongoing History of Segregated Education

The system of segregation that followed on the heels of slavery was legalized in Jim Crow laws and further enshrined in public jurisprudence in the 1896 case of *Plessy v. Ferguson*,[28] which granted legal recognition to the "separate but equal" doctrine (also upheld in many places through statute, known as de jure segregation). Segregation was also adopted in practice, known as de facto segregation, and enforced through campaigns of racial violence. Over a century of legal challenges to racially segregated education culminated in 1954's *Brown v. Board of Education*, in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared that "'separate but equal' has no place in public education."[29] But the remnants of this system—still deeply embedded in law, policy, and practice—persist in the form of public schools that are racially segregated and inequitably resourced.

School segregation past and present

Brown did not magically desegregate the nation's schools. Following *Brown*, a variety of tactics, including school district boundary changes, secessions, annexations, and detachments, were used to circumvent desegregation. In the face of noncompliance with desegregation orders by states and districts, significant progress did not occur until the 1960s, when the Kennedy–Johnson administration mobilized all branches of the federal government—legislative, executive, and judiciary—to advance school integration. By the end of 1966, the Johnson administration "had terminated federal funds for thirty-two southern school districts based on their refusal to end racial segregation in schools."[30]

Strengthened by passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 (ESAA) provided grants to districts that were working to desegregate their schools. They also allowed funds to be used to retrain teachers and develop more diverse and inclusive curricular materials.[31] Federal enforcement efforts hastened the pace of school integration.

Federal aid to support magnet schools originated in an amendment to the ESAA. The integrative goals for magnet grantees were clear, as grantees were required to advance the ESAA's statutory goals of reducing, eliminating, and preventing racial isolation and promoting equity. Also, because magnets were one program funded among other desegregation programs in the law, they were evaluated based on their effectiveness in desegregating schools. Therefore, ESAA-funded magnets were focused on desegregation and not focused on other educational objectives. This changed after the elimination of the ESAA and the creation of the stand-alone Magnet School Assistance Program in 1984 (which added objectives in addition to ones related to desegregation).

The ESAA program helped to expand magnet schools. In 1976, the first year that the ESAA provided funding for magnet schools, 14 school districts applied for funding. Four years later, over 100 districts submitted applications.[32] Federal support played a significant role in the expansion of magnet schools. Between 1982 and 1992, the number of magnet schools more than doubled, to 2,433, and the number of students served in magnet programs more than tripled, to 1.2 million.[33] By the turn of the century, there were more than 3,000 magnet schools with explicit desegregation standards educating about 2.5 million students.[34]

Desegregation was also supported by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, which issued regulations and authorized the then–U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to investigate complaints

of discriminatory behavior by recipients of federal funds, conduct compliance reviews, and initiate enforcement proceedings against noncompliant school districts.[35]

The focus of federal resources on school desegregation for that time made a significant impact. In 1961, only 6% of Black children in the South attended schools with white children,[36] but by 1973, almost 90% of Southern schoolchildren attended integrated schools.[37] Studies of the effects of the desegregation of Southern school districts during the high point of desegregation in the 1970s and 1980s show that desegregation had a positive impact on Black students and no negative impact on white students.[38]

Racial achievement gaps declined substantially during the 1970s and early 1980s, showing that desegregation, in combination with school funding reforms, could promote improved educational outcomes. Indeed, from 1964 to 1969 and during the 1970s and 1980s, all three branches of the federal government worked collaboratively to advance desegregation. If the pace of reform had continued as it had during that time, the so-called achievement gap could have been fully closed by the beginning of the 21st century.[39]

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The Federal Retreat and School Resegregation

The 1969 election of President Richard Nixon signaled the initial retreat of the executive branch from staunch support of school integration efforts. Nixon advanced an anti-integration agenda that included ending administrative enforcement of desegregation mandates and changing the position of the Department of Justice from "proactive enforcement" of desegregation to "passive acceptance" of segregation.[40]

The 1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* significantly hampered the efforts of Nixon and other anti-integrationists because it confirmed the federal judiciary's equitable powers to act to remedy past school segregation, including through approval of local plans involving busing as a mechanism to achieve integration.[41]

But Nixon, with the cooperation of the legislative branch, responded to *Swann* with prohibitions on use of federal funds to support transportation for school integration. Nixon supported the inclusion of anti-busing language in the reauthorization of the ESAA grant program for districts working to desegregate public schools, prohibiting use of funds for busing to "overcome racial imbalance."[42] Opposition to busing was undergirded by racial animus, reflecting that deep racial divisions existed in Congress and throughout the country. Prohibition on federal funds for busing was further solidified through passage of an amendment, Section 426 of the 1974 General Education Provisions Act, barring use of federal funds for the transportation of students or teachers (or the purchase of equipment for such transportation) for school desegregation. This language was only recently removed in the fiscal year 2021 appropriations cycle.[43]

Nixon also departed from federal court precedent on desegregation, and his U.S. Supreme Court appointees decided the first divided desegregation cases following the *Brown* ruling. The Court was

reluctant to remedy any segregation it deemed de facto or resulting from private choices and not enshrined in law in many subsequent cases. Among the most significant of these cases was 1974's *Milliken v. Bradley*,[44] in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a school desegregation program that included busing for Detroit public schools and the surrounding majority-white suburbs. In Detroit, as in many other Northern cities, white flight resulted in many urban centers comprised mostly of Black people. As a result, measures like busing were introduced to transcend the residential segregation resulting from white flight. In holding that the white suburbs did not have to be included in the desegregation plan because they did not intentionally cause the segregation of Detroit's public schools, the Court effectively permitted circumvention of school desegregation through white flight to surrounding suburbs. Essentially, the Court ruled that racially segregated schools that resulted from individual citizen residential choices did not amount to discriminatory state action.

The legal cover afforded to "white island districts" has allowed them to persist, while students in urban centers like Baltimore and Detroit attend schools as segregated as those of the pre-*Brown* era, characterized by high teacher turnover, limited curricular offerings, and crumbling facilities.[45] Other divisive policies, such as discriminatory housing policies that fortified racially segregated neighborhoods and the drawing of district boundary lines in racially divisive ways, have contributed to the endurance of segregated schools.

Retrenchment of segregation was deepened further during the Reagan administration. The administration favored voluntary school desegregation remedies and opposed race-conscious or mandatory remedies, instead deferring to state and local control and reducing federal enforcement efforts.[46] Funding for integration efforts, including magnet school funding, was struck a significant blow when the Reagan-backed Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 was passed, terminating funding for the ESAA. The elimination of the ESAA signaled federal disinvestment from supporting state and local school desegregation efforts.

However, funding for magnet schools was restored through the creation of the Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP) as a stand-alone program in 1984 to support magnet schools as a strategy that districts could invoke to further desegregation aims with the imprimatur to expand parental choice in education. The MSAP provides federal funds to assist in the desegregation of public schools by supporting the elimination, reduction, and prevention of minority group isolation in elementary and secondary schools with substantial numbers of minority group students.[47] The MSAP played a role in the initial expansion of magnet programs.[48]

Once again, additional limits on how integration could be pursued were imposed during the George W. Bush administration. Upon taking office, the administration diverted the focus of the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights away from k–12 desegregation enforcement.[49] This followed a series of legal challenges in the 1990s to magnet schools seeking to advance desegregation, including the Supreme Court case of *Missouri v. Jenkins*, in which the Court struck down a Kansas City interdistrict magnet plan, finding that the surrounding districts were not responsible for the district's segregated schools.[50] Following these decisions, the key mechanisms for diversifying magnet schools—specifically, intentional desegregation goals and accountability for meeting those goals—were undermined and civil rights policies were often abandoned.[51]

Further, the Bush administration eliminated desegregation orders in nearly 200 districts,[52] and without court oversight, segregation deepened. Efforts to voluntarily combat segregation were hampered by the 2007 case of *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1* (*Parents Involved*).[53]

Limitations on Race-Conscious Approaches to Integration

The Bush administration reversed the Department of Justice's position in the 2007 case of *Parents Involved*, in which Bush's Department of Justice argued in its brief that race should not be considered as a factor in voluntary programs designed to achieve racially integrated education.[54] *Parents Involved* is distinct from other desegregation cases in that it concerned the extent to which race could be used in voluntary programs not under court order to remedy past discrimination. Court-ordered desegregation programs have wide latitude to use race in devising strategies to dismantle segregation, but the Jefferson County, KY, and Seattle programs challenged in the case were not under court order at the time they were challenged (although Jefferson County's program began under a court order and continued on a voluntary basis). Voluntary programs do not have similar latitude, and *Parents Involved* fueled more uncertainty about this issue. The case was consequential for magnet schools, which can be used in both court-ordered and voluntary programs, as well as for other integration programs.

The Court recognized that reducing racial isolation and achieving racial diversity were compelling government interests, but it divided over the circumstances under which individual student race could be considered in making student assignments. The Court concluded that districts can consider student race broadly (without relying on individual student race in making student assignment decisions) in voluntary desegregation programs if they have a compelling interest for using student race and can adopt plans narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The Court also noted that districts could adopt general race-neutral policies to encourage a diverse student body.[55] Chief Justice John Roberts advocated for a colorblind approach to overcome racism.

Justice Anthony Kennedy emphasized that "the decision today should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds."[56] He underscored that mechanisms may be used that do not lead to different treatment based on classifying individual students by race, including race-neutral and general policies to encourage diversity. Race-neutral approaches "allow school districts to be aware of or to consider the racial or ethnic outcomes in developing plans so long as no specific student is assigned to a school based on his or her individual student race."[57]

Policies that do not rely upon individual student race, Kennedy noted, are consistent with the Court's reasoning. Kennedy outlined permissible approaches to fostering school integration, including strategic school siting decisions, drawing attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood demographics, allocating resources for special programs, and targeting recruitment for diverse students and faculty. For example, a magnet school enrollment or student assignment policy that considers a student's geographic location or socioeconomic status may be considered a race-neutral approach that is likely to result in fostering student diversity.

Kennedy outlined permissible approaches to fostering school integration, including strategic school siting decisions, drawing attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood demographics, allocating resources for special programs, and targeting recruitment for diverse students and faculty.

However, widespread uncertainty followed the ruling—compounded by the issuance of a 2008 "Dear Colleague" letter by the Bush administration narrowly interpreting the ruling and failing to recognize the Supreme Court's conclusion that districts have a compelling interest in promoting school integration and avoiding racial isolation.[58] It also failed to acknowledge the evidence-based approaches to advance these interests—like magnet schools—outlined in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. This guidance contributed to the lack of clarity about the extent to which (and even whether) race could be considered in making student assignment decisions to voluntarily achieve integration. As a result, many advocates "scrambled to devise and identify plans they believed would pass constitutional muster, knowing that failure to do so would effectively concede the end of desegregation in our nation's schools."[59]

The confusion has impacted the ability of many schools, including magnet schools, to voluntarily adopt or maintain integration goals, despite the fact that Kennedy's opinion made clear that the means for admitting students had to be race-neutral, but not the goal itself. Many have grappled with how magnet schools can meet their racial diversity goals through race-neutral means. For example, "In Connecticut … school officials who help manage the state's magnet school program worry about losing funding if they are unable to maintain the required racial balance."[60]

In an effort to provide clarity on the decision to states and districts, the Obama administration issued guidance in 2011 outlining a range of evidence-based strategies for reducing racial isolation and fostering racial diversity, including the creation of magnet schools and other strategies consistent with Kennedy's concurring opinion.[61]

The Trump administration rescinded the Obama administration's guidance on school diversity in July 2018 and replaced it with the post–*Parents Involved* Bush-era policy document referenced above. The Trump document stated, "The Department of Education strongly encourages the use of race-neutral methods for assigning students to elementary and secondary schools."[62] While guidance is nonbinding and does not have the effect of law, it often sends a message about an administration's position on an issue and sometimes includes evidence-based strategies and resources, both of which can influence state and district policies and practices. The Trump administration's rescission of the Obama guidance signaled a federal retreat, once again, from desegregation efforts. It compounded misunderstanding about the extent to which race can be considered in crafting school integration programs and policies, and it deprived states and districts of the valuable resource of evidence-based strategies for fostering diversity.

In the face of legal challenges and uncertainty, many magnet schools—along with other schools—have retreated from their original race-conscious integrative missions and proactive diversity efforts. This does not mean that the commitment to diversity does not exist, but rather that clarity on how to achieve it without running afoul of the law remains elusive. In response to legal challenges, shifting education priorities, and MSAP priorities, among other influences, some magnets have focused more on other factors, such as socioeconomic diversity, in addition to, or in lieu of, racial diversity. While socioeconomic status and other factors are important considerations, they are not interchangeable with the integrative purpose of magnet schools.[63]

Segregation Today

As a result of these actions, about half as many Black students now attend integrated schools than was the case in the 1980s. One study found that, on average, a Black student attends a school in which two thirds of his or her classmates (64%) are from low-income families, compared to white and Asian students who, on average, attend schools in which classmates from low-income families comprise 37% and 39% of their peers, respectively.[64] Since 1988, the high point of integration, the share of intensely segregated non-white schools (defined as those schools with only 0–10% white students) more than tripled, increasing from about 6% to 19% of all public schools.[65] (See Figure 1.) A national study of districts and charters found that, nationwide, more than one third of all Black and Latino/a students attend schools that are more than 90% non-white.[66]

Figure 1
Percentage of Intensely Segregated Schools, 1988–2013



Data sources: Orfield, G., Ee, J., Frankenberg, E., & Siegel-Hawley, G. (2016). Brown *at 62: School segregation by race, poverty and state*. The Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles. https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf (accessed 02/21/19); U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (n.d.). Common Core of Data, Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey Data. https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp (accessed 01/19/19).

Conversely, a large proportion of white students attended overwhelmingly racially isolated schools, with more than one third attending schools that are 90–100% white.[67] White and Latino/a students are the most segregated subgroups of students, with white students attending, on average, a school in which 69% of the students are white, and Latino/a students attending a school in which 55% of the students are Latino/a.[68] In fact, "segregation has been increasing steadily, creating a growing number of apartheid schools that serve almost exclusively students of color from low-income families."[69] For example, 74% of Black students attend majority non-white schools (50–100% minority), and 15% of Black students and 14% of Latino/a students attend "apartheid schools" in which white students make up 0% to 1% of the enrollment.[70]

Further, a 2016 study found that a growing percentage of k–12 public schools in the nation are hypersegregated, with largely Black and Latino/a student populations and students from low-income families.[71] This is significant, as another study reviewing 8 years of data from all U.S. public school districts found that racial segregation appears to undermine achievement, in part, because it concentrates minority students in high-poverty schools, which are, on average, less effective than lower-poverty schools.[72] These high-poverty schools tend to be under-resourced.[73] A 2018 study found that, nationally, the highest poverty districts in our country receive about $1,000 less per student than the lowest poverty districts.[74] These funding gaps are even more significant when the additional educational needs of students from low-income families are considered, with the same study estimating that it costs a district 40% more to educate a student in poverty.[75]

The disparities are even more stark when race is considered. A 2019 study found that districts serving mostly students of color spend on average $2,200 less per pupil than whiter and wealthier districts do.[76] These resource inequities are undergirded by the lower property values prevalent in lower-wealth districts, where many students of color have been concentrated. Consequently, higher-wealth, predominantly white districts are able to garner more revenue for education, even when imposing lower tax rates, due to higher property values.

Even when states seek to equalize disparities by providing more funding to lower-wealth districts, it has been difficult to counteract the effects of long-standing patterns of segregation and resource inequities between districts to completely mitigate the disparities. This is why a primary goal of desegregation is not just about changing the racial composition of schools, but also about expanding access to quality resources. Or, as some scholars phrased it: "Sitting next to a white student does not guarantee better educational outcomes for students of color. Instead, the resources that are consistently linked to predominantly white and/or wealthy schools help foster real and serious educational advantages over minority segregated settings."[77]

Of course, changing demographics, including movement of families of color to the suburbs and white families returning to city centers, has impacted deeply entrenched residential segregation, but the relationship between metropolitan school segregation, interdistrict disparities, and residential segregation remains a significant one.[78] Particularly because students are often assigned to schools in their local communities, neighborhood demographics can dictate school demographics. Research demonstrates that, as a result, racial composition differences across district boundary lines contribute more to segregation than differences within them.[79]

Research demonstrates that racial composition differences across district boundary lines contribute more to segregation than differences within them.

District boundaries and increasing segregation between districts have made it more difficult for magnet schools to draw integrated populations, as many of them were designed to focus on segregation within a district rather than between districts.[80] For example, when Prince George's County, MD, attempted to launch a magnet program, because the district was composed mainly of

students of color, the district's magnet schools remained predominantly Black even though racial balance guidelines were implemented.[81] This phenomenon is not isolated to Prince George's County, as many districts are racially isolated, as described earlier in this report.

Despite deepening school segregation and recognition of the mechanisms that fuel it, efforts to integrate schools continue to be met with opposition and even apathy, as scholars have observed: "The country has retreated from the belief that segregation itself is harmful, quietly settling for an education policy regime that accepts segregated schools as a given."[82]

Contemporary segregation has persisted. However, efforts have been waged to desegregate schools, and magnet schools have been a key part of this effort.

Magnet Schools Today

Magnet Schools in the Context of Contemporary Segregation

As discussed above, segregation among districts has material consequences, including racial isolation accompanied by resource inequities, with white and wealthier districts generating more per-pupil spending than districts composed mainly of students of color and students from lower-wealth families. In the resegregated context of today's schools, regional interventions designed to transcend residential segregation are particularly important for promoting integrated education.

Although most magnet schools are established by school districts, others are founded on a regional basis. For example, Connecticut's regional magnet schools have operated for about 20 years, with magnet school enrollment comprising about 8% of the state's total district public school enrollment.[83] Magnet schools in Connecticut emerged as a result of a significant state supreme court desegregation case, *Sheff v. O'Neill*,[84] which invalidated the drawing of district boundary lines that had segregating effects on schools. The state turned to magnet schools as a way to address the court's concern. Today, the state has about 95 magnet schools—including more than 50 interdistrict magnet schools, serving 44,495 students[85]—in regions including metropolitan Hartford, New Haven, and Waterford. The state's magnets have both supported desegregation and achieved positive results for students, with 7 of the state's 19 Blue Ribbon public schools being magnet schools.[86] (See "Interdistrict Magnets: A Snapshot of Hartford, CT," below.)

Interdistrict Magnets: A Snapshot of Hartford, CT

Interdistrict programs, like the magnet program in the Hartford, CT, region that resulted from the *Sheff* litigation, have proven successful in drawing diverse students to magnet schools. The program encouraged two-way transfers between Hartford schools and those of surrounding districts. Families can now select from 44 magnet schools in addition to the Open Choice program (for 28 non-magnet districts) in the Greater Hartford region.[87] Hartford's program relies upon cooperation and coordination between the urban and suburban districts to help facilitate the transfer of students and sustain investments in the program.

Strategic investments have been key in helping to build and sustain the program, including investments of $1.4 billion in school construction over the first 10 years, per-pupil grants to receiving districts to help make the interdistrict transfers attractive and affordable, coverage of transportation costs for out-of-district pupils (up to a maximum of $2,000 per student), and provision of an additional $350,000 for marketing campaigns through its Regional School Choice Office.[88] The community engagement investments are particularly robust and aid in placement of diverse students within the magnet schools. The program also engages in targeted marketing to help attract diverse students; a 2012–13 study showed that magnet school enrollments in the state were more equally distributed across racial subgroups than statewide enrollment.[89]

And the program has demonstrated positive outcomes. A study of the program that focused on estimating the effects on achievement found that attending an interdistrict magnet high school had positive effects on both mathematics and reading achievement of central city Hartford students. The authors concluded that "interdistrict magnets are largely meeting their mission of providing learning environments that are both more diverse and more conducive to academic achievement than would otherwise be available to students in Connecticut's central cities."[90] City magnet students reported more positive intergroup relations with less racial tension and more feelings of closeness to students of other races, with magnet students expressing stronger future multicultural interests. Other research also showed smaller achievement gaps between student racial subgroups compared to state averages.[91]

A continuing challenge of Hartford's popular magnet program is that funding has not enabled the program to expand to meet the demand for spots in the region's 20 magnet schools.[92] Additional investment would enable magnet schools like those in the Hartford region to better meet demand.

Omaha, NE, demonstrates another example of an open enrollment plan designed to address deeply entrenched housing segregation. After failed attempts to implement strategies to promote school diversity, an interdistrict desegregation program—the Learning Community—was launched. The regional governance system, the Learning Community Coordinating Council (LCCC), was tasked with supporting high-poverty schools. The program included three major changes for districts: regional governance, tax-base sharing and resource distribution, and a diversity plan.[93] The program allowed for voluntary transfers to the 11 Learning Community school districts, prioritizing students who enhanced the program's socioeconomic diversity for placement. The initial Open Enrollment plan funded districts to establish magnet schools or focus schools (which are themed schools similar to magnet schools that draw students from 11 school districts). This plan also funded transportation to increase diversity, enrolling thousands of students each year, demonstrating wide appeal for many parents. Three years of LCCC evaluations compared the performance of Open Enrollment students on 3rd- to 8th-grade reading and mathematics assessments to their resident counterparts. In low-poverty schools, Open Enrollment students who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch scored dramatically higher than peers in high-poverty schools in both reading and mathematics in all tested grades.[94] While the program has changed and continues to be impacted by state and local political considerations, there are some features of the program that direct resources into high-poverty and traditionally marginalized communities. The program has been cited as a successful approach that should be considered in diversity strategies, including mobility policies such as interdistrict magnet programs that enable movement across district boundary lines, as well as in-place investments.

The legal and political challenges that have impacted the regional programs in Connecticut and Nebraska illustrate the significance of context for integration efforts like magnet schools. In particular, the influence of the federal legislative, judicial, and executive branches has been significant for both progress and regress of school integration efforts. As described below, magnet schools have evolved in response to these legal and political influences and, in some cases, have deviated from their integrative origins. However, these legal and political influences need not mean that magnet schools remain detached from their original desegregative mission. Instead, these developments can provide a blueprint for how the federal government—in cooperation with state and local governments—can support integrative magnet schools and how magnet schools can reconnect with their missions.

Magnet Schools in the Context of Legal and Political Reversals

Magnet schools post–*Parents Involved*

While magnet schools had endured legal challenges preceding the *Parents Involved* ruling, the legal uncertainty surrounding the *Parents Involved* decision had a substantial impact on magnet schools and their historic race-conscious approach to fostering diversity.[95] District recipients of magnet school funding reported federal administration reviews of their student assignment policies that were critical of magnet schools' integration efforts using race as a criterion for admission.[96]

These federal developments, coupled with other long-standing legal challenges, influenced the shift of many magnet schools' objectives away from their integrative missions. As a result, many magnet school objectives focused on academic achievement or other outcomes, rather than on racial integration. Some of these objectives were first added after the *Nation at Risk* report in 1983.[97] Other iterations of the MSAP, including those that followed the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (a version of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act), expanded grantee focus and obligations over the years—such as adding several components in addition to reducing racial isolation—and have gradually tempered the program's original focus on magnet schools' efficacy in desegregation.

The MSAP's selection criteria have shifted to include factors beyond fostering interaction among students of different social, economic, ethnic, and racial backgrounds and improving the racial balance of students in magnet schools.[98] The Secretary of Education reviews applicants to determine (among other things) how applicants will carry out a high-quality educational program that will substantially strengthen students' reading skills; their knowledge of mathematics, science, history, geography, English, foreign languages, art, and music; or their vocational, technological, and professional skills.[99]

Currently, the program and its requirements are outlined in Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The most recent iteration of the law, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), made a few changes to the MSAP, including:

- extending the grant term from 3 years to up to 5 years;
- increasing the cumulative grant award from $12 million to $15 million for each grantee;
- permitting grantees to use funds for transportation as long as the funds are sustainable past the grant period and a significant portion is not used for student transportation; and
- prioritizing the creation and replication of evidence-based magnet programs and magnet schools that seek to reduce, eliminate, or prevent minority group isolation by taking into account socioeconomic diversity.

The program has not added incentives to address school segregation's evolving nature. For example, the program could include incentives for districts to implement interdistrict approaches. The MSAP could replicate incentives included in legislation recently reintroduced in the House of Representatives, the Strength in Diversity Act, which would provide federal funding to

support voluntary local integration efforts, such as interdistrict programs.[100] The MSAP's current shortcomings not only limit the focus of grantees on furthering desegregation, but also undermine the program's overall effectiveness in fulfilling its original purpose.

Limited funding has also restricted the ability of the program to fulfill its purposes. Over the past 30 years, the federal MSAP has granted $3 billion to districts to create or significantly revise magnet schools.[101] In real dollar terms, this represents a decrease in funding over time. Throughout these years, the small allocation for magnet schools has been far less than the demand from the field for start-up and expansion funds. In 1984, the MSAP was funded at $75 million. Current funding for the program is $109 million, which is less than a quarter of current funding for charter schools, which have been shown to be more segregative.[102] The National Coalition on School Diversity distributed a letter to Congress for the fiscal year 2022 appropriations cycle requesting that the program be funded "at least" at $500 million.[103] The current funding represents a relatively small amount of federal support given the important role magnet schools can play in creating more integrated education settings.

Key Findings: Diversity and Student Outcomes in Magnet Schools

Given the wide-ranging expectations for magnet schools to innovate, to improve the quality of education, to boost the achievement of students, and to desegregate learning environments, it is important to examine what we know about the conditions under which a variety of these goals have been achieved.

Considerations for Magnet School Diversity: "Whole School" Magnets and District Demographics

Research shows that magnet schools can effectively foster school diversity and positive outcomes,[104] but magnet school design and implementation matter for success.[105] Specifically, research demonstrates those magnet schools that most effectively foster school diversity share key features, including the incorporation of integration into school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals; intentional and ongoing family outreach and engagement; implementation of inclusive enrollment practices; and provision of free transportation.

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In addition, whole school magnets in which all students in the school participate in the magnet program can be more diverse than in-school magnet programs.[106] This does not mean that in-school magnet programs cannot be diverse or that some do not strive to be. But data show that tracking can occur in these programs, particularly when schools are designed to recruit white students by offering an in-school magnet program, while non-magnet students in the school are served in different programs. Not surprisingly, this approach can result in a situation in which students within the magnet programs are predominantly white, while those in the traditional programs are taught separately, although there may be some elective classes such as band, art, or physical education that enroll a more diverse group of students.[107] This practice of tracking students into magnet programs is consistent with the widespread practice of tracking in public schools, in which white students are tracked into higher-level courses and Black students and other students of color are relegated to lower-level courses. This practice deepens segregation and the unequal allocation of curricula and teaching resources within schools.[108]

One example of this challenge is found in Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) in Maryland. Like many other districts, MCPS developed magnet programs in the 1970s to maintain diversity and avoid racial isolation, but it later adopted competitive criteria for some of the magnet programs, identifying them as limited to "gifted and talented" students based on standardized test

scores. This practice negatively impacted diversity within the magnet programs. Consequently, a study found significant racial and socioeconomic disparities, with low numbers of students of color and students from low-income families being accepted and enrolled in academically selective programs in the district.[109] Further, the study found that even with the placement of selective programs—like magnet programs—within otherwise diverse schools, "in the absence of targeted mechanisms to integrate the program participants and non-participants, … [the magnet initiative] created conditions of within-school separation."[110] This phenomenon is not isolated to MCPS; similar outcomes have emerged from several other districts. The district has since implemented changes to its selective entrance practices, shifting from an application-based process that was largely parent driven to universal screening, which means that more students have been screened for admission than in prior years. School officials note that the selection process is "name blind" and "race blind," but these enrollment changes have garnered backlash, including litigation on behalf of Asian American students that alleges that changes to the programs' enrollment process have disadvantaged Asian students by reducing their representation in the programs.[111] Like many other districts, the MCPS example demonstrates that changes to enrollment practices can be difficult to implement. The concluding section of this paper offers some considerations for district leaders and policymakers as they approach the implementation and maintenance of diverse and effective magnet schools.

Another important consideration is magnet school geographic context, including existing district demographics, which can impact school diversity.[112] For example, a study examining data from the 8th-grade wave of the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study found that, while magnet schools did not lead to increased stratification of students of color, levels of integration were similar to those in traditional public schools, after controlling for district racial composition.[113] This finding could be interpreted to mean that magnets did not increase integration; however, it could also be interpreted to mean that magnets—if created in racially isolated neighborhoods within larger city or county districts, as is often the case—increase the diversity of schools in their neighborhoods to the levels found in the district as a whole.

A study of Prince George's County, MD, which attempted to implement a magnet school program whose school demographics reflected the racial composition of the school system, illustrates the challenges of district demographics in many communities. Because, due to white flight, the district was composed primarily of students of color, students often ended up assigned to racially homogenous schools even in the context of a magnet school program.[114] This example demonstrates that it is important to consider the district racial composition when creating a magnet school program, particularly because an increasing share of racial and ethnic segregation in American public schools occurs between, not within, school districts. For a district that has become more racially isolated over time, like Prince George's County, an interdistrict approach that draws students from several surrounding districts, as described more fully in the next section, may be a more viable option to achieve diversity.

Some design features in the Prince George's County initiative did reduce segregation. The study found that magnet schools were more integrated at the classroom level (particularly for honors and mathematics classes) than was generally the case in other schools, with increased classroom-level diversity noted between white and Latino/a students.[115] At the same time, it concluded that, while Black students were not disadvantaged in magnet schools compared to traditional public schools,

their access to these higher-level courses did not increase to the same extent, and it urged more focus on extending diversity to the classroom level for Black students.[116]

These contextual considerations are consistent with other research noting that magnet school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals have profound implications for magnet school effectiveness in fostering and sustaining school diversity.

Magnet Schools and Student Social and Academic Outcomes

Because magnet schools vary so significantly in theme, pedagogy, design, and implementation, it can be difficult for researchers to draw generalized conclusions about their effectiveness. As we describe in this section, many, but not all, studies show positive effects of magnet schools on student outcomes. A recent synthesis of research on magnet school effectiveness found positive effects in most studies on student achievement, attendance, and graduation rates, particularly for secondary magnet schools and for those that admit students by lottery. Positive results were found across large-scale national studies, studies of statewide programs, and local analyses using rigorous comparison group designs.[117] Researchers noted that it is unsurprising to find diverse conclusions in studies of the effects of magnet schools on student achievement, given the different themes, student populations, designs, and implementation contexts in which they operate.

A recent synthesis of research on magnet school effectiveness found positive effects in most studies on student achievement, attendance, and graduation rates, particularly for secondary magnet schools and for those that admit students by lottery.

Consistent with the findings of this meta-analysis, research shows particularly positive effects at higher grade levels. After controlling for a variety of student-level factors, a study tracking the outcomes of 48,561 Los Angeles Unified School District high school students found that the district's magnet program students graduated at much higher rates than non-magnet students: 73% of students attending a magnet high school graduated, compared to 43% of students not attending a magnet high school.[118]

Similarly, a study of Hartford's interdistrict magnet high schools found high percentages of students meeting or exceeding goals on state achievement exams and reporting positive academic attitudes and behaviors.[119] The study concluded that the state's magnet high schools provide academic environments that support student learning. According to the Capitol Region Education Council (CREC), Black and Latino/a students who attended CREC Magnet Schools outperformed their peers across the state in both math and reading on the Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT) and Connecticut Academic Performance Test, with "76.4% of black Hartford resident students attending a CREC Magnet School [achieving] proficiency in reading on the CMT, compared to 64.5% of black students statewide."[120]

Another study of Connecticut magnet high schools found that magnet students were also exposed to academic climates and peer support that fostered higher educational expectations.[121] A national study found that both student achievement levels and rates of gain in achievement were higher in

magnet schools than in regular public high schools or private schools for similar students.[122] One survey also found higher rates of teacher retention in integrated magnet schools, which also has positive effects for student outcomes.[123]

The most available measure of academic achievement in these studies is primarily the limited assessments of mathematics and language. Yet many magnet schools offer innovative educational experiences outside of the traditional curriculum focused on mathematics and language—including themes like aeronautics—that would be even more appropriate outcomes for evaluating their programs. A study found that students attending magnet schools reported more positive peer influences of adults in their schools regarding college expectations, better intergroup relations, and less racial isolation, compared to student reports from traditional city or suburban schools studied. Students also reported experiencing strong norms supporting peer achievement.[124]

The few studies that found little or no effect of magnet schools on student academic outcomes were often examining schools or programs with selective enrollment. As a result, after controlling for students' initial ability, the studies concluded that the magnet program did not show a positive additional influence on achievement.[125] By contrast, a study of San Diego magnet school students found that acceptance via lottery into a nonselective magnet school was linked to positive gains in mathematics achievement for students extending 2 and 3 years into the program.[126]

Two studies controlling for the self-selection bias that may operate in schools of choice found no significant differences in student achievement between magnet high schools and comprehensive public high schools serving similar students.[127] Selection bias and the extent to which it may impact magnet school student outcomes (just as it may impact student outcomes in other schools) presents an area for further study and analysis.

It is important to understand what differentiates successful magnets from less successful schools and programs. A recent meta-analysis of research on the effectiveness of 24 magnet schools located in 5 districts across 4 states in promoting positive student outcomes explored these differentials in student outcomes.[128] The study used a set of rigorous statistical strategies to construct comparison groups of matching students for each school within its district. In addition to finding widely variable outcomes across schools, the study also documented that the variation in school effects was explained by factors influencing program implementation and support. In particular, programs that had high fidelity of implementation and that were able to access strong support from magnet resource teachers had much stronger outcomes than those that struggled to implement their plans and to gain the instructional support they needed.[129] In the cases in which schools struggled to get resource teacher support, Black students suffered the most, reinforcing the need for educator training to serve diverse students well.

As mentioned previously, magnet schools differ significantly in design, implementation, and student population, which makes comparisons complicated. The next section examines components of magnet schools that research has identified as important for supporting both their integrative purposes and their ability to support students' learning successfully.

Components of Effective Magnet Schools

As noted above, research shows that when magnet schools receive assistance from their districts, they tend to be well implemented and to support student learning more effectively. One study categorized these components as "first door" components—features that help draw diverse families to magnet schools—and "second door" components—those that foster inclusiveness and that help retain students within diverse magnet schools.[130] These features are described in further detail below.

First door components

Integration embedded into school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals: Magnet schools with integrative missions incorporated into their school design, structure, and goals have been found to be more diverse than magnet schools that fail to intentionally incorporate diversity into school design, structure, and goals.[131] This is important, as a survey of hundreds of magnet school leaders found the highest percentages of one-race magnet schools were those that did not have desegregation goals.[132] This is exemplified in several prominent districts that retreated from their race-conscious integration goals, including Buffalo, NY; Charlotte, NC; and San Francisco, CA, and experienced declining school integration as a result.[133] Another example is Boston Latin School, an exam school, which in 1995 boasted that one out of every three students was Black or Latino/a.[134] But after legal challenges resulted in the removal of racial/ethnic goals from the school's enrollment criteria and in changes to the enrollment process (including abandoning set-asides for students of color), that ratio fell to one out of every six students being Black or Latino/a in 2005.[135]

Like other schools, magnet schools have been impacted by the changing demographic and legal landscape. The first federal report on magnet schools receiving federal funds through the MSAP (districts under court-ordered desegregation), released in 1983, found that more than 60% of magnet schools studied were "fully desegregated," with the sample reporting substantial progress on diversity.[136] But following release of many districts from federal court oversight, that progress was reversed. The 1996 report found only 42% of the MSAP programs were operating under desegregation goals, and the 2003 study reported 57% of magnet programs making progress in desegregation, attributing rising rates of segregation to pressure to implement race-neutral approaches to diversity.[137]

Since then, as many more districts have become majority minority, it has become difficult to diversify schools using within-district strategies for that reason as well, making interdistrict strategies more important.

It is important for magnet schools to incorporate diversity in school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals and for states and districts to design programs in ways that can accomplish this diversity using both across- and within-district approaches. It is also important to implement accountability mechanisms, such as regular evaluation and recommitment to diversity, to prevent straying from the core, historic magnet goal of integration. This may mean targeted recruitment strategies both within and, often, across districts (e.g., outreach and transportation), as well as drawing diverse students via lotteries for student assignment and developing strong academic and social supports for keeping students enrolled.

Family outreach and engagement: Magnet schools cannot foster diversity unless diverse families are aware of their existence and are able to gain access through streamlined application

processes, including support in completing the application, and readily available transportation. Research finds that conducting outreach and disseminating information to a wide range of families is a critical component of recruiting diverse students.[138] One study found that schools with outreach to prospective students were more likely to have experienced increasing integration over the last decade, while one quarter of those without special outreach were substantially segregated schools.[139]

Magnet schools that employ ongoing targeted outreach to diverse families have been found to be more successful in fostering and sustaining school diversity. A 2008 study analyzing the survey results of several hundred magnet school leaders found that magnet schools with targeted outreach to prospective students were more likely to have experienced increasing integration for the preceding decade, while one quarter of those without special outreach were one-race schools.[140] Such outreach is most effective when conducted through multiple platforms, such as social media, print, television, and radio. These outreach efforts are also most effective when accompanied by application assistance. Having a streamlined, easy-to-manage application process is important, as is having transportation plans that make accessing the school a feasible option for families outside the immediate neighborhood.

Inclusive enrollment practices: Evidence demonstrates that magnet schools with inclusive enrollment and student assignment practices, like lotteries, promote desegregation and equity more effectively than those with competitive enrollment practices.[141] While the federally funded MSAP includes a preference for recipients to use inclusive enrollment approaches,[142] many magnet schools do not implement inclusive practices, and they are not incentivized to do so.

Data from a survey of several hundred magnet school leaders found that competitive enrollment practices, like tests or grade point averages, are associated with less integrated magnet schools.[143] For example, Maryland's Montgomery County—as mentioned previously—experienced racial disparities inside schools as a result of highly competitive test-based enrollment policies for its magnet programs. Heavy reliance upon teacher recommendations, which may at times be biased, may sometimes also deter diverse enrollment in magnet schools. The survey also revealed that magnet schools relying upon grade point averages for student assignments comprised the largest share of schools that were experiencing decreasing integration.[144] Buffalo, NY, one of the earliest innovators of magnet school programs, experienced increased segregation when competitive enrollment practices, like cognitive skills tests and end-of-grade tests, were instituted in its magnet schools.[145]

In adopting more inclusive enrollment policy practices, many schools must confront biases about the intellectual abilities of Black students and other students of color historically excluded from some magnet schools. These biases also include beliefs that diversifying schools will cause achievement to plummet (which is refuted by the research outlined herein on the benefits of diversity for all students). Confronting this kind of bias is exemplified in the recent effort of a Black student in Virginia who pleaded with her school board to encourage the adoption of a lottery system to bolster enrollment of Black and Latino/a students at her STEM-themed magnet high school.[146] The school board ultimately rejected the adoption of a lottery but eliminated the entrance exam and $100 application fee.[147]

Research shows that inclusive enrollment and student assignment practices, like lotteries, interviews, and essays, are more likely to attract students of color, English learners, and students from low-income families. And weighted lotteries, such as those that consider neighborhood racial

composition, can be employed to attract diverse students. What is much more difficult for many schools and districts is combating entrenched bias and resistance to implementing more inclusive approaches that will foster school diversity or to seeing admissions with limited slots as a "win-lose" proposition.

A consideration for changes that increase access to magnet schools is additional support for expanding the number of magnet schools with successful programs so as to make the admissions processes less competitive (as outlined in the policy recommendations section of this report). Changes can be accompanied by additional support needed for magnet schools to be able to meet increased demand.

Provision of transportation: The provision of free transportation is another critical component of diversifying magnet schools. Without free and accessible transportation, magnet schools may only be realistic for those families with the resources and flexibility to provide their children with transportation. Provision of transportation is particularly important for interdistrict magnet schools that may draw students from neighboring districts to attend schools. A 2008 study of magnet school leaders found that magnet schools that provided free transportation were less likely to be racially isolated than those that did not.[148] An earlier study of Midwestern districts found that, for parents of color, the availability of transportation was an important consideration in choosing a magnet school.[149] This is often the case due to inaccessible or unreliable public transportation, even though many magnet schools are located in urban centers.

In addition, changing demographics coupled with the intentional drawing of district lines along racial lines have contributed to some districts becoming racially homogenous, underscoring the importance of allowing for policies designed to bridge district boundary lines. Therefore, interdistrict magnet programs are vital for reducing racial isolation.

Second door components

In addition to these first door components, second door features are also important, such as fostering inclusiveness and success within the school once a diverse student body is achieved. Examples of second door components include the following:

Curriculum: Innovative school curricula attract diverse students and families to magnet schools. A primary second door feature is a strong curriculum in which the magnet school theme is embedded. Particularly for diverse magnet schools, a curriculum that incorporates cultural diversity and is responsive to the unique cultural experiences and contexts that students may bring to the school is important to promote inclusiveness.

Staff: Another important second door feature is a competent, diverse, and stable magnet school teaching staff. In addition to the evidence that a well-prepared, stable teaching force boosts student achievement, especially for those historically furthest from opportunity,[150] the growing evidence on the benefits of diverse educators, including for helping improve student academic performance and attainment for all students, is strong.[151] Research shows that staff from a variety of backgrounds are better able to connect with students and support different learning styles. These staff are also better able to communicate with families of different backgrounds, to offer leadership reflecting the importance of positive cross-racial relationships, and to serve as role models for students.[152] And for Black students, evidence shows that having same-race teachers can positively impact long-term

educational achievement and outcomes.[153] Scholars suggest a variety of reasons for these positive educational experiences, including role-model effects, higher expectations, the ability to offset stereotype threat for students of color, cultural awareness, instructional supports, and advocacy for students.[154] Particularly for diverse magnet schools, a diverse teacher workforce is important to support full school diversity and promote positive student outcomes.

Professional development opportunities: Another second door effort is the implementation of ongoing professional development for magnet school educators on embedding the magnet school theme into curriculum and instruction, teaching in diverse classrooms, and fostering culturally responsive learning environments to help create conditions of inclusiveness within magnet schools. Such training should be long term so that educators continue to improve and new additions to the faculty gain the benefit of these learning experiences.

Culturally responsive learning environments: Another second door effort is the fostering of culturally responsive learning environments within magnet schools. Research shows that students learn by building upon their prior knowledge, including their cultural and community context, and making connections between that context and what they are learning.[155] In diverse magnet schools, it is important for educators to help students make connections between their cultural context and community and the material they are learning. In addition, students' ability to learn also depends on the presence of strong, positive relationships between and among teachers and students in identity-safe learning environments that eliminate the stereotype threats that undermine achievement for many students. These so-called "stereotype threats" occur when students encounter bias about one or more groups with which they identify.[156] Educators in diverse magnet schools can help to address bias through participating in ongoing training. They can also work to foster strong, genuine, and trusting relationships with students. Lastly, when educators receive training on how to deliver culturally responsive instruction, they are better prepared to connect to students' lived experiences and acknowledge students' cultural assets. Such learning environments also help students to build their own voices and learn about each other's cultural backgrounds, thereby enhancing learning opportunities for all students.

Nondiscriminatory and restorative discipline practices: Another important second door feature is the implementation of nondiscriminatory discipline practices that are focused on supporting student inclusion. Discriminatory discipline practices, like dress codes that prohibit natural hairstyles or so-called zero-tolerance policies that impose suspensions or expulsions (often for minor offenses), have been found to disproportionately impact students of color, resulting in the loss of valuable instruction time and undermining their educational outcomes. In particular, Black students and other students of color are disproportionately suspended or expelled compared to their white peers.[157] Discriminatory discipline practices emerged during the height of school segregation and have been used to push students of color out of the classroom and, often, into the juvenile justice system.[158] Ensuring that magnet schools apply discipline in a nondiscriminatory manner is vital for ensuring that they can maintain diversity.

Incorporation of these components found in diverse magnet schools is significant in the current political and social context, as magnet schools can become vulnerable to resegregation if school structures and supports like free transportation, desegregation goals, and targeted ongoing outreach are abandoned in favor of less-inclusive and less-supportive policies. These components ensure that students can reap the well-documented academic and social benefits of school diversity that effective magnet schools offer.

Magnet schools need support to effectively implement the evidence-based components described above. Some districts have found that one way to help foster this support is through the creation of magnet school resource teacher positions. These resource teachers provide expertise, support, and guidance to magnet school staff to aid in magnet program theme implementation, particularly in curriculum and in the planning and development of professional development activities.[159] For example, one study found that "fidelity of implementation and the breadth of support provided by magnet school resource teachers influenced magnet school effectiveness."[160] It also found that "differences in school effect estimates between magnet schools were not due to chance, and that there is evidence that differences in program implementation could account for the heterogeneity in effects across school sites."[161] States and districts can provide magnet schools with resources, such as funding for magnet school resource teachers, needed to create and sustain high-quality and diverse schools. Other assistance to aid in implementation, such as the provision of technical assistance and support, is described in detail in the recommendations section.

Policy Strategies to Support Diverse and Effective Magnet Schools

There are a number of policy opportunities at the federal, state, and local levels to support desegregation through the use of diverse and effective magnet schools. Recommendations for taking advantage of these opportunities include:

1. Reinstate federal guidance to states and localities about how to support school diversity.
2. Expand federal investments in magnet schools and use them to leverage school diversity and student success.
3. Expand strategic state and local investments in magnet schools in ways that support school diversity.
4. Support school-level strategies that promote both integration and student success.

Recommendation #1: Reinstate federal guidance to states and localities about how to support school diversity.

To guide efforts at desegregation, it is critically important for the federal government, informed by recent evidence, to update and reissue the joint diversity guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Education and Department of Justice under the Obama administration.[162] The guidance issued by the Obama administration outlining evidence-based approaches for advancing voluntary school integration efforts was rescinded by the Trump administration in July 2018. The guidance provided a useful interpretation of the *Parents Involved* ruling, including additional clarity regarding the extent that race can be used in policies and the kinds of voluntary programs that could be implemented. The guidance noted that districts should first consider race-neutral approaches that do not rely on individual student race and then consider generalized race-based approaches, such as neighborhood demographics. The guidance also provided recommendations for fostering diversity consistent with the law, including how to make strategic school siting decisions and how to design diverse magnet schools.

The guidance was a valuable resource for states and districts interested in accessing best practices for advancing voluntary integration efforts. To ensure that states and districts have access to evidence-based best practices, before it is reissued the guidance should be updated to include current research on magnet schools and other school integration efforts to help inform voluntary school diversity programs.

For example, since research underscores the importance of transportation for magnet schools to reduce racial isolation, the guidance can outline ways that states and districts can access funds to support within- and across-district magnet school transportation. And because advocacy efforts resulted in the removal of the prohibition on use of federal funds to aid in school transportation from the annual federal appropriations bills[163] and from Section 426 of the General Education Provisions Act,[164] these funds can now be accessed by non-MSAP programs, and MSAP grantees can be provided with increased flexibility, as well as guidance, about targeting the use of funds for transportation.

In addition, the guidance can outline support that the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights provides to states and districts to aid in program implementation and help ensure compliance with civil rights laws. Following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal government provided technical assistance to states and districts to aid in implementation of desegregation programs and help ensure compliance with the law. This technical assistance can include outreach activities, such as on-site consultations, conference participation, training classes, workshops, and community meetings. In addition, the Department of Education can provide technical assistance in the form of helping districts to design and evaluate programs, advising districts about crafting enrollment strategies, and helping districts to develop strategies to support families as they apply for enrollment.

Recommendation #2: Expand federal investments in magnet schools and use them to leverage diversity and school success.

Federal investments are vital for support of voluntary state and district school diversity efforts like magnet schools. Particularly as states and districts face budget constraints, federal support enables diversity efforts to be sustained and increased.

- One important approach is to **better fund the Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP)**, which has been seriously under-resourced and unable to respond to the demand from the field. Funded at $107 million in 2020, the program estimated it would award seven to nine grants (of no more than $15 million to each project) over the 5-year project period. This program provides a very modest level of support compared to the thousands of magnet schools in the country. Raising the funding level to at least $450 million would allow an investment in magnet schools that is comparable to federal investment in charter schools.

- The federal government can also **expand the MSAP to enable more districts to receive funds**. Currently, districts or consortia of districts that are eligible for MSAP funds are those that are either under a final court desegregation order or are implementing a voluntary or mandatory desegregation plan approved by the Secretary of Education as adequate under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To help reach a greater number of districts interested in implementing or sustaining diverse magnet schools, eligibility for MSAP funds should be expanded to include those districts that are not under court desegregation orders or desegregation plans approved under Title VI. This is particularly important as many federal and state courts have been lifting school desegregation orders, leaving districts that want to pursue integration with fewer resources to do so.

- An initiative to **allow states to apply for the MSAP or other school diversity funding** could serve to encourage more cooperative state and local school integration work. Such a program could support interdistrict programs, like the program in Hartford and other districts in Connecticut, or otherwise provide funding that could support strategies like family outreach and engagement. Funds could also support components like transportation and recruitment, training, and ongoing professional development of educators to teach in diverse magnet schools.

- Revisions to **incorporate evidence-based components within funding priorities for the MSAP** could require applicants to demonstrate how they plan to incorporate the evidence-based components of effective magnet schools outlined in this report, such as centering of integration in school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals; family outreach and engagement; inclusive enrollment practices; and provision of free transportation in their programs. Commitment to implementing the evidence-based components found in diverse magnet programs could be considered as part of applicant eligibility requirements. Requesting that applicants outline their initial plans for how they intend to allocate funds to promote the evidence-based components (e.g., targeting funds toward family outreach) can help to ensure that applicants think through these components and intentionally design their programs to foster diversity. In addition, the Department of Education can provide ongoing technical assistance once funds are awarded to help districts and schools finalize and implement their plans.

Recommendation #3: Expand strategic state and local investments in magnet schools in ways that support school diversity.

- States can **leverage federal funding** provided under ESSA Titles I and IV to support magnet schools and other school integration efforts. Under ESSA, the MSAP is funded under Title IV. Districts that are under a court-ordered or federally approved voluntary desegregation plan are eligible to apply for federal support under the MSAP. In addition, ESSA allows for 7% of Title I funding to be set aside to support evidence-based interventions for lower-performing schools serving high numbers of students from low-income families. Given the strong evidence summarized in this report on the effectiveness of diverse magnet schools in promoting positive outcomes for students, magnet schools should qualify as an evidence-based approach for school improvement funds under ESSA, especially for racially and socioeconomically isolated schools. This source of federal funds enables states to implement programs to advance voluntary integration. For example, New York state launched a Socioeconomic Integration Pilot Program drawing upon Title I funds to support districts in further developing interventions to support school integration.[165]

- States can also **provide targeted grant funding to districts** to create and sustain magnet schools. A state program can replicate the MSAP and/or fund specific components like family outreach and transportation, such as that provided by the state to magnet schools in Omaha, NE. States can also provide funding for magnet school evaluation and oversight to aid districts and schools in implementing, sustaining, and adjusting diversity goals. Regular and consistent evaluation of progress in meeting diversity goals is important, as research shows that without regular evaluation and recommitment to diversity, magnets can stray from their historic integration purpose.[166] Analysis of administrative data coupled with surveys of students, faculty, and parents can shed light on the effectiveness of outreach as well as program efforts and help identify areas for improved communication and outreach, along with curriculum and professional development opportunities. State and district leaders can also provide ongoing technical assistance to schools regarding strategies for evaluating and improving programs.

- States and districts can **ensure that magnet school programs are designed to center school integration** within the school design, mission, structure, focus, and goals. A survey of hundreds of magnet school leaders found that schools that were racially isolated often did not have diversity goals, and district or school recruitment, transportation, and assignment policies may not have been designed to support such goals.[167] This may include developing a statement of principles defining the state, district, and school commitment to diversity and outlining strategies to achieve it—even absent the ability to use race as a factor in admissions—including taking into consideration factors like student neighborhood or socioeconomic status in student assignment decisions. Districts can also make strategic school siting decisions, engage in recruitment to attract diverse students to the school, and re-evaluate diversity goals and progress in meeting those goals on a consistent basis. In addition, as we have described, interdistrict programs, like Connecticut's magnet program, are often needed to facilitate diversity since segregation often occurs between districts. State policymakers should modify state laws as needed to permit interdistrict transfers that facilitate the ability of students from surrounding districts to attend magnet schools and allocate funding, as Connecticut has, to support and incentivize student transfers to achieve diversity.

Recommendation #4: Support school-level strategies that promote both integration and student success.

To help promote diverse and effective magnet schools, additional recommendations are grouped under first door efforts, or those policies that will help to ensure that a diverse group of students walk through the front door of a magnet school together, and second door efforts that ensure that students within magnet schools are supported in positive, culturally affirming, and inclusive environments. These efforts can help to sustain diversity and inclusiveness within magnet schools.

Support first door features that promote diverse magnet schools

- At the district and school levels, **ensure that diverse families are aware of magnet schools and the application process**. Schools with outreach to prospective students were found to be more likely to have experienced increasing integration over the last decade, while many of those without special outreach were one-race schools.[168] Districts and schools can conduct outreach to diverse families through a variety of platforms (such as social media, print, television, and radio) in multiple languages and can target funding and assistance to help schools do the same. Sustained outreach through multiple means (online, in person, flyers, word of mouth through local community organizations, etc.) can help to identify and support diverse families in learning about magnet schools. Even with an innovative and attractive theme, a magnet school cannot attract diverse students if diverse families do not learn about the opportunity. This is especially important to attract families to magnet schools that draw students from surrounding districts—families who may not know about a magnet school and are unaware of their student's eligibility to attend. These outreach efforts are most effective when there is a streamlined, easy-to-manage application process accompanied by application assistance. And schools can be intentional about ensuring that diverse family voices are incorporated into activities and decision-making once students are enrolled.

- **Implement open and inclusive enrollment practices** to help ensure that diverse families enroll in magnet schools. Research shows that magnet schools with inclusive—rather than competitive—enrollment practices, like lotteries, better promote desegregation and equity.[169] Research also shows that inclusive enrollment practices, like lotteries, interviews, and essays, are more likely to attract students of color, English learners, and students from low-income families. And weighted lotteries, such as those that consider neighborhood racial composition, can be employed to attract diverse students. Districts can support magnet schools in implementing inclusive enrollment practices to ensure that more students have the opportunity to attend magnet schools. Districts can prohibit magnet schools from implementing selective or exclusionary enrollment practices, and states can restrict special funding to those that are inclusive.

- **Make strategic decisions about school siting and feeder patterns** to optimize diversity and accessibility. Districts with larger proportions of students of color will encounter challenges in achieving diversity. Strategies for ensuring school diversity, such as consideration of neighborhood demographics and location relative to other neighborhoods and the availability of transportation, should be at the forefront of school siting and feeder decisions. Such strategies can include placing a magnet school near the border of a city and suburban school system or near the border of an inner suburb with a non-white population and an outer-ring suburb with a predominantly white population. It may also be important to consider current and changing demographics that may be impacted by gentrification. Research has found wide variation in the degree and nature of integration across magnet districts based both on districts' existing demographics and how well-structured magnet school student assignment processes are designed.[170]

Support second door features that enable inclusive, well-supported learning experiences

- **Focus on "whole school" magnet programs.** Whole school magnet programs are found to better foster diversity than in-school programs in otherwise diverse schools. States and districts can be intentional about supporting creation of whole school magnet programs that involve all students in the magnet programming, rather than instituting separate tracks and programs within the school. Ensuring that all students can participate in the whole school program fosters inclusiveness. The magnet school theme should be embedded within the curriculum throughout the entire school. To support this approach, magnet school teachers should be prepared to deliver instruction aligned with the school theme. Magnet school teachers should also be provided with the resources needed, including ongoing professional development opportunities, to support diverse learning environments and the mission of the school across all curricular programs. This support may include designating magnet resource teachers who can be prepared to help work with teachers and school leaders to embed the theme into curriculum and foster inclusive classrooms, as well as onboard new staff about the school's theme and approach to learning.

- **Provide innovative and culturally responsive curriculum to all students.** Research shows that students learn by building upon their prior knowledge and making connections between the material they are learning and their own culture and community.[171] In diverse magnet schools, it is important for educators to help students make connections between their cultural context and community and the materials they are learning. Magnet school

teachers can incorporate evidence-based strategies, such as including stories and content about diverse cultures into curriculum and encouraging students to study multiple points of view, to help foster inclusiveness, student engagement, and achievement. For example, magnet schools serving Hmong students in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area incorporate Hmong culture and language in the curriculum of dual language immersion schools.[172] Teachers should be prepared and supported to foster culturally responsive learning environments that center student voice and help students connect what they are learning in school with their lives.

- **Implement nonexclusionary and restorative school discipline policies.** Discriminatory discipline practices, like dress codes that prohibit natural hairstyles or so-called zero-tolerance policies that impose suspensions or expulsions (often for minor offenses), disproportionately impact students of color, resulting in the loss of valuable instruction time and undermining their educational outcomes.[173] Implementation of inclusive school discipline practices that are educative and restorative, rather than exclusionary, is important for ensuring that diverse students develop a strong community and sense of belonging and do not lose valuable instruction time or otherwise suffer the consequences of exclusionary school discipline practices. Magnet schools should be supported to implement inclusive approaches to school discipline found to foster inclusive environments, like restorative practices, social and emotional learning, and mental health services and supports. States and districts can also support schools in providing ongoing training on implicit bias and anti-racism to support educators in addressing bias and understanding how it may manifest in the school and classroom.

In addition to focusing their program guidelines and funding priorities on these strategies for success, states and districts can develop communities of practice to support and share best practices across schools to aid in implementing and maintaining these second door efforts.

Conclusion

Given the profound consequences associated with segregated education and the re-entrenchment of segregation in too many of the nation's public schools, well-designed magnet schools that incorporate components outlined in this report present a compelling evidence-based option for promoting school diversity and positive student outcomes. Magnet schools certainly cannot remedy school segregation on their own; they are only one component of necessary broader systemic and structural changes needed to mitigate contemporary forms of segregation. The work to achieve integration is long term, as the efforts to re-entrench racial segregation are persistent, but magnet schools provide a viable strategy for advancing school integration and improving the nation's schools. Evidence shows that these schools present an approach that is consistent with legal interpretations of permissible approaches to supporting school diversity, as recognized in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1* case. These approaches can promote stronger social and academic outcomes.

Reversing the resegregation that betrays *Brown v. Board of Education*'s promise of equal access to educational opportunities will require sustained and cooperative action at the federal, state, and local levels. But the historical context outlined in this report demonstrates that it has been done before and can be done again. This coordinated action includes leveraging funding sources to invest in diversity efforts and re-evaluating and changing course when necessary to ensure that more students have access to diverse and equitable educational opportunities. We cannot risk complacency as the current trends of resegregation deepen. Depriving students of the numerous benefits of integrated educational experiences impacts their personal and social development and threatens the ability of the nation to produce adults equipped to participate in a diverse global economy. The educational future of many of our nation's students depends upon acting affirmatively to achieve integration. As one researcher observed, "The students magnet schools serve, and the American education system as a whole, are all the better for this approach."[174]

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ABSTRACT

This paper develops intuition about socioeconomic-based affirmative action and the extent to which it can replicate the levels of racial diversity evident in selective colleges. Using stylized simulation models, we investigate the potential relative effects of race- and/or socioeconomic-based affirmative action policies on the racial and socioeconomic distribution of students into colleges. Results suggest three important patterns: (1) reasonable SES-based affirmative action policies do not mimic the effects of race-based policies on racial diversity; (2) there is little evidence of systemic "mismatch" induced by affirmative action policies; on average there are only small effects on the mean achievement of students' peers; and (3) the use of affirmative action policies by some colleges affects enrollment patterns in other colleges.

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Simulation Models of the Effects of Race- and Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action Policies

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Simulation Models of the Effects of Race- and Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action Policies

Abstract

This paper develops intuition about socioeconomic-based affirmative action and the extent to which it can replicate the levels of racial diversity evident in selective colleges. Using stylized simulation models, we investigate the potential relative effects of race- and/or socioeconomic-based affirmative action policies on the racial and socioeconomic distribution of students into colleges. Results suggest three important patterns: (1) reasonable SES-based affirmative action policies do not mimic the effects of race-based policies on racial diversity; (2) there is little evidence of systemic "mismatch" induced by affirmative action policies; on average there are only small effects on the mean achievement of students' peers; and (3) the use of affirmative action policies by some colleges affects enrollment patterns in other colleges.

Keywords: SES-based affirmative action, race-based affirmative action, policy simulations

Simulation Models of the Effects of

Race- and Socioeconomic-Based Affirmative Action Policies

In their 2013 decision in *Fisher v. University of Texas*, the Supreme Court upheld the concept of affirmative action but issued a challenge to university administrators and scholars: in order to use race-based affirmative action, they must show "that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity" (*Fisher v. the University of Texas*, 2013, p. 11). As a result, developing and assessing the effectiveness of admissions policies designed to increase racial diversity in selective colleges is crucial. One way to begin to evaluate alternative policies is to use simulations of the college application, admission, and enrollment processes. Well-designed simulations have the advantage of allowing rapid experimentation with a variety of policies. While simulations are not definitive about what will actually happen in the real world under a given policy, they can help build intuition and provide guidance for the types of policies that may be most effective. With these aims in mind, this paper uses a simulation model to investigate the dynamic effects of various types of affirmative action college admission policies.

Any race-neutral affirmative action approach faces a difficult challenge. Even with the legality of race-conscious affirmative action policies, racial minority students remain under-represented in higher education, particularly at selective institutions. Figure 1 shows the postsecondary destinations of the high school class of 2004 by college selectivity (Reardon, Baker, and Klasik, 2012). In this figure, the width of each bar represents the percent of the college-age population enrolled at the given level of school. Very selective colleges (those colleges with Barron's Selectivity rankings of 1, 2, or 3[1]) have many more White,

[1] Barron's Profiles of American Colleges (www.barronspac.com) provides selectivity rankings for most four-year colleges in the United States. Colleges are ranked on a scale from 1-7, where 1 is the most selective and 6 is the least selective (colleges with a ranking of 7 are specialty colleges with unique admissions criteria). These rankings are based on the high school GPAs, high school class rank and SAT/ACT scores of enrolled students, as well as the proportion of applicants admitted. To give a concrete example, colleges ranked in the top two categories (1 and 2) in 2004 had median SAT scores of at least 575, admitted fewer than 50% of applicants, and enrolled students with

and many fewer Black and Hispanic, students than the population of 18-year-olds overall. However, despite the pattern of decreasing racial diversity with increasing selectivity, the most selective colleges (Barron's 1s) are slightly more diverse than the colleges just below them in the selectivity rankings. This relative diversity may be the result of race-based affirmative action policies used in at least some of the most selective colleges. While we cannot know what the racial composition of these most selective colleges would be in a world without any race-based affirmative action, it's clear that racial minority students would be even more dramatically under-represented.[2]

Figure 1 here

Proposed alternatives to race-based affirmative action policies have generally taken one of two forms: "percent plans" and socioeconomic-based affirmative action policies. In this paper we focus on simulations of the second option, socioeconomic-based affirmative action. We focus our attention on these policies for two reasons: there is already a large body of literature that examines percent plans, and, quite importantly, these plans have not been shown to be effective at increasing or maintaining racial diversity (e.g. Arcidiacono & Lovenheim 2004; Bastedo & Jaquette, 2011; Howell, 2010; Long, 2004, 2007).[3]

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media GPAs of about 3.5 and in the top 35% of their high school classes.

[2] Appendix A Figure 1 similarly gives postsecondary destinations for the high school class of 2004, but this time by family income rather than race (Reardon, Baker, & Klasik, 2012). Similar to Figure 1 the more selective an institution is, the higher the average family income of its students. However, the most selective colleges have more students from low-income families than do slightly less selective schools. This may be an ancillary effect of race-based affirmative action policies, or may result from other factors, including perhaps the greater prevalence of need-blind admissions practices, need-based financial aid, and income-based recruitment practices. Reardon, Baker, and Klasik (2012) give a more detailed description of these figures and their creation.

[3] Under percent plans any student who graduates in some pre-specified top percentage of their high school class automatically gains admission to the public university system. In order to increase the racial diversity of university admissions, such plans leverage the existing racial segregation of high schools; any plan that takes the top portion of a school with a high minority population is bound to admit a sizeable number of minority students. Three public systems (the University of California, the University of Texas, and the Florida State University systems) have already enacted some version of a percent plan because of existing affirmative action bans or because of anticipation of future restrictions on race-conscious affirmative action. The extant research indicates that such plans tend to reduce racial and ethnic diversity relative to the affirmative action plans that preceded them (Arcidiacono & Lovenheim 2004; Bastedo & Jaquette, 2011; Howell, 2010; Long, 2004, 2007), and it was the legal challenge of Texas's attempt to increase its Universities' diversity above and beyond what their Percent Plan yielded that led to the Fisher case.

The failure of percent plans to deliver on their promise has been part of what has prompted some scholars and colleges to propose a second race-neutral form of affirmative action, one that relies on socioeconomic status (SES) instead of race to determine admissions preferences (Gaertner & Hart, 2013; Kahlenberg, 1996). Under SES-based affirmative action, students are given an admissions advantage because of their socioeconomic background rather than their race or ethnicity. The presumption is that such plans can effectively capitalize on the correlation between race and income in order to construct a racially diverse class of students. The potential effects of such policies are not clear. Some existing research suggests that substituting SES for race in college admissions decisions can at least partly maintain rates of minority enrollment while increasing college access for economically disadvantaged students (Carnevale & Rose, 2004; Carnevale, Rose, & Strohl, 2014; Gaertner & Hart, 2013; Kahlenberg, 2012). Other research suggests that SES is not a sufficiently good proxy for race for SES-based policies to be effective at producing substantial racial diversity (Gaertner & Hart, 2013; Reardon & Rhodes, 2011; Reardon, Yun, & Kurlaender, 2006; Kane, 1998). At the very least, socioeconomic-based affirmative action may help to increase socioeconomic diversity on college campuses, which in and of itself may be a desirable outcome for colleges. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of SES-based affirmative action, in practice, however, because such plans are not widely used.

Our aim in this paper is to develop general intuition about socioeconomic-based affirmative action and the extent to which it can replicate, or even improve, the modest levels of diversity evident in selective colleges under current admissions practices. Specifically, we investigate the potential relative effects of race- and/or socioeconomic-based affirmative action policies on the racial and socioeconomic distribution of students into colleges.

In addition to this basic question of the potential for policy efficacy, we also investigate two other issues that have been understudied in the affirmative action literature. First, some critics of affirmative action claim that race-based affirmative action does a disservice to racial minority students because it

places them in environments where their academic preparation systematically falls below that of their peers (e.g. Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Coate, & Hotz 2012; Sander 2004). This "mismatch" might lead to a lower likelihood of degree completion or segregation due to homophily based on academic backgrounds (Arcidiacono, Khan, & Vigdor, 2011). There is little consensus on the extent to which mismatch due to affirmative action results in such consequences, so in this paper we pay particular attention to how different affirmative policies might alter the academic preparation of the peers that students of difference races are exposed to within the colleges in which they enroll.

Second, we attend to the effects that affirmative action policies at one or more colleges have on enrollment patterns at other schools. College admission and enrollment processes take place in an interrelated, dynamic system, where admissions policies at one college might affect enrollment patterns at other colleges. If students are aware of affirmative action admissions policies, they may alter their application behavior to account for how the policies might affect their likelihood of admission to particular colleges. Changes in applicant pools may then change admission probabilities, even at colleges not using affirmative action, as colleges adjust their admission selectivity to account for changes in their applicant pools or yield rates due to changing student application and enrollment behavior. The number of colleges using particular affirmative action policies may therefore affect enrollment patterns throughout the system, and diversity gains in some colleges may be offset in whole or part by diversity losses in others. Our simulations here are designed to provide some insight into these potential system-wide, dynamic effects of affirmative action admissions policies.

We build intuition about the answer to these questions through an agent-based simulation model, which incorporates a realistic and complex (though certainly highly-stylized) set of features of the college application, admission, and enrollment processes.

The Utility of Agent-Based Simulation

By using an agent-based simulation model (often called an ABM) we are able to compare the effects of a range of policies on enrollment patterns in a way that takes into account how a policy would affect the full system of colleges. This model allows us to investigate how affirmative action policies might affect university composition in a world in which students 1) have somewhat idiosyncratic preferences about colleges; 2) have some uncertainty about their own admissibility to each college; and 3) use their resources and limited information to strategically apply to a small subset of colleges, and in which colleges 1) differ in their use of affirmative action policies; 2) have idiosyncratic perceptions and preferences regarding students; and 3) strategically admit enough students to fill their seats under the expectation that not all students admitted will enroll. Although this model falls short of being completely realistic, it captures important dynamic features of the application/admissions/enrollment processes that enable us to investigate the ways that affirmative action might affect enrollments.

This simulation approach improves upon previous assessments of socioeconomic-based affirmative action in several important ways. First, unlike prior simulations, it models a dynamic system of colleges, rather than a single, static college. Both Gaertner and Hart (2014) and Carnevale, Rose, and Strohl (2014) simulate effects of just one cohort of students applying to college in one year and, in the case of Gaertner & Hart (2014) at just one university. Gaertner & Hart (2013), for example, simulate the effects of SES-based affirmative action using real university applicants to a single university (the University of Colorado). Their simulation, by its nature, does not incorporate dynamic processes: it provides no intuition on how application behavior might change as subsequent cohorts of students learn how the policy might affect their likelihood of admission, nor on how enrollment patterns at the University of Colorado might differ if other colleges also changed their admissions policies. Our simulation, in contrast, allows student behavior to change in response to different admission policies and investigates the enrollment patterns across an entire system of colleges.

Second, it is more realistic than other simulations in some important ways. Whereas the simulation in Carnevale, Rose, and Strohl (2014) assumes that all students apply to all colleges, our model has students strategically applying to a small portfolio of colleges based on their (imperfect) assessments of college quality and their likelihood of admission. Moreover, in the Carnevale, Rose, and Strohl (2014) simulation of socioeconomic-based affirmative action, the model measures socioeconomic disadvantage using many variables not typically available to admissions officers (for example, the percent of individuals in an applicant's neighborhood who hold a college degree). Our model, in contrast, uses an index that is implicitly based on the types of factors (family income, parental education, parental occupation) that would be available to admissions officers.

Simulating the Mechanics of Affirmative Action Policies

Selective colleges generally try to admit classes of students that are both academically qualified and also diverse along numerous dimensions. These dimensions may include race or SES, but also academic interests, extracurricular talents, geography, and other factors. For example, colleges may want to boost enrollment in an under-subscribed major or program, or find a new English horn player for their orchestra. Selective colleges across the country demonstrate admissions preferences for these students who will add to the different types of diversity of their campus. These preferences—as well as racial or socioeconomic diversity preferences—are typically enacted through a holistic review process in which the overall academic preparation of an applicant is assessed across a host of dimensions.

Because it is part of a holistic process, the added weight given in the admissions process to students' non-academic characteristics such as race is not explicit or directly measurable. Indeed, by law it cannot be: the Supreme Court has prohibited colleges from assigning numeric values to race-based characteristics (*Gratz v. Bollinger*, 2003). That is not to say, however, that the *average* admissions weight given to a characteristic like race (or horn-playing skill, for that matter), cannot be quantified after the

fact given the right data. One can ask, for example, how much higher, on average, are the SAT scores of White students than those Black students with similar chances of admission. The answer to questions of this type provides a way of quantifying the weight given to race and factors associated with race in a holistic admissions process. A non-zero answer to this question does not, however, imply that admissions officers simply add a certain number of SAT points to each Black student's score and then admit all students simply on the basis of their (adjusted) SAT scores.[4]

To make the simulations in this paper realistic, we simulate a holistic admissions process in which race and/or SES are given more or less (or no) weight in admissions decisions. For this, we need a sense of the average weight given to these factors by real selective colleges and universities so that the simulations produce patterns that are grounded in real-world data. The existing empirical evidence on the size of admissions weights given to applicants' race, however, is limited and variable. Simply comparing the average SAT scores of students of different races enrolled at select elite colleges, as Herrnstein and Murray (1994) did, can be misleading for a number of reasons. First, because of racial disparities in SAT score distributions, we would expect the mean scores of admitted Black and White students to be different even if a college admitted solely on the basis of test scores.[5] Second, this approach cannot disentangle differences in average scores that are due to differential admission criteria from differences in scores that are due to racial differences in application or enrollment patterns.

[4] The difference between a post-hoc inference of the average weight given to race and assigning a numerical value to race in an admissions process is subtle but important. To see the difference, consider a baseball team that would like players who can play a range of positions, and would also like each of them to be skilled hitters (e.g. having a high on-base percentage). If the pool of potential players includes a large number of fielders who are great hitters but few pitchers who are good hitters, the team may reasonably pass up a player who is an excellent fielder and hitter in order to sign a pitcher who is a weaker hitter because it needs some great pitchers. If one then compared the average pre-draft on-base percentages of pitchers and fielders to measure the "weight" assigned to being a pitcher in the signing process, this difference would likely be large—maybe 200 points. But this does not mean the team added 200 points to each pitcher's observed pre-draft on-base percentage and then simply signed the players with the on-base percentage, regardless of whether they were a fielder or pitcher.

[5] This may seem counterintuitive, but it results from the fact that racial differences in mean test scores mean that there are more minority students with very low scores, and more White students with very high scores. If a college simply admitted every student with an SAT score above, say, 1200, the mean score for White students in this group would be higher than that of minority students, because of the higher proportion of White students with very high scores.

A better approach to estimating average affirmative action weights is to use data on a pool of applicants to one or more selective colleges and to estimate the relationship between race/SES and the probability of admissions. Both Kane (1998) and Espenshade and Radford (2009) use this approach. They fit a model predicting admission on the basis of race, academic, and other observable factors and then compare the coefficients on the race variables with the coefficient on SAT scores. This allows them to express the weight given to race in terms of the weight given to SAT scores. For example, if a Black student's odds of admission were 7 percent greater than an otherwise observationally identical White student, one can calculate what change in SAT score would be needed to yield the same 7 percent boost in the odds of admission. Using different data sets and slightly different models, they both estimate that the implicit weight given to race (being Black, specifically, in their models) in the admission to selective colleges is roughly equivalent to the weight given to an additional 300-400 SAT points (as measured on the 1600 point SAT scale). It is worth reiterating that this is not to say that the colleges in their sample add 300-400 points to Black students' SAT scores and then admit students on the basis of (adjusted) SAT scores. Rather, it is to say that the implicit weight given to race and race-related factors in whatever holistic review process the colleges use is roughly equivalent to the weight that is given to a difference of 300-400 SAT score points.[6]

It is important to note that these estimates apply only to the most selective colleges and universities. Espenshade and Radford's data set contains only seven selective, four-year colleges or universities. Kane's estimates come from an analysis of the top 20% of four-year colleges in terms of

[6] The Kane (1998) and Espenshade & Radford (2009) SAT-equivalent weight estimates are likely too high. Their models include a number of control variables, such as high school grade point average and extracurricular involvement. Because these variables are positively correlated with SAT scores, their inclusion in the model will tend to attenuate the coefficient on the SAT score variable. This, in turn, will exaggerate the SAT-equivalent weight (because it is a ratio of the coefficient on race to the coefficient on SAT scores). Another way to see this is to realize that two students who differ by 300-400 SAT score points will tend to differ also on many other factors that affect college admission, so the average difference in admission probabilities between two students who differ by 300-400 SAT points will be much larger than that implied by the SAT coefficient alone. This means that a smaller difference in SAT points (along with the other differences in correlated characteristics) will yield an average difference in admission odds equal to that implied by the race coefficient.

selectivity. His models based on all four-year colleges yield estimated weights one-third as large. Such findings are in keeping with the patterns in Figure 1 above that suggest there is greater use of race-based affirmative action at the most selective colleges.

Because of concerns that the estimates of the SAT-equivalent weight given to race may be too high (see footnote 5 above), and because existing estimates do not describe the SAT equivalent weight that colleges give to Hispanic students or to low-SES students, we conduct our own simple analysis of recent college admission data. Using data from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS), a study that includes college application and admission data for a nationally-representative sample of students who were 10th graders in 2002, we estimated SAT-equivalent racial and SES admissions weights using methods similar to those of Espenshade and Radford (2009) and Kane (1998). We fit a much more parsimonious models than they do, however: we predict the odds of admission using only SAT scores and dummy variables for race or a standardized variable for SES. To account for the possibility that the implicit weights vary in magnitude along with the selectivity of the college, we repeated this analysis for admission to each of the six Barron's Selectivity categories. Similar to Kane, we find notable racial admissions preferences only in the top Barron's category, which represents approximately 10% of four-year colleges with that are not open admission. We estimate significant positive admissions preferences for both Black and Hispanic students applying to these most selective colleges. We estimate that black students are given an implicit weight that is roughly equivalent to that given to students with an SAT score 250 points higher than another student (slightly more than one standard deviation on the SAT scale); for Hispanic students the estimated implicit weight is similar to that given to students with an SAT score about 260 points higher than another student. We find very little or no evidence of racial preferences in admissions to colleges in lower selectivity tiers (for details, see Appendix B, Table 1).

We conduct a similar analysis to estimate the average implicit weight given to low-SES students in admissions. Here we find evidence of slight socioeconomic-based affirmative action in the most selective

colleges (the weight given to a standard deviation difference in family SES is roughly the same as given to a 30-point SAT score difference). Moreover, the evidence indicates that students applying to less selective colleges were *penalized* for their lower SES in the admission process (in these colleges higher-SES students were given implicit preference in admissions). The SES weights are, however, relatively small in all cases, reflecting perhaps the fact that existing SES-based admissions preferences work in two directions: on the one hand, most colleges rely heavily on student tuition and must take ability to pay into account in admissions; on the other hand, many colleges, particularly very selective colleges, actively recruit and admit low-SES students (for details, see Appendix B, Table 2).

In sum, it appears that, in 2004, affirmative action or other related policies at the most selective colleges increased the odds of minority students' admission substantially, by an amount that may be as high as the difference between students whose SAT scores differ by several hundred points. SES-based affirmative action policies, however, appear to have been much less prevalent. On average, low-SES applicants appear to have received little or no admissions preference at most colleges.

Method

We use a modification of the agent-based model (ABM) of college applications, admissions, and enrollment developed by Reardon, Kasman, Klasik, and Baker (2014). Their model includes two types of entities: students and colleges. In their model, students had only two attributes: family resources and academic records. We assign each student a race as well. The racial composition of our student cohorts, race-specific distributions of academic achievement and resources, and race-specific correlations between resources and academic achievement are constructed to match the characteristics of the high school class of 2004 (as estimated from the ELS study).[7] The parameters used in our model are presented in Table 1.

[7] We base our achievement distribution on the NCES administered standardized assessment of English Language Arts and Mathematics given to tenth grade students in ELS.

For simplicity, as well as the availability of real-world data, we limit our model to the four largest racial groups in the United States: White, Hispanic, Black, and Asian. Five percent of our students are Asian, 15 percent are Black, 20 percent are Hispanic, and 60 percent are White. Our family resources measure is meant to represent the economic and social capital that a student can tap when engaging in the college application process (e.g. income, parental education, and knowledge of the college application process) and is based explicitly on the SES index variable from ELS.[8] The family resource measure is standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Academic record represents the academic qualities that make a student attractive to a college (e.g., test scores, GPA, high school transcripts). We construct our sample of simulated students to match the joint distribution of race, SES, and composite math and reading scores in the ELS sample. We convert the scores from the original ELS test score scale to a scale that approximates the 1600-point SAT because of the ubiquity of this scale, and because we calibrated our race and socioeconomic implicit admission weights in terms of SAT points.

There are 40 colleges in our model, each of which has a target enrollment for each incoming class of 150 students, meaning there are a total of 6,000 seats available for each cohort of students. The ratio of total students to total college seats was selected to be roughly the same as the proportion of 2002 tenth graders who attended any type of college by 2006[9]. The only attribute that colleges have is "quality", which operationally represents the average academic achievement of students enrolled in the school. In the real world, this mean academic achievement is probably correlated with, but not the same as, the quality of educational experience for students at a given college. Quality is measured in the same units as student academic achievement.

[8] In ELS, this SES index is a composite measure of mother's and father's education, mother's and father's occupation, and family income.

[9] Although 100% of students in our model "apply" to colleges, roughly 40% don't get in anywhere because there are fewer seats than students. An alternative model would have students with near-zero probabilities of admission not apply to any colleges. Our results are not sensitive to this modeling choice, however, because these students' applications have no aggregate effect on what type of students are admitted to colleges – the colleges in our model end up with the same students they would have using either approach.

The model iterates through three stages during each simulated year: application, admission, and enrollment.[10] During the application stage, a cohort of prospective students observe (with some uncertainty) the quality of each of the 40 colleges in a given year and select a limited number of colleges to which to apply, based on their (uncertain and somewhat idiosyncratic) perceptions of the quality of each college and of their probability of admission to each. In the admission stage, colleges observe the academic records of students in their applicant pools (again, somewhat uncertainly and idiosyncratically) and admit those they perceive to be most qualified, up to a total number of students that colleges believe will be sufficient to fill their available seats based on yield information from previous years. During this stage, some colleges use affirmative action strategies that take students' race, SES, or both, into consideration when they evaluate students' academic records. In the enrollment stage, students compare the colleges to which they have been admitted and enroll in the one which they perceive to be of highest quality. At the end of each simulated year, college quality is updated based on the average academic records of students who enrolled in that year. These three stages are repeated in the next year with a new set of 10,000 students and the same set of colleges.

Although the model abstracts away many of the complexities of the actual application process, we do introduce several elements into our model that are intended to mimic real-world college selection and enrollment processes. The first are imperfect information and idiosyncratic preferences: students do not rank colleges identically, and colleges do not rank students identically. This represents the presence of idiosyncratic preferences (e.g. a student might be impressed by a college's dormitories or a college might place a premium on talented quarterbacks) as well as imperfect information on the part of both types of agents.

Second, students do not apply to every college, but instead strategically engage in the application process. Using admissions results from prior years, students estimate their probability of admission to

[10] For a more detailed and analytic explanation of the agent-based model, see Appendix B.

each college, though their estimates are imperfect because they have imperfect information about each college's selectivity and about their own academic record and attractiveness. Using these probabilities and their perceived utility of each college, students determine the expected utility of applying to each college and select a set of applications that maximizes their expected utility. Although most high school students likely do not engage in such an explicit process of utility maximization in choosing where to apply to college, the algorithm applied by the students in the ABM, in conjunction with their imperfect information and idiosyncratic preferences, produces very realistic patterns of application (students apply to colleges appropriate to their academic record) (Reardon, et al. 2014).

Finally, the model allows students' family resources to influence the college application and enrollment process in four ways. First, students' resources and academic record are positively correlated (using the empirical race-specific correlations estimated from the ELS data); this means that high-resource students are more likely than low-resource students to apply, be admitted, and enroll in higher quality colleges. Second, students with more resources submit more applications than their lower-resource peers, increasing their probability of being admitted to a desired college. Third, students with higher resources have higher-quality information both about college quality and their own academic achievement relative to other students; this increases their likelihood of applying to colleges that are a good match for their academic records. Fourth, higher resource students are able to enhance their apparent academic records (analogous to engaging in test preparation or other private tutoring, obtaining help writing college essays, or strategically participating in extracurricular activities). These features of the model are explained and calibrated by Reardon, Kasman, Klasik, & Baker (2014), who use ELS data to determine appropriate values for the parameters governing them. Reardon et al (2014) show that, taken together, imperfect information, idiosyncratic preferences, strategic application behavior, and socioeconomic influences create patterns of college selection and enrollment that are similar to those in the real world; low-resource students tend to apply to a limited set of lower-quality colleges, while their

high-resource counterparts tend to create larger application portfolios with "safeties," "targets," and "reaches" that increase their chances of attending a high-quality college.

In order to examine the influence of affirmative action strategies, we modify the Reardon et al (2014) ABM to allow colleges to exercise preferences for racial or socioeconomic diversity by weighting race and/or SES in the admissions process. We conducted a set of simulations, each with a different combination of affirmative action policy conditions. We explore a "baseline" scenario in which no colleges use affirmative action. We then explore scenarios in which the top four colleges use moderate race-based affirmative action, strong race-based affirmative action, moderate SES-based affirmative action, strong SES-based affirmative action, moderate race-and-SES-based affirmative action, and strong race-and-SES-based affirmative action.[11] While empirical observation of college admissions in the ELS dataset indicates that only colleges in the most elite group (roughly the top 10%) employ racial affirmative action policies, we experiment with different numbers of colleges using moderate race-and-SES-based affirmative action in order to explore dynamic system-wide effects that result from different numbers of colleges using these policies. For these experiments, we include scenarios where the top one, four, ten, 20, or all 40 colleges use affirmative action in admissions; we also include a scenario where four of the top 10 colleges (those ranked 1, 4, 7, and 10) use affirmative action. In each scenario, the model runs for 30 years, with our top-tier colleges starting to use affirmative action strategies after a 15-year burn-in period, in which the simulation runs, but no colleges use affirmative action; we do this so that both colleges' qualities and students' perceptions of admission stabilize before the introduction of affirmative action. Using the

[11] In our models, "moderate" and "strong" race-based affirmative action policies give minority students an implicit weight equivalent to 150 or 300 academic achievement points, respectively. "Moderate" and "strong" SES-based affirmative action gives students an implicit weight of plus or minus 75 or 150 points, respectively, for each standard deviation they are above or below the average student in resources. While the magnitude of the implicit SES-based affirmative action weight is half that of the implicit race weight, recall that the SES weight is used across the SES distribution and the size of these weights are expressed in terms of the weights given for students 1 standard deviation below the mean resource level. Because of this approach, the difference in weights between students +/- 1 SD from the average resource level is 300 achievement points—and students farther from the mean have even larger weight differences. So, despite their apparently smaller magnitude, the SES weights produce larger admissions advantages, top to bottom, than the race-based weights.

results of these simulations, we are able to examine how affirmative action influences the racial and SES composition of colleges, and the quality of colleges that students attend.

Results

We start by comparing the effects of race- and SES-based affirmative action policies on the racial and socioeconomic composition of the top colleges. Figure 2 shows the racial composition among the four colleges that use affirmative action by simulated affirmative action policy. The proportion of Black and Hispanic students is positively affected by both types of affirmative action policies, but increases more rapidly when the magnitude of racial affirmative action increases than when the magnitude of socioeconomic affirmative action does. This is evident when one compares the rate of change in the proportion of minority students in bars 1, 2, and 3 (increasing race-based affirmative action with no SES-based affirmative action) with the rate of change in the proportion of minority students in bars 1, 4, and 5 (increasing SES-based affirmative action with no race-based affirmative action). Bars 6 and 7 show that colleges are most racially diverse when both race- and SES-based affirmative action policies are used.

Figure 2 here

Figure 3 shows the socioeconomic composition of colleges that use affirmative action (in terms of student resource quintiles) by simulated affirmative action policy. SES-based affirmative action policies have a large effect on socioeconomic composition of colleges. Racial affirmative action policies, on the other hand, have a small effect, especially relative to that of socioeconomic affirmative action policies. The first quintile students—the poorest students—experience the greatest gain in overall enrollment rate under both affirmative action strategies. The highest quintile experiences the greatest reduction in enrollment. There are only small changes in enrollment for the second, third, and fourth quintiles.

Figure 3 here

Next we turn to how affirmative action policies affect the mean academic achievement of the

other students enrolled in one's college. Figure 4 shows mean academic achievement of enrolled students as a function of the student's own achievement, race, and affirmative action type. Here again, only the top four colleges in the simulation use affirmative action. For minority students (defined as Black and Hispanic students), race- and the combination race- and SES-based affirmative action policies increase the mean academic record of peers relative to no affirmative or SES-based affirmative action policies alone (see right panel). This increase in the mean academic achievement of students is experienced through most of the achievement distribution, and amounts to as many as 40 SAT points. This consistent increase in mean achievement is evidence that on average minority students experience modestly better academic settings under affirmative action policies. Conversely, White students (left panel) experience small decreases in the mean academic achievement of their peers under all types of affirmative action, although this decrease is only appreciable under the joint SES- and race-based affirmative action policies, and only at the high end of the student academic achievement distribution. On average, most White students do not experience any changes to their academic environment as an effect of affirmative action policies.

Figure 4 also includes a 45-degree line, which indicates a student's own achievement. When the lines indicating the average achievement of students' peers are below the 45-degree line, this means that minority students, on average, have scores above the average for their school. For minority students with achievement above roughly 1100 on our scale (one half standard deviation above the population mean achievement of 1000), the average achievement of their classmates is typically below their own achievement in each of the affirmative action scenarios shown in Figure 4. For minority students with slightly lower achievement, race-specific affirmative action does lead to them enrolling, on average, in schools where their own achievement is below the school average, but only slightly. These patterns suggest that concerns about affirmative action leading to minority students enrolling in schools for which they are not academically prepared may not be well-founded.

Figure 4 here

Similar patterns are evident in Figure 5, which shows the mean academic achievement of enrolled students as a function of student academic record, low- or high-SES, and type of affirmative action policy. Low-SES students see an increase in the mean academic achievement of their peers under any affirmative action policy that utilizes SES, but only minor increases as a result of race-based affirmative action. This increase is relatively consistent in the upper two-thirds of the student academic achievement distribution, with the largest increases for students with achievement above 1200. High-SES students, however, see a decline in the mean academic achievement of their peers under all affirmative action policies, and particularly for the combined SES- & race-based policy. While these decreases are not large through much of the student achievement distribution, they do increase as student academic achievement increases; at the high end of the student achievement distribution, the decrease is a much as 40 SAT points under the joint race- and SES-affirmative action policies. Note also that there is no evidence in Figure 5 that affirmative action leads to low-SES students being enrolled in schools for which they are academically unprepared.

Figure 5

Figure 6 compares the mean academic achievement of enrolled students by student achievement and race, under scenarios where race-based affirmative action policies are used by different numbers of colleges. For White students (left panel), there is little difference in the mean achievement of peers under any affirmative action admissions policy; the lines are close throughout the distribution. For minority students, however, there are increases in the mean achievement of enrolled peers under all affirmative action policies; these gains are evident across the majority of the student achievement distribution. As one might expect, when only one college uses affirmative action, only students in the top of the achievement distribution experiences gains in peer achievement, whereas when ten colleges use these admissions policies students across the distribution experience gains.

Figure 6

Because students and colleges comprise an interconnected system, the effects of affirmative action policies will not be isolated to the colleges that use them. Colleges that do not use affirmative action policies are affected by the presences of such policies in other schools. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate these system dynamics—the effect of different numbers of colleges using affirmative action policies on the kinds of students (achievement, race, and SES) enrolled in all colleges. In each of these figures, grey arrows indicate the colleges that use affirmative action and black arrows show colleges that do not. The movement of colleges (length and direction of the arrow) indicates changes in mean achievement of enrolled students and proportion of enrolled students who are either black or Hispanic (Figure 7) or low-income (Figure 8). In both figures, the colleges using affirmative action policies use moderate levels of both SES- and race-based affirmative action.

A few results are immediately clear in Figures 7 and 8. First, colleges that are using affirmative action move *up* and to the *left* in the figures. That is, these colleges become more diverse (racially and socioeconomically) and their students' average achievement declines slightly. Second, the slope of these grey arrows is quite steep, which indicates that the changes in mean achievement are much less pronounced than the changes in the proportion of minority or low-income students. Third, the less selective colleges that use affirmative action experience the greatest changes in both diversity and average achievement—their lines move the furthest. Fourth, colleges that do not adopt affirmative action policies but that are close in mean achievement to those that do also experience significant changes in diversity and average achievement, though in the opposite direction as those using affirmative action. That is, they become less diverse and the mean achievement of their enrolled students increases. Fifth, the effects on colleges that use affirmative action vary relatively little by the number of colleges using affirmative action; once a school is using these admissions policies it seems to matter little whether colleges near it are also using them. Finally, only in the most extreme cases (20 or 40 colleges using

affirmative action policies) is the margin of college attendance affected. Under the other scenarios the arrow representing un-enrolled students (the left most arrow) remains mostly unchanged.

Figures 7 and 8 here

Discussion

The results of our simulations suggest at least three important patterns: (1) reasonable SES-based affirmative action policies do not mimic the effects of race-based policies on racial diversity and reasonable race-based affirmative action policies do not mimic the effects of SES-based policies on SES diversity; (2) there is little evidence of any systemic "mismatch" induced by affirmative action policies; on average there are only small effects on the mean achievement of students' peers; and (3) the use of affirmative action policies by some colleges affects enrollment patterns in other colleges as well.

From a policy perspective, SES-based affirmative action policies do not seem effective at producing racial diversity – socioeconomic-based affirmative action produces only modest gains in racial diversity. These results are consistent with Sander (1997), who found that SES-based affirmative action at the UCLA law school did not produce the levels of diversity achieved under race-based affirmative action policies. Our simulations suggest that unless SES-based affirmative action policies use a very high, probably untenable, preference for lower-resource students, these policies are unlikely to result in the same racial composition in colleges as under current race-based affirmative action policies. Similarly, our models suggest that socioeconomic affirmative action results in considerable economic diversity in selective colleges. In contrast, race-based affirmative action alone yields relatively little socioeconomic diversity.[12] SES-based affirmative action policies can only work to produce racial diversity (and race-based policies to produce SES diversity) if the correlation between SES and race is high. Our analysis makes clear

[12] If colleges are looking to create socioeconomic diversity, one concern that may limit colleges' use of SES-based affirmative action, however, is that it necessarily increases the enrollment of students from the bottom of the socioeconomic distribution. It may carry a heavy cost in terms of financial aid (a factor not included in our models).

that the correlation between SES and race is not high enough to make SES-based affirmative action a realistic alternative to race-conscious admissions policies.[13] In sum, this suggests that SES-based affirmative action policies will be unable to meet the *Fisher* standard of "workable race-neutral alternatives [that] would produce the educational benefits of diversity" (*Fisher v. the University of Texas*, 2013, p. 11).

It is also worth noting that our models suggest that affirmative action policies are unlikely to change the margin of college attendance. That is, they do not have much effect on *who* attends college, but only on *which* college they attend if they do. Unless affirmative action policies are targeted at much lower achieving students or are implemented much more widely than they currently are, these policies are unlikely to affect the overall racial and socioeconomic distribution of college attendees.

Second, while it has been argued that affirmative action can lead to academic "mismatch" for minority students, we find no evidence that this is a systematic result of affirmative action policies. Moderate levels of race- and/or SES-based affirmative action resulted in high-achieving minority or low-SES students enrolling, on average, in colleges where their academic preparation was below the average level for the college they enrolled in. Similarly, we find that affirmative action has little effect on the average academic preparation of students in the colleges of the typical White and high-SES student.

These results, of course, focus on only the average level of academic preparation in a college. If affirmative action policies have effects on the spread of academic achievement within in a college, and if students' college experiences are partially segregated by academic level (by ability tracking in classes or study groups, for example), affirmative action policies may affect students' experiences in ways our models do not capture. Our results also focus on the average effects experienced by students. If affirmative action policies operate by changing the colleges that marginal students attend (that is,

[13] This is not to say that the correlation isn't high—it is—just that it is not high enough that one can be used as a proxy for the other in affirmative action policies. This conclusion is consistent with the ineffectiveness of SES-base K-12 school integration policies at producing racial integration (Reardon, Yun, and Kurlaender 2006; Reardon and Rhodes 2011).

pushing a few students into more selective colleges), these average results could hide significant changes for some students. While these possibilities are important to examine in greater detail, the small average changes indicate that such policies might not induce large problems with mismatch on a system-wide level.

Third, system dynamic effects are an important, and often overlooked, factor in affirmative action policies; because colleges and students are operating in an interconnected and interdependent system, the policies of one college can affect all colleges. We find that these effects are particularly strong for colleges that are not using affirmative action policies but are close in quality to schools that are. This could be a particularly important dynamic in states in which public colleges are unable to use race-based affirmative action but private colleges of similar quality can use race conscious admissions policies. This suggests that any complete assessment of affirmative action policies must attend to effects not only within colleges that use affirmative action, but also those that do not.

The models presented in this paper do not address issues of cost or financial aid. It is likely that cost and financial aid decisions will mute some of the effects of affirmative action policies unless the policies are accompanied by increased financial aid or other greatly modified tuition structures. This is a direction for future research and an area that policy makers should pay close attention to.

In *Fisher*, the Supreme Court challenged states and universities to find race-neutral strategies that can achieve educationally-beneficial diversity. Racial diversity is, the Court has agreed, educationally-beneficial (*Grutter v. Bollinger*, 2003). The question, then, is how to best achieve such diversity in Constitutionally-permitted ways. Perhaps the best way would be to eliminate racial achievement and high school graduation gaps; this would certainly go a long way toward equalizing access to selective colleges and universities without the need for race-based affirmative action. But, although these gaps have narrowed moderately in the last two decades (Reardon, Robinson-Cimipan & Weathers 2015; Murnane 2013), they are still very large, and far from eliminated.

Until racial disparities in educational preparation are eliminated, then, other strategies are needed. Our analysis here suggests that affirmative action policies based on socioeconomic status are unlikely to achieve meaningful increases in racial diversity. That is not to say that socioeconomic affirmative action would not be valuable in its own right—it would increase socioeconomic diversity on university campuses and would benefit low-income college applicants—but only that it is not an effective or efficient means to achieving racial diversity. Race-conscious affirmative action does, however, increase racial diversity effectively at the schools that use it. Although imperfect, it may be the best strategy we currently have.

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Table 1

Agent-Based Simulation Model Parameters

Parameter	Value	Source
Number of students	10,000	N/A
% White	63%	ELS
% Black	16%	ELS
% Hispanic	15%	ELS
% Asian	6%	ELS
Number of colleges	40	N/A
College capacity	150 students/college	N/A
Student achievement		ELS
White	*achievement~N(1052, 186)*	
Black	*achievement ~N(869, 169)*	
Hispanic	*achievement ~N(895, 185)*	
Asian	*achievement ~N(1038, 202)*	
Student resources		ELS
White	*resources~N*(.198, .657)	
Black	*resources~N*(-.224, .666)	
Hispanic	*resources~N*(-.447, .691)	
Asian	*resources~N*(.012, .833)	
Resources-achievement correlations		ELS
White	*r*=0.395	
Black	*r*=0.305	
Hispanic	*r*=0.373	
Asian	*r*=0.441	

Quality reliability (how well students see college quality)	0.7 + *a*(*resources*); *a*=0.1	Reardon et al. 2014
Own achievement reliability (how well students see their own achievement)	0.7 + *a*(*resources*); *a*=0.1	Reardon et al. 2014
Achievement reliability (how well colleges see student achievement)	0.8	Reardon et al. 2014
Apparent achievement (perceived achievement, increased or decreased through "achievement enhancement")	*perceived achievement* + *b*(*resources*); *b*=0.1	Becker 1990; Buchmann et al. 2010; Powers and Rock 1999; Reardon et al. 2014
Number of Applications	4 + INT[*c*(*resources*)]; *c*=0.5	ELS

Note. Quality and achievement reliability bound by minimum values of 0.5 and maximum values of 0.9

Figure 1


Racial Composition of Postsecondary Destinations, Class of 2004
Population Proportions
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Enrollment Composition
White
Asian
Other
Nat. American
Hispanic
Black
Less than high school
HS graduate, not in college
Enrolled in less than 4-year college
6
5
4
3
2
1
Enrolled in 4-Year College
(by Barron's ranking: 1 = most competitive)
Educational Enrollment Status

Figure 2


Racial Composition of Colleges Using Affirmative Action,
By Affirmative Action Type
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
86
8.6
3.9
1.9
78
7.1
9.3
5.6
68
6
15
11
85
7.7
5.1
2.4
82
7.4
6.8
3.4
75
6.8
11
6.9
57
5.1
22
16
Race Type:
SES Type:
none
none
moderate
none
strong
none
none
moderate
none
strong
moderate
moderate
strong
strong
Black
Hispanic
Asian
White

Figure 3


Socioeconomic Composition of Colleges Using Affirmative Action, By Affirmative Action Type
Percent
100
80
60
40
20
0
59
23
11
5.4
56
23
12
6.6
51
22
14
8.7
47
25
15
9.2
34
25
19
14
7.6
44
24
16
11
5.5
24
22
20
17
16
Race Type: none moderate strong none moderate strong
SES Type: none none none moderate strong moderate strong
Resource Quintile
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

Figure 4


Mean Achievement of Students in Own College
By Race, and Affirmative Action Type; Top 4 Schools Use Affirmative Action
White
Minority
Affirmative Action Type
None
Race-Based (moderate)
SES-Based (moderate)
SES- & Race-Based (moderate)
45-Degree Line
Mean Achievement in College
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Population Density
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
Student Achievement

Figure 5


Mean Achievement of Students in Own College
By SES, and Affirmative Action Type; Top 4 Schools Use Affirmative Action
High SES
Low SES
Mean Achievement in College
Affirmative Action Type
None
Race-Based (moderate)
SES-Based (moderate)
SES- & Race-Based (moderate)
45-Degree Line
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Population Density
1600
Student Achievement

Figure 6


Mean Achievement of Students in Own College
By Race and Number of Affirmative Action Schools; Moderate Race-Based Affirmative Action
White
Minority
Affirmative Action Schools
Zero
One: Top School
Four: Top Schools
Four: In Top Ten Schools
Ten: Top Schools
45-Degree Line
Mean Achievement in College
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Population Density
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
Student Achievement

Figure 7


Mean Achievement and Proportion Minority, by Number of Schools Using Affirmative Action
1 Affirmative Action School
4 Affirmative Action Schools
4 of Top 10 Affirmative Action Schools
10 Affirmative Action Schools
20 Affirmative Action Schools
40 Affirmative Action Schools
Proportion minority students
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
800
1000
1200
1400
Mean achievement of enrolled students
Moderate race- and SES-based affirmative action policies used
Arrows start at school's position in year 15 and end at school's position in year 30
Left-most arrow represents unenrolled students
schools that don't use AA
schools that use AA

Figure 8


Mean Achievement and Proportion Low-income, by Number of Schools Using Affirmative Action
1 Affirmative Action School
4 Affirmative Action Schools
4 of Top 10 Affirmative Action Schools
10 Affirmative Action Schools
20 Affirmative Action Schools
40 Affirmative Action Schools
Proportion low-income students
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
800
1000
1200
1400
Mean achievement of enrolled students
Moderate race- and SES-based affirmative action policies used
Arrows start at school's position in year 15 and end at school's position in year 30
Left-most arrow represents unenrolled students
schools that don't use AA
schools that use AA

Appendix A

Figure A1



Appendix B

Table B1: Estimates of Implicit Weight Given to Minority Students in Admissions Process, High School Class of 2004

	All schools		Barrons 4		Barrons 3		Barrons 2		Barrons 1	
SAT	0.076	***	0.079	***	0.09	***	0.093	***	0.115	***
	(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Asian	-0.004		-0.028		0.026		0.006		0.007	
	(0.011)		(0.022)		(0.021)		(0.029)		(0.024)	
	-5.26		*-35.44*		*28.89*		*6.45*		*6.09*	
Black	-0.04	***	-0.098	***	-0.044	*	-0.028		0.303	***
	(0.010)		(0.016)		(0.021)		(0.034)		(0.040)	
	-52.63		*-124.05*		*-48.89*		*-30.11*		*263.48*	
Hispanic	0.024	*	-0.025		0.01		0.037		0.294	***
	(0.010)		(0.018)		(0.021)		(0.031)		(0.034)	
	31.58		*-31.65*		*11.11*		*39.79*		*255.65*	
Intercept	-0.015		0.038		-0.197		-0.376		-1.102	
	(0.019)		(0.033)		(0.038)		(0.061)		(0.080)	
N	23,000		6,700		5,000		2,800		2,700	

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: Authors' calculations from ELS:2002 study. Estimates are from a linear probability model predicting acceptance to a given selectivity of school as a function of SAT score and dummy variables for race. Sample sizes have been rounded to the nearest 100. The implicit admissions weight (in SAT points) is included in italics below the standard error for each model.

Table B2: Implicit Weight Given to Socioeconomic Status in Admissions Process, High School Class of 2004

	All schools		Barrons 4		Barrons 3		Barrons 2		Barrons 1	
SAT	0.076	***	0.083	***	0.092	***	0.094	***	0.09	***
	(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
SES	0.01	*	0.027	***	0.003		0.001		-0.033	*
	(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.013)		(0.014)	
	13.2		*32.5*		*3.2*		*1.1*		*-36.6*	
Intercept	-0.025		-0.026		-0.216		-0.381		-0.716	
	(0.017)		(0.030)		(0.035)		(0.057)		(0.073)	
N	23,000		6,700		5,000		2,800		2,700	

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Source: Authors' calculations from ELS:2002 study. Estimates are from a linear probability model predicting acceptance to a given selectivity of school as a function of SAT score and the ELS SES variable (continuous and standardized). Sample sizes have been rounded to the nearest 100. The implicit admissions weight (in SAT points) is included in italics below the standard error for each model.

Appendix C

Explanation of Model

Initialization

For each scenario of the model, we generate J colleges with m available seats per year (for the sake of simplicity, m is constant across colleges). During each year of the model run, a new cohort of N students engages in the college application process. Initial college quality (Q) is normally distributed, as are race-specific distributions of student achievement (A) and student resources (R). We allow for race-specific correlations between A and R. The values used for these parameters, and their sources, are specified in Table 1. We select these values to balance computational speed and distribution density (e.g. for number of colleges and students); real-world data (e.g. for achievement and resource distributions); and based on the original version of the model (ELS 2002; Reardon et al., 2014).

Submodels

Application. During this stage of our model, students generate an application portfolio, with each student selecting n_s colleges to which they will apply. Every student's perception of each college's quality (where student s's perception of college c's quality is denoted Q^*_{cs}) is a function of the college's true quality (Q_c) plus a random noise term (u_{cs}), which represents both imperfect information and idiosyncratic preferences.

$$Q^*_{cs} = Q_c + u_{cs};\ \ u_{cs} \sim N(0, \tau_s). \tag{B.1}$$

The noise in students' perceptions of college quality has a variance that depends on a students' resources; students from high-resources families have better information about college quality. Specifically,

$$\tau_s = Var(Q_c)\left(\frac{1-\rho_s^Q}{\rho_s^Q}\right),$$

(B.2)

where ρ_s^Q, the reliability of student perceptions of college quality, is a function of student resources, and bounded between 0.5 and 0.7, as described in Table 1.

Students then use perceived college quality (Q_{cs}^*) to evaluate the potential utility of their own attendance at that college (U_{cs}^*), based on how much utility they place on college quality:

$$U_{cs}^* = a_s + b_s(Q_{cs}^*), \tag{B.3}$$

where α_s is the intercept of a linear utility function and β_s is the slope. Reardon et al (2014) showed that allowing α_s and β_s to vary with students' socioeconomic resources had little effect on college application decisions; as a result we fix both to be constant across students.

Students may augment their own achievement, and they perceive their own achievement with noise. Thus, their assessment of their achievement, for purposes of deciding where to apply is:

$$A_s^* = A_s + a_s + e_s; \quad e_s \sim N(0, \sigma_s), \tag{B.4}$$

where a_s represents enhancements to perceived achievement that are unrelated to achievement itself (e.g. strategic extracurricular activity participation or application essay consultation) and e_s represents a student's error in her perception of her own achievement. The values that are used for these parameters and their relationships with student resources are listed in Table 1. As above, the error in a student's assessment of her own achievement has a variance that depends on her family resources:

$$\sigma_s = Var(A)\left(\frac{1-\rho_s^A}{\rho_s^A}\right),$$

(B.5)

where ρ_s^A, the reliability of student perceptions of their own achievement, is a function of student

resources, and bounded between 0.5 and 0.7, as described in Table 1.[14]

Based on their noisy observations of their own achievement and college quality, students estimate their probabilities of admission into each college as a logisitic function of the difference between their perception of their own achievement and their perception of a given college's quality:

$$P_{cs}^{*} = f(A_{s}^{*} - Q_{cs}^{*}) = \left(1 + e^{\alpha+\beta(A_{s}^{*}-Q_{cs}^{*})}\right)^{-1} \quad \text{(B.6)}$$

where the parameter of f are based on admission patterns over the prior 5 years. In each year of the model, the parameters α and β of f are estimated by fitting a logit model predicting the observed admissions decisions using the difference between (true) student achievement and college quality for each submitted application over the past 5 years. We set $\alpha = 0$ and $\beta = -0.015$ for the first 5 years of our simulation (since there are no prior estimates to use). These values were selected based on observing the admission probability function over a number of model runs; the starting values do not influence the model end-state, but do influence how quickly the function (and the model itself) stabilizes.

Each student applies to a set of n_s colleges, where n_s is determined by the student's resources, as described in Table 1. Given n_s, a student applies to the set of n_s colleges that maximize her overall expected utility. To determine the expected utility of an application portfolio, we do the following. Let $E_s^*\{C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_{n_s}\}$ indicate student *s*'s expected utility of applying to the set of n_s colleges $\{C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_{n_s}\}$, where the colleges in the set are ordered from highest to lowest perceived utility to student s: $U_{C_1 s}^{*} \geq U_{C_2 s}^{*} \geq \cdots \geq U_{C_n s}^{*}$. Define $E_s^*\{\emptyset\} = 0$. Let P_{cs}^{*} indicate student *s*'s perceived probability of admission to

[14] The intercept value, minima, maxima, and linear relationships with resources used for the reliabilities with which students perceive their own achievement and college quality, as well as the intercept and slope values used for students' evaluation of the utility of attending colleges are based on those used in previous work (Reardon et al., 2014). Briefly, the resource relationships are based on experimentation into the role of differential information quality in the observed sorting of students into colleges by socioeconomic status (Reardon et al., 2014). In the absence of available empirical evidence, the other values used are plausible estimates: the average student has moderately high, but not perfect, perception of college quality (e.g. familiarity with college rankings) as well as their own achievement (e.g. knowledge of their SAT scores); and because of resource, effort, and opportunity costs the utility of attending a very low-quality college is less than 0 (i.e. lower than not attending college). Extensive model testing suggests that our selections of these specific parameter values did not affect the overall interpretation of our results.

college *c*. Then the expected utility of applying to a given set of colleges is computed recursively as

$$E_s^*\{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{n_s}\} = P_{C_1 s}^* \cdot U_{C_1 s}^* + \left(1 - P_{C_1 s}^*\right) \cdot E_s^*\{C_2, \dots, C_{n_s}\}. \tag{B.7}$$

In our model, each student applies to the set of colleges $\{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{n_s}\}$ that maximizes $E_s^*\{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{n_s}\}$. In principle, this means that a student agent in the model computes the expected utility associated with applying to every possible combination of three colleges in the model, and then chooses the set that maximizes this expected utility. The model developed by Reardon et al (2014) uses a fast algorithm for this maximization; we use the same algorithm here.

Although the model assumes all students are rational, utility-maximizing agents with enormous computational capacity, this is moderated by the fact that the student agents in the model have both imperfect information and idiosyncratic preferences, both of which are partly associated with their family resources. This means that there is considerable variability in student application portfolios, even conditional on having the same true academic records, and that high-resource students choose, on average, more optimal application portfolios than lower-resource students. Both of these features mimic aspects of actual students' empirical application decisions (e.g. Hoxby & Avery 2012). More generally, the assumption of rational behavior is an abstraction that facilitates focus on the elements of college sorting that we wish to explore. We recognize that real-world students use many different strategies to determine where they apply.

Admission. Colleges observe the apparent achievement ($A_s + a_s$) of applicants with some amount of noise (like the noise with which students view college quality, this also reflects both imperfect information as well as idiosyncratic preferences):

$$A_{cs}^{**} = A_s + a_s + w_{cs}; \;\; w_{cs} \sim N(0, \phi). \tag{B.8}$$

As described in Table 1, colleges assess students' achievement with a reliability of 0.8. Given that true achievement has a variance of 200^2 in the population, this implies that the error variance colleges'

assessments of student achievement is

$$\phi = Var(A)\left(\frac{1-0.8}{0.8}\right) = .25 \cdot 200^2 = 100^2. \tag{B.9}$$

Thus, in the model, colleges' uncertainty and idiosyncratic preferences have the effect of adding noise with a standard deviation of 100 points (half a standard deviation of achievement) to each student's application.[15]

Affirmative action policies are activated after year 15 of model runs (in order to allow college quality and application, admission, and enrollment behavior to stabilize first). At this point, colleges' affirmative action policies are activated and remain stable through the remainder of the model run. Letting G_c and H_c indicate the magnitude of affirmative action weights used in college c's race- and resource-based affirmative action policies, respectively, and letting B_s, H_s, and R_s indicate a student's race (black or Hispanic, respectively) and resources, colleges rank students according to

$$A_{cs}^{***} = A_{cs}^{**} + G_c(B_s + H_s) + H_c R_s. \tag{B.10}$$

Colleges rank applicants according to A_{cs}^{***} and admit the top applicants. In the first year of our model run, college's expected yield (the proportion of admitted students that a college expects to enroll) is given by:

$$Yield_c = 0.2 + .06 \cdot (College\ Quality\ Percentile) \tag{B.11}$$

with the lowest-quality college expecting slightly over 20% of admitted students to enroll and the highest quality college expecting 80% of admitted students to enroll. In subsequent years, colleges admit $\frac{m}{Yield_c}$ students in order to try to fill m seats (where m=150 in our model). After the first year of a model run,

[15] As with the parameter values that describe student perception, the means, minima, and maxima used for the reliability with which colleges perceive student achievement is based on what was used in previous work (Reardon et al., 2014). Although there is a lack of extant empirical evidence to inform these values, we made estimates that seem sensible: collectively, college admission officers have quite a bit of experience evaluating students and thus colleges have a highly accurate (but also not perfect) perception of student achievement. Extensive model testing suggests that our selections of these specific parameter values did not affect the overall interpretation of our results.

colleges are able to use up to 3 years of enrollment history to determine their expected yield, with $Yield_c$ representing a running average of the most recent enrollment yield for each college.

Enrollment. Students enroll in the college with the highest estimated utility of attendance (U_{cs}^*) to which they were admitted.

Iteration. Colleges' quality values (Q_c) are updated based on the incoming class of enrolled students (whose average achievement is denoted $\bar{A}_c$) before the next year's cohort of students begins the application process:

$$Q_c' = 0.9 \cdot Q_c + 0.1 \cdot \bar{A}_c \quad \text{(B.12)}$$

We run our model for 30 years (this appears to be a sufficient length of time for our model to reach a relatively stable state for the parameter specifications that we explore).

The Forgotten Choice?

Rethinking Magnet Schools in a Changing Landscape

A Report to Magnet Schools of America

Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley

Foreword by Gary Orfield

November 2008

The Civil Rights Project

Proyecto Derechos Civiles

Acknowledgments

This report stems from the analysis of a survey distributed at the spring 2008 annual meeting of the Magnet Schools of America (MSA), and we are grateful to the organization for both distributing the survey and giving us the opportunity to analyze these data. We also appreciate the time and insight provided by each of the respondents who completed the survey instrument. While we appreciate their collaboration, the analysis was conducted separately of MSA and they did not influence the conclusions we reached. The Magnet Schools of America has as its mission to "promote equity, diversity, and academic excellence." We hope that this report will help them to continue to assist magnet schools in achieving all of these important goals.

The authors would like to thank several staff members at the Civil Rights Project. Ana K. Soltero Lopez and Daniel Hagos contributed to the initial data organization and entry, providing important groundwork for the development of this study. We thank Thomas Kissling for his proof-reading and Chris Calvert for the report's layout. In addition, the report would not have been possible without the assistance of Jared Sanchez, who spent many hours assembling, entering and organizing data, along with editing and proofreading various versions of the document. We want to particularly thank Chungmei Lee for her assistance with the analysis of the NCES data and Laurie Russman for her hard work and concerted efforts, all of which helped move this project forward. We are also appreciative of Patricia Gándara's feedback.

Finally, we would like to recognize the invaluable insight and wisdom of Gary Orfield; this research would not have been possible without his guidance.

Foreword

There has been intense discussion of choice in American schools for decades. In this year's presidential campaign, the candidates of both major parties promised to increase support for one form of choice—charter schools. Yet, almost nothing was said about a system of magnet schools that enrolls more than twice as many students in "schools of choice," a policy that has produced many extremely popular and successful schools. Further, these magnet schools were designed to break down racial barriers and foster the voluntary commitment of students, parents and teachers to integrated schools offering special educational opportunities that, by their nature, could not be offered in comprehensive neighborhood schools.

The magnet school system flourished in the l970s and l980s and then lost public attention as the courts began to dismantle desegregation plans. Funds were then pumped into the expansion of charter schools, which are similar in some very important ways but differ in others. Though the story of magnet schools is a complex one, I believe that it has many positive lessons that deserve attention in the development of new federal policies, particularly as it offers important implications for future policies about charters, the new pilot schools, and other choice mechanisms. Magnet schools themselves also deserve increased support.

Large-scale choice first became part of American education when schools in the South adopted "freedom of choice" plans in the early l960s, hoping to avoid mandatory desegregation. Those plans left the system of segregation so intact that the Supreme Court later held they were inadequate in remedying illegal segregation.[1] After urban school districts were required to desegregate in the l970s, pioneering educators in Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Buffalo, and other communities invented ways to create educationally distinctive schools that worked to produce significant desegregation. This approach, supported by both liberals and conservatives, received substantial funding to expand similar models. Importantly, it showed positive impacts on support for public schools, while at the same time increasing desegregation through choice, important new educational options for families, and academic gains. Senator John Glenn sponsored new federal legislation in 1976 to grant funds to create more magnet schools, which passed with widespread support.[2] The federal Magnet School Assistance Program was very popular with school districts across the country, even with its requirements for desegregation policies. At their best, magnet schools offered special curricular offerings along with the following: integrated staffs of teachers drawn by interest, strengthened by training and curricular materials; very good parent information; free transportation to interested students; desegregation standards for student body composition; outreach to eligible students; and selection methods that relied on student interest rather than screening tests. Magnet schools provided choice with the three essential civil rights policies -- information, open access, and desegregation standards -- along with truly distinctive educational offerings. Some of these schools became extraordinarily popular.

Magnet schools deserve attention now especially since many are changing and sometimes moving away from their founding principles as a result of recent policy shifts and the Supreme Court's 2007 decision that limited the tools for voluntary integration.

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[1] *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,* 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
[2] Congressional Record, Aug. 27, 1976.

Both authors of this study, which analyzes a recent survey of several hundred teachers and administrators affiliated with magnet schools across the country, are among the millions of alumni of magnet schools. Erica Frankenberg attended a magnet middle school, begun in the late 1980s as part of a settlement to a long-running desegregation case in Mobile, Alabama, while Genevieve Siegel-Hawley attended an inter-district magnet high school in Richmond, Virginia. Each of these schools was explicitly focused on creating opportunities for racially diverse schooling experiences, which was also paired with a college-preparatory curriculum.

Mobile's Phillips Preparatory offered free transportation, did outreach to communities about magnet school options, selected students to roughly approximate the surrounding district or region's racial composition, and hired a racially diverse faculty and administration. It has also consistently maintained a racially-balanced school even as the district has been declared unitary (in 1997) and has transitioned to a majority black and majority low-income district.

In the metropolitan Richmond area, the Maggie Walker Governor's School for Government and International Studies provides students and families with a unique opportunity to attend a highly touted academic program, enrolling students from eleven different cities and counties in the region. The building itself is the site of one of Richmond City's historically black high schools, named for a highly successful African American businesswoman. Recently, the increasingly competitive nature of the admissions process has resulted in a sharp decline in minority student enrollment. Encouragingly, Maggie Walker has retained an educational consulting group to help research and refine its admissions procedures in an effort to more firmly adhere to the school's inclusive vision statement.

Erica and Genevieve write:

> Our experiences and the impact of the magnet schools we attended suggest that magnet schools can offer opportunities for rich educational experiences, both academically and socially, that are unparalleled, preparing us for leading universities and prompting us to become researchers studying issues of racial inequity in American public schools. Much of our understanding and deep commitment to integration comes from being white Southerners in these life-changing schools. In a society where white students are the most isolated, but where students of color will soon make up half of the nation’s enrollment, these increasingly rare integrated experiences are more needed now than ever before, especially as desegregation plans are dissolved.

It has been my great honor to teach students for more than three decades in six of the nation's leading research universities, three great private and three great public institutions. I have had countless students in my classes, read their essays, talked and debated with them about important issues, listened to their insights, and put them to work in classroom and professional research projects trying to understand important social and educational issues. Many of my best students attended magnet schools which have given them positive interracial contacts and experiences and have sharpened their perception, given them talents for effectively crossing lines of social division, and provided a rich preparation for living, working, and contributing to an extremely diverse society.

I have also seen the impact of magnet schools in my own family. Two of my daughters were part of a voluntary busing program to the Booker T. Washington magnet school in Champaign,

Illinois. The school, located in an African American community in a downstate Illinois university city, had excellent teachers and a strong principal, Hester Suggs. The magnet school provided them and our family with very positive experiences in a school that was warmly multicultural.

We are now at a stage where, for decades, the country has done almost nothing positive to produce successful interracial schooling and communities. During this time, all three branches of government have cut back the limited but important tools that existed before the Reagan era began dismantling the civil rights revolution. We should look carefully at the experience of magnet schools in creating mutually beneficial and widely accepted ways of pursuing both integration and educational choice. If we could reinforce the civil rights policies in these institutions and apply them more broadly to other systems of school choice, we could begin to reverse the trend of deepening re-segregation of American society.

Gary Orfield

Executive Summary

Magnet schools are the largest set of choice-based schools in the nation and today enroll twice as many students as the rapidly growing charter school sector. The intent of magnet schools was to use incentives rather than coercion to create desegregation. Magnet schools, then, represent a compromise between individualism (choosing one's school) and achieving community goals (diversity). Magnet schools were originally designed to incorporate strong civil rights protections (such as good parent information/outreach, explicit desegregation goals, and free transportation) and most were designed not to have selective admissions processes. This differs from more recent schools of choice that have been designed without these mechanisms. Today, in the aftermath of federal court decisions limiting race-conscious efforts by school districts, magnets comprise a diverse set of schools serving a variety of functions. Many have lost their desegregation mechanisms, which, as we will show, have made a difference in their racial diversity.

Magnet schools have been historically an important part of school districts' efforts to create desegregated, high-quality educational options for students. As the Supreme Court began limiting the extent of desegregation remedies in the 1970s, a subsequent growth in magnet schools occurred. The federal government began to provide funding for the establishment of new magnet programs, a policy that combined desegregation, innovation, and parental choice. In an era of exploding educational choice options – rapidly accelerated by the popularity of charter schools – with growing racial diversity among the under-18 population, it is worth revisiting magnet schools' efforts at integration.

This report compares the characteristics of students in magnet and charter schools, as well as exploring whether and how magnet schools may be affected by the presence of nearby charter schools. Charters have become a central focus of school choice proponents, which is highlighted by their inclusion in the education platforms of both presidential candidates during the 2008 election. President-elect Obama has suggested doubling the annual federal funding for charter schools, to $400 million annually (Hoff, 2008). As a result of these and other pressures, attention has been siphoned away from magnet schools. It is important to understand the differences between the two types of schools in an effort to grasp some of the potential effects of policy emphasis on charters.

Magnet schools were located in 31 states in 2005-06, the latest year for which there is available data, and enroll more students (just over 2 million) than charter schools. Magnets are more likely to be located in central cities than charters; both types are more likely to be in cities when compared to the location of other traditional public schools. Data indicate that the charter school population is more affluent than the magnet school population, as well as the student population in all public schools. Charters also contain a higher percentage of white students than magnet schools, while there is higher segregation of black students—and isolation of white students—in charter schools than magnet schools. Latinos are more segregated in magnet schools, which may be due to the high enrollment of Latino students in magnet schools in the western U.S. In short, in comparison to magnet schools, many charters today are enrolling a disproportionately affluent and white student population. These data suggest that it is important to consider the experiences of magnet schools alongside those of charter schools as educational choice grows.

This report is an analysis of responses to a survey of public school employees, ranging from teachers to superintendents, associated with magnet schools. The survey was administered with the cooperation of the Magnet Schools of America at its spring 2008 conference. These data have been independently analyzed by the Civil Rights Project staff. We describe a few key findings below.

The mission of magnet schools has shifted considerably from its historical focus on racial desegregation, perhaps due to realities facing magnet schools such as stagnant funding for magnet schools and a move away from focusing on race-conscious desegregation efforts in federal policy and judicial decision-making. Only one-third of schools in this sample still have desegregation goals while nearly as many schools no longer or never had desegregation goals.

The conditions under which magnet schools are structured have important implications for levels of diversity. For example, schools with desegregation goals were more likely to be substantially integrated or experiencing increasing integration. By contrast, the highest percentages of one-race schools were those that had never had any desegregation goals. Additionally, whole school magnets as compared to school-within-a-school magnets were more likely to be diverse. Competitive admissions criteria, such as using GPA or test scores as part of the admissions process, are frequently used by magnet schools and, among this sample, were used more often by a larger number of segregated schools. Most schools have at least one type of special outreach to attract students and families from racially diverse backgrounds. Schools that outreach to prospective students were more likely to have experienced increasing integration over the last decade, while one-quarter of those without special outreach were one-race schools.

Teacher training in the form of orientation, professional development and mentoring, to name a few practices, can be an important element in the preparation of teachers for racially diverse classrooms. More than one-third of all schools in this sample do not offer any kind of teacher training about creating successful race relations. Similar to other literature on teacher mobility, perceptions of teacher turnover culled from this survey were lower in magnet schools that were integrated or increasingly integrated.

Transportation has been an important provision of magnet schools, specifically to ensure that everyone who chooses what might be out-of-neighborhood schools is able to attend. We find that most schools in this sample do provide free transportation, and that such schools are less likely to be racially isolated.

We also find that demand for slots in magnets schools is more likely to increase among all groups of parents if the magnets have some desegregation goals and also specific outreach to prospective students. By contrast, higher percentages of schools without any outreach reported that this demand only increased among some types of parental groups, and that demand had declined overall in the last decade.

Magnet schools located in districts with nearby charter schools were more likely to report decreasing levels of integration than districts without charter school alternatives.

Taken together, this report suggests that conditions in magnet schools are indeed changing, thus deserving close attention in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's *PICS* decision to limit the use of race in student assignment plans. We conclude with a series of recommendations as to how we can learn from and improve upon the experience of magnet schools to continue to offer unique, high-quality diverse educational options to current and future generations of students.

The Forgotten Choice? Rethinking Magnet Schools in a Changing Landscape

Magnet schools play an historic and central role in desegregation as well as in the growth of public school choice. In an era of prolific educational options for parents, including charter, private and alternative schools, magnets stand out as the only form of choice created for the purpose of racially integrating schools. Understanding the trajectory of magnet schools - in terms of their growth, development and adherence to the core mission of desegregation - offers important lessons for advocates of public school integration in the 21st century. Moreover, grasping the implications of a shift away from the original goal of desegregation for magnet schools (Goldring and Smrekar, 2000; Steele and Eaton, 1996) becomes increasingly urgent as current political and legal circumstances offer uncertain terrain for sustaining, much less increasing, racially diverse learning opportunities. This report examines on-the-ground desegregation conditions in magnet schools in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's restrictions on using race in student assignment policies.

The reverberations from the June 2007 Supreme Court decision in *Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District (PICS)* continue to echo through the magnet school community, as well as among other educational groups. In a divided ruling, the Court reaffirmed the value of racial diversity in our nation's schools, yet limited the options available to districts interested in ensuring such diversity. Many magnet programs have traditionally relied upon race-conscious measures to promote integrated school environments. While it is too early to be able to assess the full extent of the effects of *PICS* on magnet enrollment policies,[3] we find that many magnet schools in this sample report changing desegregation goals and declining integration levels. These policy shifts have important implications for the success of the magnet concept, which was founded, in part, research findings concluding that racially diverse schools contain academic and social benefits for students (Linn & Welner, 2006; Orfield, Frankenberg & Garces, 2008).

Magnet schools are public schools that emphasize a special curricular or theme focus, traditionally in order to attract white students to schools in minority neighborhoods (Goldring and Smrekar, 2000). Magnet schools tend to be located in large, high poverty urban districts and, sometimes, in high poverty/minority areas within school districts (Levin, 1997; Goldring and Smrekar, 2000). Enrollment at magnet programs is not restricted to existing school attendance zones and (Steele and Levin, 1994). Many magnet programs – particularly at the outset of their establishment – strived to maintain a racially balanced student body (Goldring and Smrekar, 2000). In this fashion, magnets help disrupt patterns of residential segregation that give way to school segregation under neighborhood school policies. Given these structures, magnet programs have historically been a popular way for school districts to comply with desegregation orders. Today parent demand for magnets often exceeds the number of slots available (Blank, Levine and Steele, 1996), and many programs establish methods to deal with over-subscription issues (e.g. lotteries, first come-first serve, or entrance qualifications). The underlying goals of many of

[3] One of the first post-*PICS* challenges was in New York City to the Specialized High School Institute, which helps to prepare low-income and minority students for the admissions test to New York City's specialized high schools, which have extremely competitive admissions processes and have an extremely low percentage of black & Latino students in a district with 71% of such students. The Institute subsequently revised its admission criteria to eliminate consideration of students' race/ethnicity and to consider instead students' socioeconomic status.

these admissions strategies have historically been to ensure a racially diverse student body.

This study helps fill a gap in the literature about magnet schools and whether they contribute to school desegregation given changes in the legal climate and education policy arena (particularly the growth of non-magnet educational choice). What was once a popular policy option for districts interested the expansion of racially inclusive school choice has become a forgotten choice in American educational policy. In the movement away from proactive measures to improve educational equity, have we undermined one of the most popular mechanisms to ensure racially diverse, academically challenging schools? These issues will be further explored in the report.

Research Questions

This paper will assess the current desegregation conditions in magnet schools. In doing so, we answer the following research questions:

1. To what extent have magnet schools and policies been affected by the increasing legal and political constraints of the past fifteen years?
    a) How many magnet schools still operate under desegregation goals, and to what extent are these goals changing?
    b) How do these changes correspond with racial integration levels in magnet schools over the past decade?
2. To what extent do magnet schools employ policies to attract a diverse student body, and how successful are they in terms of parental demand, student diversity, and teacher turnover?
3. How do other educational choice options in the district relate to demand for magnets and their integration levels?

Other research indicates that magnet schools can have a positive impact on academic outcomes for students. This fact, alongside the early desegregation effects of magnet schools, makes a strong case for renewed policy emphasis on magnets as a major type of educational choice. Although magnet schools today comprise a diverse set of schools, the integrative success of magnets should make civil rights considerations an important component of school choice; without them, the opportunity to create and maintain racially diverse learning environments begins to fade. However, this report finds that, among those in our sample, magnet schools can quickly become susceptible to re-segregation if school structures like free transportation, desegregation goals and special outreach are scrapped in favor of less inclusive policies. Not surprisingly, then, our research shows parent demand for slots in magnets schools is more likely to increase among all groups of parents if the magnets have some desegregation goals and specific outreach to prospective students.

The report is organized into five sections. The first reviews the development and growth of magnet schools, their shifting emphasis on desegregation, the academic benefits associated with these programs, and the demographic landscape of school choice today. The second section examines racial integration levels in magnet schools, looking closely at the relationship between integration and a number of factors that might enhance the ability of these schools of choice to

attract and retain a diverse group of students. A third section of the report explores parent demand for magnets, and whether or not it is associated with racial integration levels, free transportation, and outreach. Fourth, charter schools may be a source of competition for magnet schools, and we examine how the presence of charters in a district may relate to parent demand and racial integration in magnet programs. Finally, the report closes with a brief exploration of the understanding of the recent Supreme Court decision and policy recommendations for enhancing the ability of magnet schools to create diverse schools in this new demographic and educational landscape.

Background on Magnet Schools

The development and growth of magnet schools

Although the concept of magnet school choice was put into operation as a desegregation strategy, the relationship between school choice and segregation dates back to the early days of Massive Resistance. School districts across the South sought to avoid compliance with *Brown* by adopting "freedom of choice" plans, which allowed students and families the "freedom" to choose to attend any school. In reality these plans did little to disrupt long-standing patterns of segregation, beyond a few token black students attending what were virtually all-white schools. In fact, the Supreme Court was forced to intervene as evidence mounted against the effectiveness of freedom of choice plans, ruling in 1968 that "rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated to simply burden children and their parents with a responsibility [that should be] placed squarely on the School Board" (see *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,* 441-2). Parental choice under this framework simply maintained the status quo – perpetuating segregated school systems.

As politicians decried "forced busing" implemented in the early 1970s to meet desegregation requirements, magnet schools rose to prominence as a widely accepted strategy for combining desegregation with parental choice. The early failures of uncontrolled choice did not necessarily discourage conservatives from continuing to push the strategy (Orfield & Eaton, 1996), and as the judicial and political winds shifted, liberals conceded that compromises were in order (Blank et al., 1983; Frankenberg and Le, forthcoming*).*

The 1974 *Milliken* decision released suburban areas surrounding Detroit from bearing responsibility for patterns of metropolitan segregation that characterized Detroit's central city and adjacent suburbs. In essence, the Supreme Court's ruling sealed off the boundaries between many American cities and their suburbs, creating an easy (and nearby) alternative for white parents fleeing desegregation orders in urban centers (Orfield, 1996). In particular, cities in the North and Midwest (e.g. Buffalo and Cincinnati) were being asked to desegregate their schools at a time when urban housing markets were undergoing rapid racial change. These districts faced the challenge of desegregating their schools without further exacerbating white flight fueled by a tempting alternative in close proximity presented by the *Milliken* decision: participate in mandatory school reassignment to further an urban desegregation plan, or move to nearby suburbs that were almost all-white. As a result, urban districts began to offer magnet schools as a high-quality educational alternative - providing incentives for whites to remain in city systems, while, at the same time, allowing the districts to meet their desegregation requirements (Frankenberg and Le, forthcoming). Thus, many districts outside the South (where countywide

school districts existed that limited the effect of *Milliken*, along with more widespread desegregation already in place) witnessed a growth of magnet schools in the mid-1970s.

In addition to the effects of the *Milliken* decision, there was also growing political resistance to far-reaching desegregation strategies. Following the implementation of several extensive desegregation court-ordered remedies, Congress passed the Eagleton-Biden Amendment in late 1977, placing severe restrictions on HEW's[4] ability to prescribe busing as a method to desegregate and comply with Title VI (Raffel, 1998). In sum, the Supreme Court's retreat from authorizing comprehensive city-suburban desegregation and the growing number of politicians who were intent on deriding the use of "forced busing" prompted liberal factions to support magnets as one of the few remaining desegregation strategies that appeared politically viable. Many conservatives touted the virtues of school choice, in part because the market-based implications of offering competitive alternatives to public schools (Chubb and Moe, 1990).

Government support for magnet programs

As the popularity of magnet schools grew in the wake of the *Swann* decision, which sanctioned cross-district student assignment for the purpose of integration (see *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg*, 1971), the federal government passed the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) in 1972 to assist school districts pursuing desegregation. Though the first magnet school opened several years prior to ESAA in Tacoma, Washington (Rossell, 2005), the most significant period of growth occurred after 1975 (Goldring and Smrekar, 2000). Two important events took place during this time period that spurred the magnet movement onward: first, the courts recognized their legitimacy as tools for desegregation (see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 1975); and second, in 1976 Congress amended ESAA by initiating a federal grant program for school districts interested in opening magnet programs to aid in furthering desegregation goals (Orfield, 1978). Magnet programs garnered a large share of ESAA funding through the 1970s until Reagan cut funding for desegregation in his first year in office (Orfield, 2007). Funding was partially reinstated by the passage of the Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP) in the mid-1980s, with bipartisan support from Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Orrin Hatch (Clinchy, 1993).

Thus, the limitations on federal efforts to support busing to further school desegregation were coupled with the new MSAP support for magnet schools. As a combination of a number of factors, then, magnet schools in districts multiplied – so much so that between 1985 and 1993, MSAP awarded grants to 117 school districts nationwide (Steele & Eaton, 1996).[5] The U.S. Department of Education estimates that over half of all large urban school systems used magnets as a tool for desegregation (Goldring & Smrekar, 2000).

The shifting purpose of magnet schools

Increased accountability and high stakes testing, the rising popularity of school choice, and the retreat from desegregation make today's educational landscape vastly different from the one in which magnet schools originated. Perhaps it is not surprising then that many magnets report a shift away from the original purpose of desegregation.

[4] The Department of Health, Education, & Welfare (HEW) was the federal agency overseeing education until the Department of Education was formed.

[5] By comparison, only 14 school districts applied for MSAP grants in 1976, the first year they were available (Blank et al., 1983).

The Department of Education has conducted three broad reviews of magnet programs established with the help of ESAA funding or MSAP grants (importantly, this is only a subset of all magnet schools that exist—magnet schools were only funded in 41 districts for the 2007-2010 MSAP funding cycle). The 1983 report found that over 60% of magnets studied were "fully desegregated," with the remainder still reporting substantial racial/ethnic diversity (Blank et al., 1983). The next evaluation, published in 1996, found less encouraging results: only 42% of new magnet programs were operating under obvious desegregation guidelines (Steele & Eaton, 1996). And finally, the latest magnet study issued by the Department of Education in 2003 found that 57% of newly founded magnet programs were making progress in combating racial isolation, while another 43% were experiencing an increase in segregation (Christenson et. al, 2003; Amicus brief of ACLU, 2006).[6] The 2003 study explicitly cited the use of race-neutral admissions criteria as a possible explanation for the fact that over 40% of 1998 MSAP awardees reported rising segregation (Christenson et. al., 2003, p. 77). The first two evaluations of magnet schools examined the extent to which MSAP awardees specifically designated desegregation as a goal of their programs. The third and final Department of Education study did not research desegregation goals, suggesting that priorities – at least at the federal level – may have been shifting. While this does not mean that the magnet programs themselves were no longer establishing desegregation goals, the Department of Education's failure to examine what had been a key focus of the first two reports is indicative of changing values. These Department of Education evaluations reinforce two key points: (1) Magnet programs by no means guarantee an opportunity for integrated schooling, and in fact may provide just the opposite; and (2) many magnets are being established without explicit goals for desegregation.

Further indication of shifting federal priorities came with a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s. These rulings helped solidify the judicial retreat from desegregation begun with the 1974 *Milliken* decision; taken together they lessened the standard necessary for school districts to be judged to have completely eliminated the effects of segregation (Orfield & Eaton, 1996). The third decision, *Missouri v. Jenkins*, is particularly relevant because it focused on the establishment of magnet programs in Kansas City. As part of an effort to ameliorate widespread segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area, the district court refused to implement a metropolitan city-suburban desegregation plan, ordering instead the creation of inter-district magnet schools. The magnet schools were designed to attract white city and suburban students to largely minority city schools and to improve the educational achievement of students. More than $1.5 billion was spent to upgrade the city schools and to provide unparalleled educational resources for these magnet schools. However, the Supreme Court rejected this remedy, finding no evidence of interdistrict responsibility for Kansas City's segregation and urged the local court to return the district to "local control" (Morantz, 1996). This case further highlights the diminished commitment to desegregation – from multiple branches of government – making the gradual shift in magnet goals becomes easier to comprehend.

Alongside the changing goals of magnet programs, there has also been an increasing emphasis on raising the academic performance of American school children. Constrained by the Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s and today's standards and accountability movement, magnets are now under pressure to perform many other duties beyond desegregation. Indeed, with each

[6] The 2003 report studied MSAP grantees from 1998-2001. While the first two Department of Education studies assessed the effectiveness of magnets in reducing or eliminating minority isolation as it related to the desegregation goals of each program, the 2003 report did not include a direct assessment of desegregation goals.

renewal of MSAP funding, magnet programs were expected to serve as beacons of innovation, reform and/or raised academic standards in addition to the goals of preventing racial isolation (Frankenberg & Le, forthcoming). As we will see in the following section, magnet programs have been relatively successful at improved academic outcomes, but the addition of these extra educational goals makes it more difficult to focus on trying to prevent segregation.

Academic benefits of magnet programs

Several studies have pointed to important academic gains for children attending magnet schools. One of the more widely disseminated reports on the educational benefits of magnet programs found evidence to support higher rates of student achievement in magnets than in regular public high schools, private or Catholic schools (Gamoran, 1996). The study also found that magnet students made faster achievement gains in most subjects – with the exception of mathematics – than high school students in other types of schools (Gamoran, 1996). In addition, the first study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education examined the quality of education in magnets, finding that over 80% of schools surveyed had higher average achievement scores than the district average (Blank et. al, 1983; Blank, 1989). In a follow up summary of the 1983 report, the author highlighted four school districts (Austin, Dallas, San Diego, and Montgomery County, MD) where, after controlling for differences in student backgrounds, magnet programs had positive effects on achievement test scores (Blank, 1989). Research conducted in school districts in the mid 1980s and early 1990s pointed to higher reading scores for students participating in career magnet programs in New York City (Crain, 1992), as well as increased opportunity for closer student-teacher relationships and access to unique curricula (Metz, 1986). Additionally, a comprehensive 1998 study of magnet schools in Jacksonville –Duval County, Florida found that while magnet programs were struggling to effectively desegregate the school system, comparisons of the district's norm-referenced achievement tests yielded evidence of higher achievement for magnet students at all grade levels (Poppell & Hague, 2001). Finally, a 1990 study conducted in metropolitan St. Louis examined student attitudes and achievement for black students participating in St. Louis's city and suburban transfer program. This study compared students who enrolled in neighborhood schools, interdistrict suburban schools, and city magnet schools for grades 4, 6, 8 and 10. With few exceptions, the highest achievement results were found among students in city magnet schools, although some of these results may be due to the fact that students in these schools had higher achievement prior to participation in the program (Lippitz, 1992).

Methodologically, it is hard to assess the "impact" of magnet schools due to issues of self-selection. Do the improved academic outcomes occur because of the magnet school itself or is there unaccounted-for variation in those families who choose magnet schools that explains the academic gains? Magnet schools require a certain level of parental involvement or motivation in order to access information and seek admission to a non-traditional school, but it is difficult to determine how that impacts the academic outcomes of students in magnet programs (compared to regular public schools). In other words, students participating in magnets are more likely to come from backgrounds where parents were more organized and tended to be highly motivated to find high quality educational opportunities for their children, even if they did not necessarily have more financial resources (Wells, 1996, Goldring & Hausman, 1999). These characteristics, in turn, are associated with higher academic achievement (Coleman, 1966).

Nevertheless, some studies, including three outlined above (Blank et al., 1983; Blank, 1989; Crain, 1992), have attempted to account for this selection bias by examining achievement results for "winners" and "losers" in lotteries used to determine magnet school admissions. Studying the achievement patterns of lottery losers – students from families who had information and access to the choice system but who, due to oversubscription and luck of the draw, failed to secure a place at a magnet program –allows the researcher to isolate the effects of magnet schools because the students would have similar family advantages but different schools. Many of these studies, including one focused on school choice in San Diego, still find that magnets are associated with positive academic benefits. The San Diego research found that acceptance to a magnet high school via lottery was associated with positive gains in math achievement two and three years into the program (Betts, 2001).

Further evidence of positive academic gains, even after controlling for selection bias, comes from the experience of students in Connecticut's interdistrict magnet programs. As part of its compliance with a statewide desegregation case, Connecticut has established more than fifty interdistrict magnet schools in metropolitan Hartford, New Haven, and Waterbury, schools that draw students from multiple school districts with the intent of providing racially diverse schools. Through a comparison of magnet lottery "winners" and "losers", a recent analysis of the achievement of students in these interdistrict magnet schools found that magnet and high schools have positive effects on students' reading and math scores (Bifulco, Cobb, & Bell, 2008). Among middle schools, the effects are largest when the magnet school reduces the racial isolation by at least 40 points in comparison to district schools the city students would otherwise be attending. Still, other studies controlling for selection biases have found no significant differences in student achievement between magnet high schools and comprehensive high schools (Jacob, Cullen and Levitt, 2005; Ballou, Goldring, & Liu, 2006).

Most research to date, in sum, suggests that there are important academic benefits for students attending magnet schools. Of course, more research is needed to fully comprehend academic outcomes for magnets (and to understand the non-academic outcomes as well). Particularly since there has been relatively little research focus on magnet schools in recent years –especially in comparison to studies of the academic outcomes of students in charter schools[7]–it is important to carefully investigate the extent to which magnet schools affect the outcomes of students who attend them.

The following section explores the broader landscape of educational choice today. The growth of other choice options has profoundly impacted the development and expansion of magnets, and, as a result, warrants further examination.

School choice today

School choice continues to play an important role in the politics of American education. In an era when charter schools have proliferated as all kinds of educational choice options have grown

[7] A forthcoming report from the Institute on Race & Poverty examines the segregation and academic achievement of students in charter schools in the Twin Cities, where some of the first charter schools were established. This analysis finds growing segregation as some urban charter schools segregate minority students while suburban charters are havens for white students. Additionally, charter schools have poorer academic scores than traditional public schools or Choice is Yours, the Minneapolis-area choice program designed to further desegregation (see Institute on Race & Poverty, forthcoming). By contrast, a new analysis of Chicago and Florida charter schools suggests that attending charter schools improves students' chances of graduating high school and attending college (Booker, Sass, Gill & Zimmer, 2008). These vastly different findings may be partially explained by the very different nature of charter schools as established independently according to each state's charter school legislation.

in prominence and in demand by parents, funding and support for magnet programs has declined (Amicus brief of ACLU, 2006). In fact, the number of magnet schools that receive MSAP funding has declined in recent grant cycles because the overall funding level has remained stagnant and not adjusted for inflation at just over $100 million. Charter schools in most states have few of the racial/ethnic balance requirements that were often included in the design of magnet schools, and a number of studies have suggested that charter schools are, on average, more segregated than public schools (Cooper, et. al., 2000; Frankenberg & Lee, 2003; Garcia, 2007; Institute on Race & Poverty, forthcoming). As the number of charter schools has swelled in recent years, the educational options available to parents have also increased. Nationally, according to NCES data, there are 2,736 magnet schools. Magnet Schools of America's directory of magnet schools, however, lists approximately 4,000 magnet schools.[8] NCES identified nearly 4,000 charter schools. However, there were 1 million more students in magnet schools than in charter schools in 2005-06.

As seen in Table 1, black and Latino students comprise a much larger percentage of magnet and charter school students than they do among all public schools. There are more magnet students than charter students among those of every race except for American Indian students. Yet, less than one-third of all magnet school students are white. There are, in fact, more black students than whites in magnets. Latino students also comprise a large percentage of magnet school students—considerably larger than their share of charter students or among all public school students—but are slightly less than the number of white students.[9]

Table 1: Magnet & Charter School Enrollment in U.S. by Race/Ethnicity, 2005-06[10]

	White	Black	Latino	Asian	American Indian	**Total**
Magnet Schools						
Number	661,267	665,491	610,620	133,146	12,756	2,083,280
Percentage	31.7	31.9	29.3	6.4	0.6	99.9
Charter Schools						
Number	406,000	321,873	223,996	35,871	13,896	1,001,637
Percentage	40.5	32.1	22.4	3.6	1.4	100.0
All Public Schools						
Percentage	57	17	20	5	1	48,635,135

There are also differences between magnet schools and charter schools in terms of the levels of low-income students they enroll. The percentage of low-income students among all public school students have jumped in the last five years, and with it, students of every race have a higher percentage of low-income students in their schools in 2005-06 than in 2000-01 (see Orfield & Lee, 2007). Notably, however, black and Latino students attend schools that, on average, have much higher percentages of low-income students than do students of other races. This trend holds across all types of schools: magnet, charter, or public (see Table 2).[11]

[8] More information is available from MSA website (https://www.magnet.edu/modules/content/index.php?id=106).
[9] There are regional and state comparisons of the racial composition of magnet, charter and all public schools in the Appendix.
[10] The data reported in this section draw upon the magnet school and charter school designations in the NCES Common Core of Data. Since magnet schools vary widely, it is impossible to know how precisely they are identified by states who submit data counts to NCES. A school, for example, that acts as a magnet school, but is not officially labeled as such may not be designated by one state as a magnet but may be by another state. In other states, schools may not be designated as magnet schools at all for data collecting purposes. Approximately ten states do not authorize the establishment of charter schools.
[11] Both magnet and charter schools are forms of public schools.

For students of every racial group, charter schools are a place where they are less exposed to low-income students than among the entire universe of public schools.[12] The opposite is true for magnet schools for virtually every racial/ethnic group. The average Latino student attending a magnet school, for example, is in a school where two out of three students are from low-income families. Charter school Latino students, by contrast, attend programs where just over half of their peers are from low-income backgrounds. This trend is true for students of all races in charter schools in comparison to their same-race magnet school peers.

Table 2: Percent Low-Income in Schools Attended by the Average Student, by Race and Sector

Percent Low-Income	White Student	Black Student	Latino Student	Asian Student	American Indian Student
Charter Schools	22.7	51.9	52.3	35.3	34.9
Magnet Schools	35.7	61.7	67.1	46.2	46.8
All public schools	31	59	59	36	51

Data show that segregation is growing among U.S. public schools (Orfield & Lee, 2007), and this trend is reflected in magnet and charter schools as well (see Tables 3a and 3b). There are slightly higher percentages of charter schools (32% of all charter schools) and charter school students (35% of all charter students) attending 90-100% minority schools in 2005-06 than there are among magnet schools and students (29% of magnet schools and 33% of magnet students). At the same time, there is also a slightly larger percentage of charter school students attending racially isolated white schools (7%) than among magnet school students (5%). The absolute numbers of students in segregated minority or white schools is higher among magnet schools because of the larger number of such students.[13]

Among African Americans, a higher percentage of charter school students (69%) were in schools with 0-10% white students than were magnet school students (47%). The reverse pattern is true for Latino, Asian, and white students, although there were small percentages of white students in 90-100% minority magnet or charter schools. Also of note is the fact that nearly 40% of white students in magnet schools are in predominantly minority schools, which suggests that magnet schools offer opportunities for substantial interracial exposure for these white students.

[12] According to the Center for Education Reform, a school choice advocacy group, half of schools not participating in the National School Lunch Program may not for a number of reasons such as state law, lack of facilities, or lack of people to process related paperwork (http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_CharterSchool_FreeLunchFacts.pdf).

[13] See appendix for additional tables examining state-level comparisons of segregation for black & Latino students in magnet, charter, and all public schools.

Table 3a: Percentage of Students in Magnet Schools by School Racial Composition and Student Race/Ethnicity, 2005-06[14]

Percentage of white students in school:	White		Black		Latino		Asian		Am. Indian		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
0-10%	22,222	3.4	314,733	47.3	316,123	51.8	37,715	28.3	3,077	24.1	693,870	33.3
10-50%	232,091	35.1	269,680	40.5	249,810	40.9	68,780	51.7	4,836	37.9	825,197	39.6
50-90%	312,792	47.3	79,322	11.9	42,977	7.0	25,621	19.2	4,114	32.2	464,826	22.3
90-100%	94,162	14.2	1,756	0.3	1,710	0.3	1,030	0.8	729	5.7	99,387	4.8
Total	661,267	100	665,491	100	610,620	100	133,146	100	12,756	100	2,083,280	

Table 3b: Percentage of Students in Charter Schools by School Racial Composition and Student Race/Ethnicity, 2005-06

Percentage of white students in school:	White		Black		Latino		Asian		Am. Indian		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
0-10%	7,793	1.9	222,416	69.1	106,386	47.5	8,821	24.6	4,808	34.6	350,224	35.0
10-50%	65,878	16.2	63,899	19.9	75,018	33.5	12,402	34.6	3,661	26.4	220,858	22.0
50-90%	263,520	64.9	34,165	10.6	41,039	18.3	13,734	38.3	5,033	36.2	357,491	35.7
90-100%	68,809	17.0	1,393	0.4	1,553	0.7	914	2.6	394	2.8	73,063	7.3
Total	406,000	100	321,873	100	223,996	100	35,871	100	13,896	100	1,001,636	100.0

Magnet and charter schools are more likely to be located in central cities than all other public schools (Table 4). In some states, charter schools can only be established in certain urban areas (see Frankenberg & Lee, 2003). Magnet schools are even more likely than charters to be found in large cities. Two thirds of magnet schools are located in urban areas (see Table 4), while only one-tenth of magnet schools operate in small towns or rural areas. By contrast, just over half of all charter schools are found in urban areas, with nearly one fifth of charters located in small town or rural communities. Charters and magnets are found at nearly the same rates in suburban localities – with just over a quarter of both types of schools located in the suburbs—and the percentage of charter schools in rural areas is double that of magnet schools, yet both are considerably lower when compared to all other public schools.

Table 4: Percentage of Students in Public, Charter and Magnet Schools by Locale, 2005-06

	Public[15]		Charter		Magnet	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Urban	20,903	23.8	1,998	54.2	1,720	63.4
Suburban	29,542	33.7	928	25.2	703	25.9
Large Town	964	1.1	31	0.8	9	0.3
Small Town	7,865	9.0	187	5.1	69	2.5
Rural areas	28,432	32.0	546	14.8	211	7.8

These contemporary numbers, along with the prior history of magnet schools, indicate that, despite a huge investment in the development of charter schools, magnet schools hold continued

[14] Tables 3a and 3b show, reading across the rows, the number and percentage of students of each racial/ethnic group in schools in the four categories of schools, which are defined by the percentage of white students in the left column.
[15] For brevity of terminology, public here refers to all non-charter, non-magnet public schools

significance – in terms of the number of students enrolled, popularity, longstanding and continued federal support, and their historical ability to encourage racial diversity - in the array of educational choices now available (Christenson et al, 2003).

Data and Methods

The data for this paper was obtained through the distribution of a survey instrument containing 19 items covering a range of issues related to racial integration and diversity efforts in magnet schools and programs. Respondents answered questions regarding their understanding of the Supreme Court decision, school and district policy responses to date, the current status of racial outreach and desegregation goals, teacher turnover rates and training practices, and changes in parent demand and racial composition.

The survey was disseminated at the annual Magnet Schools of America (MSA) conference in April 2008 in Chattanooga, Tennessee, attended widely by administrators, teachers and district officials in the magnet community. The MSA conference provided the researchers with a unique opportunity to gather important and relevant information regarding desegregation conditions in the aftermath of *Parents Involved* from a large group of magnet school stakeholders. Though these distribution parameters necessarily precluded a random sample of the magnet community, 236 completed, anonymous surveys were returned to conference organizers, who forwarded them to the research team. More than 1,000 people attended the conference, many of them as teams from districts. In such instances, only one person per district may have completed a survey. Though this final group cannot be considered representative of the extensive, diverse group of magnet schools, it is a sampling of those at this important meeting.

While the sample limits the ability to generalize from our findings, we are able to explore important questions about the ways in which magnet schools are currently operating, an area which has not been the subject of much recent research. Further, these responses do represent the opinion of hundreds of people associated with many magnet schools educating thousands of students across the country. Even with the sample limitations, at the moment there is no other on-the-ground data focusing on integration and experiences in magnet schools post-*Parents Involved*. Thus, cognizant of these shortcomings, we report the trends while recognizing the need for further, more systematic investigation of the current environment in magnet schools.

Respondents had the option of identifying the name of their respective school or district.[16] As a result, the research team was able to match reported racial/ethnic and free and reduced lunch data for a subset of the magnet schools and districts in this sample with the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Common Core of Data. We merged the dataset from the survey with both 1995-96 and 2005-06 school and district racial and poverty composition. Using data that spanned a decade allowed us to analyze how respondents' views of the racial transition their school was (or was not) experiencing compared to the actual changes in student demographics. With the 2005-06 data, we could also analyze, for example, responses from those who said they were associated with a "one-race" school and from those who, according to the CCD, worked in a school that was 90-100% white or non-white (our definition of "one-race").[17] These data allowed

[16] This was not a required question with the intention that, without reporting this information, respondents might give more candid responses.

[17] The term "one-race" school does not mean to imply intentional discrimination has resulted in these schools being largely of one race but instead refers to the demographic patterns of students. We used the term "one race" here because that was the terminology used on the questionnaire. These

the team to evaluate both respondents' perceived racial/ethnic trends and the actual demographic trends of their schools and districts.

Our analysis uses descriptive statistics[18] to summarize the characteristics of variables, and cross-tabulations and means comparison primarily to describe relationships among different sets of variables.

Sample Characteristics. Among those who reported their district identification, there were respondents from more than 60 districts and from every region across the country. The magnet schools that respondents were associated with combined to educate approximately 400,000 students. The majority of survey respondents were teachers (34.7%), followed by principals and assistant principals (24.2%) and magnet coordinators (15.7%) (see Table 5). The preponderance of teachers and principals in the sample may have provided strong insight into building level magnet school conditions and perhaps a slightly more limited perspective on district policy decisions.

Table 5: Job Responsibility of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
No Response	15	6.4
Teacher	82	34.7
Principal/Asst. Principal	57	24.2
Superintendent/Asst. Supt.	6	2.5
Administrator	11	4.7
Magnet coordinator	37	15.7
Other non-teaching coordinator	28	11.9
Total	236	100.1

Although there was considerable variation among school and district student composition, respondents' reported, on average, that their magnet schools were comprised of student populations that were 31% white and 63.5% low-income (as measured by free and reduced price lunch status). These numbers closely approximated the actual NCES figures (see Table 6).

On average, respondents described their districts as containing student populations that were 37.1% white and 61.2% low income. While the numbers approximating the percentage of white students were fairly close to NCES figures, respondents tended to overestimate the figures for students qualifying for free and reduced priced lunch at the district level.

schools could be racially isolated minority or racially isolated white schools though it is impossible to determine which of these (rather different) types of schools the respondents intended by the category "one race". .

[18] Descriptive statistics show relationships between different variables, but do not show causation (e.g., that one variable causes certain responses to another question).

Table 6: Student characteristics of respondents' schools and districts

	Self-reported	NCES, 2005-06
Percentage of white students, school	31.0 (N=176)	31.4 (N=109)
Percentage of white students, district	37.1 (N=109)	39.5 (N=152)
Percentage of low-income students, school	63.5 (N=165)	58.8 (N=98)
Percentage of low-income students, district	61.2 (N=91)	52.9 (N=151)

We compared respondents' perceptions of racial integration of their school(s) to both their self-reported estimates of racial and socioeconomic composition and, when possible, to NCES data from their school. We now turn to an analysis of the magnet survey data, starting with an exploration of the current level of racial integration in magnets.

Racial Integration Levels in Magnet Schools

Magnet schools have traditionally been successful in creating diverse student bodies because magnet schools, particularly those that are or were once part of desegregation plans, were designed with certain features to try to attract students of all racial/ethnic backgrounds. These programmatic features include: explicit desegregation goals; school design; certain admissions criteria; free transportation; and outreach to the public. We will examine each one below as they relate to the integration levels of magnet schools in this sample. In subsequent sections, we will examine parental demand and the relationship between magnet schools and other types of school choice, particularly charter schools. First, however, we examine the demographics of magnet schools in this survey.

Demographic Snapshot of Magnet Schools in Sample

In the bulk of this section on integration changes in magnet schools, we analyze responses by answers detailing how integration has changed in their school(s) in the last decade. Is integration increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same? Are the schools stably integrated or largely one-race schools? In this first subsection, we examine how these different categories of integration levels relate to self-reported and U.S. Department of Education data about school composition to get a fuller understanding of how respondents may be viewing these categories. Importantly, these tables include only a subset of responses since not all of the respondents completed the question asking for the racial and socioeconomic composition of their school(s).

In Table 7 below, the category of schools that is notably different are the one-race schools, which combine a very low percentage of white students, on average, with a high percentage of low-income students. One concern about magnet schools has been that they might "cream" more educationally advantaged students from non-magnet schools in the district. Similar to the connection between concentrations of nonwhite students and low-income students in public schools has been found in other research (see Orfield & Lee, 2007, 2005), these figures suggest that among this sample, largely one-race magnet schools are not "creaming" middle-class minority students to any significant extent.

In contrast, magnet schools described as substantially integrated by respondents were schools that had the highest percentage of white students and the lowest percentage of low-income students, on average. In fact, survey respondents labeling their magnet school(s) as substantially integrated

were schools that contained, on average, a white student population comprising roughly 40% of the total enrollment. For comparison, it is worth noting that even among these substantially integrated magnet schools there are a much lower percentage of white students than among all public school students (57% white).

Table 7: Self-reported magnet student characteristics in 2005 by categories of integration change over last decade

Integration Changes		% White	% Black	% Latino	% Asian	% Low-income
Substantially integrated	Mean	38.8	38.3	18.3	4.6	60
	N	60	59	57	52	53
One-race school	Mean	6.8	70.7	21.7	1.4	80.4
	N	16	16	14	14	14
Increasing integration	Mean	31.5	46.4	19.7	3.7	62.4
	N	56	56	55	55	55
Decreasing integration	Mean	25.5	55.1	17.8	7.4	64.5
	N	32	32	31	28	30
Total	**Mean**	**30.6**	**47.6**	**19**	**4.5**	**63.7**
	N	**164**	**163**	**157**	**149**	**152**

When matching the responses regarding the school(s) integration levels with the NCES racial composition figures, substantial declines in the overall percentage of white students attending magnets over the last ten years are evident. Since the 1995-96 school year, the average magnet program considered "substantially integrated" has a ten percentage point decline in its white student population (see Table 8). For schools described by respondents as having increasing integration, the decline is even more rapid: 14.4%. The declines in white percentage among the magnet schools' surrounding districts were larger, on average, except in schools that were characterized as decreasing levels of integration. Thus, respondents' categorization of their own school's diversity may be influenced by the perception of the school in relation to the surrounding district. Nationally, due to demographic changes across the country (see Orfield and Lee, 2007; Frey, 2001), the overall percentage of white students in public schools has decreased by about 6% in the last decade (Frankenberg, 2008). The disproportionately large decline in the percentage of white students at magnet schools suggests that at least some magnet schools among this sample are losing their ability to attract students from all racial/ethnic groups.

Table 8: Change in white percentage from 1995 to 2005, by categorization of school diversity

		Change from 1995-2005 in white percentage	
		School level	District level
Substantially integrated	Mean	-10	-12.2
	N	30	43
One-race school	Mean	-13.7	-16.3
	N	9	11
Increasing integration	Mean	-14.4	-14.5
	N	26	50
Decreasing integration	Mean	-16.1	-13
	N	8	31
Total	Mean	-12.7	-13.6
	N	73	135

Desegregation Goals

The legal, political, and educational landscape has changed dramatically in the four decades in which magnet schools have been in existence. Given that many magnet schools were created as a tool to further desegregation, it is worthwhile to examine how many programs still operate under such goals, as well as how a shift away from desegregation goals may have impacted integration levels.

The Department of Education evaluations – described above in the introduction – are some of the only sources of information regarding the quantity of magnet schools with desegregation goals. The 1996 Department of Education's evaluation of magnet schools receiving MSAP funding identified the extent to which magnet schools had explicit desegregation objectives – which was criteria for being selected for funding – and found that only 37% had explicit desegregation objectives, while another 21% had desegregation goals that could be inferred from program materials. The desegregation objectives included goals of reducing existing minority isolation, reducing projected minority isolation, or eliminating racial isolation. The report does not compare the success of magnet schools with desegregation objectives to those without them. The evaluation found that schools were more successful in making progress towards their objectives rather than actually meeting the specific enrollment targets, the latter of which were often more ambitious. Yet, even among the 58% of schools with desegregation objectives, only two-thirds met their objective by the end of the funding period (Steele & Eaton, 1996). Further, the report found that in districts where magnets were part of a voluntary desegregation plan there was more progress towards meeting desegregation objectives than among mandatory desegregation districts, although these differences were not statistically significant.

Although not specific to magnet schools, the experiences of districts that are no longer operating under desegregation plans also seem useful to consider. These districts, while under a court-ordered desegregation plan, often had explicit desegregation goals that they were required to meet before they could be released from court supervision.[19] Once these districts were declared unitary,

[19] It is likely that some of the magnet schools that are part of this sample originated in districts under such plans.

or had been judged to eliminate prior vestiges of segregation, they were no longer required to take active efforts to maintain desegregated schools. For some districts, desegregation was replaced with other efforts, such as race-neutral goals like socioeconomic integration, and in other instances with goals that de-emphasized racial or socioeconomic concentrations of students altogether. In several prominent districts (i.e., San Francisco, Charlotte) that changed from race-conscious goals, there has been a decline in the integration of students in their schools (Biegel, 2005; Brief of ACLU, 2006; Brief of Swann Fellowship, 2006; Lee, 2006).

Nearly one third of magnet programs in this sample reported that they still had desegregation goals – either under court order, under the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) agreements, or because of local voluntary action. Yet, the combined number of respondents whose magnet schools no longer had desegregation goals or who never had desegregation goals amounted to more than 40% of all responses. Another 12% report that they are in the process of changing or have already changed to race-neutral factors (i.e. poverty status or geography). In sum, results from this sample of magnet schools suggest that considerable changes either have occurred or are occurring in terms of desegregation goals for these programs.

Table 9: Number and Percentage of magnet programs reporting desegregation goals

	Number	Percent
School(s) has desegregation goals – either under court order or voluntary	74	31.5%
School(s) no longer has desegregation goals, but did in the past	61	26.0%
School(s) have such goals but they are in the process of being changed OR have been changed to race-neutral factors	29	12.3%
School(s) never had desegregation goals	40	17.0%
Did Not Reply	31	13.2%
Total	235	100.0%

Given these changing desegregation goals, we next examine how magnet school desegregation goals relate to their level of integration. More than three-quarters of schools with desegregation goals are either substantially integrated under current policy or experiencing a gradual increase in levels of integration, which is considerably higher than among all respondents in this survey. While schools with desegregation goals had the highest share of schools that were also substantially integrated (38.6%), the second-highest category of schools that were integrated were schools without any desegregation goals (see Table 10).

Just over 35% of magnet schools that are in the process of changing goals or have already changed to race-neutral ones report a decrease in integration levels. Yet, an equal percentage report rising integration. These schools also had the lowest percentage considered substantially integrated. This suggests that changing goals may be less compatible with maintaining stable integration, at least among this set of schools, although there is obviously a fair amount of variation among this group. This would be expected depending on what types of goals they were switching to, how long ago these goals were changed, or other factors.

In this sample, ten percent of schools that never had goals report being one-race schools, and approximately seven percent that never had goals or are in the process of changing them are also one-race schools. These figures are considerably higher than those schools that do have

desegregation goals—less than 3% of those are considered to be predominantly of one race. In addition, a disproportionately high percentage, 31%, of schools that no longer have desegregation goals (but did in the past) report a decrease in integration levels.

Table 10: Desegregation goal of schools by changes in integration levels over last decade

		Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
School(s) has desegregation goals	Count	29	2	29	12	3	75
	%	38.7	2.7	38.7	16.0	4.0	100.0
School(s) have changing/ race-neutral goals	Count	5	2	11	11	2	31
	%	16.1	6.5	35.5	35.5	6.5	100.0
School(s) dropped desegregation goals	Count	14	4	19	19	5	61
	%	23.0	6.6	31.2	31.2	8.2	100.0
School(s) never had desegregation goals	Count	14	4	11	5	6	40
	%	35.0	10.0	27.5	12.5	15.0	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	8	5	6	1	9	29
	%	27.6	17.2	20.7	3.5	31.0	100.0
Total	Count	70	17	76	48	25	236
	%	29.7	7.2	32.2	20.3	10.6	100.0

Among this sample of magnet schools we see that a third of schools still maintain desegregation goals while even more-- nearly 40%-- once had desegregation goals but have either abandoned them or have changed them to race-neutral goals. In other words, then, we see a reflection in this sample of the larger federal movement away from focusing on desegregation as a goal of magnet schools. Yet, the above data demonstrate a relationship among schools which have desegregation goals with schools that have experienced substantial or increasing levels of integration.

Type of Magnet

Magnet programs traditionally follow one of two configurations. Some magnets are established as schools unto themselves, and districts tend to allow these programs individual school buildings; for this reason, schools such as these are referred to as "whole school magnets" in our survey. The second type of magnets are those programs placed in a traditional zoned school, where some students apply to attend a magnet program with a special theme, while other students go to the same school for non-themed education. This is referred to here as "school within a school." There is not much prior literature that systematically evaluates whether whole-school magnets differ from "school within a school" magnets in terms of integration. One of the Department of Education evaluations found that magnet schools that were dedicated, whole-school magnets were more likely to meet their desegregation objectives than school within a school magnets, as well as attendance zone magnets (magnet programs serving children in a particular neighborhood) (Steele & Eaton, 1996).[20] Further, there are issues of within-school equity that arise in such programs since minority students may be prevented from enrolling in unique, high

[20] An early evaluation of magnet schools concluded that whether magnets were whole-school or partial magnets did not affect the educational quality of the schools, but this did not address the integration of such schools or whether everyone had access to the quality educational offerings (Blank et al., 1983).

quality magnet options in their own schools while out-of-neighborhood white students are allowed to attend. As a result, even if these schools are diverse at the school building level, racially isolated classrooms remain inside the school (Orfield & Eaton, 1996). For example, classes in the magnet program might be predominantly white while regular classes outside the magnet component are nonwhite—though there may be some elective classes such as band that enroll a more diverse group of students. The following tables examine how these trends and issues apply to magnet programs in our sample.

Whole school magnets, by far, comprise the largest number of schools participating in the study (70.2%).[21] Survey participants from "school within a school" magnets made up 15% of respondents. Finally, the minority of respondents who answered "both" work with both types of magnet schools.

Table 11: Number and Percentage of Magnet Types

Type of Magnet	Number	Percent
Whole School Magnet	165	70.2
School within a School Magnet	36	15.3
Both	29	12.3
Did Not Reply	6	2.6
Total	235	100.0

Two-thirds of whole school magnets (66.1%) reported substantial integration under their current policy or a gradual increase in integration levels. Only half of the "school within a school" magnets were similarly integrated (see Table 12).

Importantly, 16.6% of school within a school magnets report being one-race schools, which suggests that these magnet programs are less effective than whole school magnets, among the magnet schools in this survey, in creating racially diverse schools. Additionally, there are a disproportionately lower percentage of within-school magnets that reported increasing integration during the last decade (only 22%). By contrast, 35% of whole-school magnets reported increasing integration during this time period.

[21] A 1994 Department of Education evaluation estimated that 58% of magnet schools were whole-school magnets and 38% were school-within-a-school (Steel & Levine, 1994).

Table 12: Magnet type by changes in integration levels over the past ten years

		Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
Whole School Magnet	Count	51	10	58	30	16	165
	%	30.9	6.1	35.2	18.2	9.7	100.0
School within a school magnet	Count	10	6	8	7	5	36
	%	27.8	16.6	22.2	19.4	13.9	99.9
Both	Count	7	1	9	10	2	29
	%	24.1	3.5	31.0	34.5	6.9	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	2	0	1	1	2	6
	%	33.3	0	16.6	16.6	33.3	99.8
Total	Count	70	17	76	48	25	236
	%	29.7	7.2	32.2	20.3	10.6	100.0

According to respondents' descriptions of their schools' student racial composition, white students comprise about a third of the average whole school magnet's student body, but only 20% of the average school-within-a-school magnet's students (Table 13). Differences between types of schools in terms of low-income students are much smaller. This further corroborates earlier findings suggesting that many whole school magnets do a better job of racially integrating students.

Table 13: Magnet Type by Self-Reported Student Composition of School

Magnet Type		Self-reported by respondent	
		% school white	% school low-income
Whole school magnet	Mean	33.4	61.9
	N	128	121
School within a school magnet	Mean	19.7	64.5
	N	30	24
Both	Mean	32.9	68.2
	N	14	15
Did Not Reply	Mean	33.3	81.3
	N	3	4
Total	Mean	31.0	63.5
	N	176	165

Thus, while there may be classes that are diverse—not to mention other enriched educational options these schools may offer some students— school-within-a-school magnets are less effective at creating integration among schools in this sample.

Admissions Criteria

Early desegregation plans (e.g., court-ordered or HEW/OCR agreements) specified that student assignment for schools, including magnet schools, should be on the basis of interest, not ability. Although originally most magnet programs did not have admissions criteria, today magnet schools may have a variety of factors they consider in selecting students for enrollment,

particularly if demand exceeds the number of available seats. Some factors, such as preference for siblings that are current students or the consideration of geographic proximity, may be used by other district schools. Other factors may be unique to magnet schools and may relate to a magnet's particular theme, such as auditions for a performing arts magnet school. An earlier estimate suggested that one-third of magnet schools used selective criteria for admissions (Smrekar & Goldring, 1999).

Specialty schools that use selective or competitive admissions criteria - such as grade point averages, test scores, or essays – arose separately from and prior to modern magnet programs (Dentler, 1991). There are a small number of specialty schools that have existed for a very long time, schools that are nationally prominent and were intentionally elite public schools. For an example of two such schools, we briefly focus on Boston Latin School in Massachusetts and Lowell High School in San Francisco, two of the oldest and most prestigious public schools in the country (Ming, 2002; Dentler, 1991). Under Boston's court-ordered desegregation plan and San Francisco's desegregation consent decree, the two schools' admissions criteria were changed to comply with desegregation efforts. In the late 1990s, however, the admissions processes of both exam schools, each of which were aligned with diversity goals, were challenged.[22] The resulting judicial decisions, along with others, struck down the use of racial/ethnic preferences in a competitive admissions process in K-12 schools,[23] heralding a new era for exam schools.

Boston Latin School and Lowell High School have experienced significant resegregation since the courts issued their 1999 decisions. In 1995, prior to the litigation, Boston Latin boasted a racially diverse student population, with white students making up just over half of the student body (Table 14). Black and Hispanic students combined to comprise over a third of students attending Boston Latin, with Asians accounting for the remaining share (roughly 17%). Ten years later, and six years after the court's ruling removing racial/ethnic goals from admissions' consideration, Boston Latin reported a significant decline in the enrollment of black and Hispanic students (Table 14). Combined, black and Latino students accounted for one out of three students in 1995 at Boston Latin, but only one out of six students in 2005. The figures for San Francisco's Lowell High School are less dramatic, though they still portray a decline in racial diversity after 1995. In particular, the percentage of black and Hispanic students fell, with black students making up just under 3% of the student body in 2005 (Table 14).

Table 14: School enrollment by race/ethnicity at Boston Latin & Lowell, 1995 and 2005

	Asian (%)	Latino (%)	Black (%)	White (%)
Boston Latin School				
1995	16.9	11.0	21.6	50.4
2005	28.9	6.8	9.6	54.5
Lowell High School				
1995	68.1	9.7	4.6	17.5
2005	74.9	6.1	3.0	15.9

[22] *Wessman v. Gittens* (1999) was a decision by the First Circuit Court that determined the Boston Latin School's quota system for setting aside seats for under-represented minority groups was illegal. Boston, however, had been declared unitary in 1987, and in 1990 federal court oversight was entirely removed. In *Brian Ho v. SFUSD* (1999), the district court ordered San Francisco Unified School District to remove race as a factor in the student assignment system. The court's decision stemmed from a complaint filed by a group of Chinese American parents concerned about race-conscious admissions policies at Lowell High School.

[23] *Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools* (1999) & *Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board* (1999) were decisions by the Fourth Circuit that invalidated the use of race-conscious criteria by school districts for alternative schools and approving student transfers. For further discussion see Ma & Kurlaender, 2005.

These percentages are particularly striking considering the fact that, in 2005-06, three-fourths of Boston Public School district students are black or Latino, along with 37% of San Francisco Unified students. Although it is impossible to know what would have happened to these numbers had the decisions not occurred during this time period, the decline in underrepresented minority groups at specialty high schools with competitive admissions criteria and no racial/ethnic guidelines is an example of how such criteria may limit the racial diversity of such schools.

We examine among magnet schools in this sample whether there is a relationship between integration levels and the use of selected types of competitive admissions criteria by magnet schools.[24] Today, competitive admissions criteria are often used by magnet schools. However, recipients of MSAP funding are not allowed to use any such criteria. They can, however, use lotteries to allocate seats in cases in which student demand exceeds capacity.

The five types of criteria we look at and their frequency of use among respondents' schools in this sample are:

- Test scores, 16.1%;
- Essays, 8.1%;
- Grade Point Average (GPA), 10.6%;
- Interviews, 11.9%; and
- Auditions, 12.3%.

For comparison, we also look at magnet schools with open enrollment policies, which account for 27% of respondents, and those using a lottery system, 63% of respondents. It is important to note that these criteria are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is quite likely that schools may use the lottery system in combination with another factor.

Among the magnet schools respondents to this survey were affiliated with, higher percentages of schools using essays and interviews as part of their admissions criteria reported that they were substantially integrated or had increasing integration during the last decade. None of the schools using essays as part of their magnet admissions process reported being a largely one-race school, while almost three-quarters of these schools were substantially integrated or had experienced increasing levels of integration in the last decade. Similarly, nearly half of magnet schools using interviews as a factor guiding student admissions reported increased integration over the last decade—the highest percentage among all types of admissions criteria—while only 14.8% of these schools reported a gradual decrease in integration levels (see Table 15).

By contrast, magnet schools using test scores and/or auditions as factors in determining admission report lower levels of integration. More than one-tenth of respondents affiliated with magnet schools using test scores or auditions report that their schools are largely one-race. In addition, just over half of the schools using such admissions criteria reported that their schools were either substantially integrated or increasingly integrated, which is considerably lower than the 74% of schools using essays. Further, schools using GPA as an admissions factor were the highest share of schools that were experiencing decreasing integration (24%).

[24] Respondents were allowed to select as many criteria as they wanted, because many schools use more than one factor for admissions.

For further comparison, we also looked at the reported integration levels for schools that had non-competitive admissions criteria, using either a lottery (in cases where there is more demand than available seats) or open enrollment. Many of these patterns support the conclusion that non-competitive admissions schools are more integrated. For example, fewer schools using a lottery were one-race than virtually every type of competitive admissions criteria used by magnet schools. Open enrollment magnets in this sample have the highest percentage of schools described as substantially integrated and one of the lowest percentages of schools that have decreasing levels of integration.

Table 15: Magnet schools using competitive & noncompetitive admissions criteria by integration changes over the 10 years

		Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
Test Scores	Count	9	4	13	8	4	38
	%	23.7	10.5	34.2	21.1	10.5	100.0
Essays	Count	6	0	8	4	1	19
	%	31.5	0	42.1	21.1	5.3	100.0
GPA	Count	7	2	10	6	0	25
	%	28.0	8.0	40.0	24.0	0	100.0
Interviews	Count	6	2	13	4	3	28
	%	21.4	7.1	46.4	14.3	10.7	99.9
Auditions	Count	8	4	8	6	3	29
	%	27.6	13.8	27.6	20.6	10.3	99.9
Open Enrollment	Count	21	6	21	10	6	64
	%	32.8	9.4	32.8	15.6	9.4	100.0
Lottery	Count	41	6	53	33	15	148
	%	27.7	4.1	35.8	22.3	10.1	100.0
Total, All Schools	Count	70	17	76	48	23	236
	%	29.7	7.2	32.2	20.3	9.7	100.1

We should be careful in interpreting these results, as they represent small numbers of responses. Yet, these trends point to an uneven landscape of integration opportunities for magnet schools using competitive admissions criteria. Higher percentages of schools using interviews and essays as part of their admissions process have greater racial integration than those schools using test scores or GPA. Further, schools in this sample using non-competitive admissions—open enrollment and lottery—were somewhat more likely to be integrated and less likely to be one-race schools or experiencing decreasing integration.

Outreach

Although there are limits placed on magnet schools (and, indeed, most public schools) in *Parents Involved*, racially targeted outreach is explicitly recognized by Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion as a legal mechanism to enhance the racial diversity of all schools. Outreach to families and communities is an important component in providing all children equal access to magnet school opportunities (Wells & Crain, 1997; Fuller, Elmore & Orfield, 1996). Students cannot be selected for magnet schools if they do not know about them and submit applications by the relevant deadline. In addition, since information about schools is often passed through networks among parents (Holme, 2002), outreach to different sectors of the community can help ensure that a broad range of students know about the different magnet school opportunities a district

may offer. Outreach may take the form of information sessions or fairs at different locations in the community, a parent information center (Cookson, 1994; Glenn et al., 1993), dedicated district employees for outreach, or publications promoting awareness about the school. This section examines how outreach relates to parent demand for magnet programs in this sample, as well as the potential relationship between integration levels and the presence of outreach.

The vast majority of respondents in this sample reported that their schools had some type of outreach, leaving a small number of schools without any outreach activities. Special outreach to attract students to magnet schools was associated with more extensive integration levels among the magnet school respondents participating in this study. In particular, over 65% of schools with outreach described their programs as substantially integrated or experiencing increasing integration, by far the largest share of schools in that category (Table 16). By contrast, one quarter of schools without some form of special outreach were considered largely one-race schools, which was much higher than the share of one-race schools (5%) that did outreach to attract students.

Outreach efforts might be in place in schools as a result of two contrasting trends. For example, we see that over one-fifth of schools with special outreach report decreasing integration. On the other hand, a small fraction of schools without some form of special outreach reported an increase in integration levels and forty percent of schools without outreach efforts describe their program as substantially integrated under current policy. These trends may be due to complacency with their present levels of integration, reducing the urgency of conducting special outreach.

Table 16: Schools reporting special outreach to attract students to magnet program(s) from other racial/ethnic groups by changes in integration levels over the past 10 years

		School is substantially integrated under current policy	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
School(s) has some form of special outreach	Count	61	11	74	46	17	209
	%	29.2	5.3	35.4	22.0	8.1	100.0
School(s) does not have some form of special outreach	Count	8	5	1	1	5	20
	%	40.0	25.0	5.0	5.0	25.0	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	1	1	1	1	3	7
	%	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	42.9	100.1
Total	Count	70	17	76	48	25	236
	%	29.7	7.2	32.2	20.3	10.6	100.0

Looking more in-depth at outreach to different groups, survey respondents were asked to specifically describe what type(s) of outreach their magnet schools employed.[25] Nearly two-thirds of respondents reported that there were parent information centers and information sessions in the community; over half of respondents also reported additional publicity about magnet schools (Table 17). Slightly less than half of respondents indicated that they employed staff members for recruitment purposes.

[25] Respondents were asked to circle all that applied.

For magnet programs in this sample, less than one in four schools with staff members for recruitment or using other non-specified types of outreach (designated as an "other" category in the survey question) reported substantial integration under their current policies, which is lower than the share of integrated schools with other types of outreach. On the other hand, nearly 40% of respondents from magnet programs using other types of outreach reported rising levels of integration, suggesting that some of these methods might be more effective than others. "Other" types of outreach included use of websites, mailings, TV & radio advertising, visits to feeder schools and magnet fairs & showcases.

Interestingly, while all types of outreach are related to higher levels of increasing integration than those schools without outreach (see above table for comparison), they were also connected to disproportionately high levels of decreasing integration in these schools. Approximately one tenth of schools in the total sample are experiencing decreasing levels of integration, yet over twenty percent of schools in every type of outreach category report declining integration levels. These numbers may reflect two types of situations: (1) where some magnet programs that have chosen to proactively engage in outreach efforts did so because they were already experiencing a decrease in integration; and (2) where schools' outreach efforts may have helped to increase the magnet schools' levels of integration. Of course, it is also possible outreach efforts are or have been in place, but they have not been successful at attracting a racially diverse group of students.

Table 17: Types of outreach by integration levels

		School is substantially integrated under current policy	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
Parent Information Center	Count	45	7	53	37	12	154
	%	29.2	4.5	34.4	24.0	7.8	99.9
Info Sessions in the Community	Count	45	7	51	34	12	149
	%	30.2	4.7	34.2	22.8	8.1	100.0
Staff Members for Recruitment	Count	28	5	41	27	13	114
	%	24.6	4.4	36.0	23.7	11.4	100.1
Publicity about magnet(s)	Count	37	7	49	30	12	135
	%	27.4	5.2	36.3	22.2	8.9	100.0
Other Type of Outreach	Count	5	1	8	5	2	21
	%	23.8	4.8	38.1	23.8	9.5	100.0
Total	Count	70	17	76	25	48	236
	%	29.7	7.2	32.2	10.6	20.3	100.0

Results from this section suggest that special outreach can have positive impacts on integration levels in magnet schools – though some types of outreach were more effective in increasing demand among all groups than others for schools in this sample.

The Role of Teachers

Both the racial composition of faculty members and the training of teachers for diverse schools have been important elements of fully desegregating schools and ensuring that diverse schools are able to effectively educate students from all backgrounds. Having a racially diverse staff is important for students of all backgrounds, and the Supreme Court's *Green* decision in 1968 required that desegregation plans have faculty integration as part of their overall desegregation efforts. In early magnet schools, principals were sometimes given the ability to select teachers on the basis of teachers' interest and, if under desegregation plan, to reflect the demographics of the

students to comply with the *Green* decision (1968). Due to teacher transfers and retirements, even in schools where there was an initial selection of interested teachers and training provided, magnet school faculties today may not have as strong a focus on preparing and training teachers for diversity in the classroom. Further, there are other magnet schools that may have been set up without a desegregative purpose, or where an existing school was hastily converted to a magnet school without any substantive changes to the school, including the faculty. In other districts there may be union restrictions that prohibit teachers applying and being selected for magnet schools. In addition, ESAA funds that helped to train all teachers, including magnet school teachers, in race relations techniques are no longer available and there has been a de-emphasis of desegregation in subsequent reauthorizations of MSAP. All of these conditions make the ability of magnet administrators to select teachers specifically for the magnet school much more limited and the training for diversity rarer today for teachers, even as the student population becomes more racially diverse (see Frankenberg & Siegel-Hawley, 2008).

On a more positive note, one of the differences between magnet schools and other types of schools is that usually teachers apply to teach in magnet schools, while there is less choice—at least in larger districts where there are often multiple schools at each grade level— for teachers in non-magnet schools. Similar to theories about parental choice discussed later in the report, there is some support for the idea that teachers who choose their schools (as compared to those who are assigned) may be more committed (Raywid, 1989), which among other things may mean that teachers remain there longer. Magnet school teachers may also benefit from more resources at their school and higher percentages of the faculty may have more advanced degrees and certification (Smrekar & Goldring, 1999).

Given this context, we asked about different types of training for teachers in magnet schools. This section will examine how teacher training relates to integration levels, and we begin by examining the frequency of each type of training. They are[26]:

- Orientation included information on promoting successful race relations, 20%;
- Staff development focused on promoting successful race relations, 38%;
- Teacher mentors engaged with the topic of promoting successful race relations, 14%;
- Policies were developed to recruit and retain racially diverse faculty, 21%;
- Other types of training were offered about promoting successful race relations, 7%; and
- No training in techniques promoting successful race relations was offered, 34%.

Among the magnet schools in this sample that offered some type of training about race relations, the most common type of training was staff development, with nearly forty percent of schools reporting this type of activity. Importantly, more than a third of schools did not offer any training in techniques promoting successful race relations. The lack of professional development opportunities in the area of race relations is of concern in any type of school, but perhaps particularly so given the traditional commitment to desegregation and racial diversity that spurred the development and spread of magnet schools.

We examine the relationship between types of training and integration levels in the table below.

[26] Teachers were asked to circle as many as applied.

More than one in four schools that were substantially integrated had teacher recruitment policies; lower percentages of one-race schools and schools with declining integration had such policies.

Of note, while less than half of respondents in each type of school reported no training regarding race relations, except for respondents associated with decreasingly integrated magnets, there were a larger number of respondents selecting "no training" than any one particular type of training. The trend of no training in these environments is troubling, given the reported levels of diversity at the magnet schools in question. An exception to these trends is that a substantial majority of respondents in schools that were experiencing decreasing integration reported staff development about race relations.

Largely one-race schools report disproportionately low percentages of professional development for racial diversity in all categories, with the exception of teacher orientation, where nearly twenty four percent of respondents say that orientation is available, compared to 19.9% for the category. By contrast, however, only about one in six respondents in largely one-race schools reported staff development around issues of race relations, which was considerably lower than the percentages of respondents in other types of schools. Further, almost half of respondents in racially isolated schools reported no training, perhaps suggesting that such training is not viewed as necessary in more segregated contexts.

Table 18: Teacher Training Opportunities and Racial Integration

	Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
Mentors	10	2	12	4	4	32
	14.3%	11.8%	15.8%	8.3%	16.0%	13.6%
Staff development	19	3	29	30	8	89
	27.1%	17.6%	38.2%	62.5%	32.0%	37.7%
Orientation	16	4	14	10	3	47
	22.9%	23.5%	18.4%	20.8%	12.0%	19.9%
Teacher recruitment	19	3	17	6	5	50
	27.1%	17.6%	22.4%	12.5%	20.0%	21.2%
Other types of training	6	0	2	8	0	16
	8.6%	0.0%	2.6%	16.7%	0.0%	6.8%
No training	25	8	31	10	5	79
	35.7%	47.1%	40.8%	20.8%	20.0%	33.5%
All teachers	**70**	**17**	**76**	**48**	**25**	**236**

While training is important, the stability of teachers, particularly after schools invest in further development for these teachers, is also important for magnet and non-magnet schools alike. This may be even more significant for magnet schools with a particular educational theme, which, in combination with any training teachers may receive about race relations, means that these teachers may be more difficult to replace.

We examined the turnover of teachers in magnet schools in comparison to surrounding schools. This, it should be noted, only asked about perceptions of how turnover rates compared and did not draw on any administrative data to corroborate these perceptions. Yet these perceptions are important to consider because a school with even a perception of high teacher turnover—in comparison to other area schools—may have difficulty attracting teachers and students.

Importantly, lower teacher turnover is associated with substantially integrated magnet schools in this sample. More than a third of schools report a lower rate of teacher turnover than surrounding

schools are substantially integrated under their current policies, which is a disproportionately high share of such schools. Further, nearly 70% of schools with lower teacher turnover rates are either experiencing increasing integration levels or are already substantially integrated (Table 19).

Conversely, schools reporting higher rates of teacher turnover had disproportionately higher percentages of one race schools. Larger percentages of schools experiencing turnover were one-race schools (10.3%) than were the percentage of schools experiencing lower turnover that were one-race schools (3%). In addition, more than one-fifth of schools with greater teacher turnover levels report decreasing integration levels, which is disproportionately higher than their overall percentage of schools in this sample.

Table 19: Teacher Turnover & Integration Levels in Magnet Schools

Teacher Turnover	Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
Greater	8	3	10	6	2	29
	27.6%	10.3%	34.5%	20.7%	6.9%	100.0%
About the Same	28	11	33	24	6	102
	27.5%	10.8%	32.4%	23.5%	5.9%	100.0%
Lower	34	3	33	18	11	99
	34.3%	3.0%	33.3%	18.2%	11.1%	100.0%
Did Not Reply	0	0	0	0	6	6
Total	**70**	**17**	**76**	**28**	**25**	**236**
	29.7%	**7.2%**	**32.2%**	**11.9%**	**10.6%**	**100.0%**

These trends indicate that lower rates of turnover are associated with more extensive integration of magnet schools, while higher rates of teacher turnover are found in magnet schools with decreasing integration levels and racial isolation.

Transportation

The provision of free transportation to students granted school transfers to increase desegregation in the South was first required in the HEW[27] 1965 school desegregation guidelines, which explained what was necessary for district compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Orfield, 1969).[28] Thus, free transportation has long been considered one of the conditions under which schools can help ensure that everyone is able to attend a school of choice, regardless of family situation, language differences, socioeconomic status, or racial/ethnic isolation (Wells, 1996). A study of magnet schools in two large Midwestern districts found that particularly among minority parents, the availability of transportation was a consideration in choosing a magnet school for their children (Smrekar & Goldring, 1999). This percentage may increase as the number of households with a parent or guardian at home dwindles.

Transportation to schools that may be at a geographic distance from some students' homes (as compared to closer neighborhood school options) is particularly important in an era where households have multiple earners and where parents may not have work schedules that allow them to transport children to these schools. Yet, at the same time, as fuel costs rise, transportation costs for school districts are sky-rocketing, and transportation for out of zone students—such as

[27] HEW stands for Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

[28] Compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act became particularly important for districts after the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act the following year, which increased federal funding for schools, but contained a provision that allowed the withholding of money if the district was not in desegregation compliance.

magnet school students—has been the focus of a number of school districts across the nation as they look to cut costs. In the last few months, a search of newspaper articles revealed that large districts in Alabama, Florida, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Georgia, and Wisconsin have all contemplated cutting or otherwise altering the transportation they provided to magnet school students. Since this concern is recent, caused by the spiking fuel costs, it is not clear the extent to which these transportation policy changes may be impacting the diversity of magnet schools.

In this survey, conducted prior to recent concerns regarding fuel costs, we asked about the provision of transportation to magnet schools. Since free transportation would provide greater access to the magnet program of a families' choosing, the following tables examine the extent to which transportation is associated with changes in integration levels. Nearly 12% of schools that did not provide free transportation to their students were largely one-race, considerably higher than the percentage of schools that did provide transportation that were also one-race (6.4%). On the other hand, roughly 35% of magnet programs in this sample that did not offer free transportation to students reported increasing integration levels, which was slightly higher than the percentage of schools that did offer free transportation and reported increasing integration (see Table 20). Although it is impossible to know from the survey data why this pattern exists, possible explanations include location in a dense urban area that makes it possible for students to walk to school, the ability to use a student ID to ride a public bus cheaply, or location near work places that makes the school attractive to parents from a variety of backgrounds.

Table 20: Access to free transportation to magnet program(s) for all students by changes in integration levels over the past 10 years

		Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
School(s) provides free transportation	Count	58	12	61	39	19	189
	%	30.7	6.4	32.3	20.6	10.1	100.0
School(s) does not provide free transportation	Count	11	5	15	7	4	42
	%	26.2	11.9	35.7	16.7	9.5	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	0	0	0	0	5	5
	%	0	0	0	0	100.0	100.0
Total	**Count**	**69**	**17**	**76**	**46**	**28**	**236**
	%	**29.2**	**7.2**	**32.2**	**19.5**	**11.9**	**100.0**

Among this sample, most (approximately 80%) schools provided free transportation for all students. Surprisingly, schools that did not provide transportation for students reported a higher percentage of respondents who felt that parental demand had increased among all groups in the last decade (Table 21). And one out of eight respondents with schools that provide transportation reported that parental demand declined. Perhaps this is indicative of other school features that are or are not a bigger attraction to parents. It is important to note that the vast majority of schools do offer transportation for students.

Table 21: Transportation to magnet program(s) by changes in parent demand over past 10 years

		Parental Demand:				Did Not Reply	**Total**
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
School(s) provides free transportation	Count	27	88	37	24	13	189
	%	14.3	46.6	19.6	12.7	6.9	100.0
School(s) does not provide free transportation	Count	6	24	7	1	4	42
	%	14.3	57.1	16.7	2.4	9.5	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	0	2	1	0	2	5
	%	0	40.0	20.0	0	40.0	100.0
Total	**Count**	**33**	**114**	**45**	**25**	**19**	**236**
	%	**14.0**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.6**	**8.1**	**100.0**

Differences in student composition exist among schools that provide free transportation and those that do not. White students make up nearly a third of the student body in the average magnet program offering free transportation, compared to 23% in magnets that do not provide free transportation (see Table 22). Magnet programs with free transportation also have a lower percentage of low-income students, suggesting that these schools are better at "magnetizing" – attracting students from a variety of racial and socioeconomic backgrounds to their program.

Table 22: Transportation policy by school and district racial composition

Transportation policy		**% school white**	**% school low-income**
Program(s) offer free transportation	Mean	32.7	62.0
	N	147	138
Program(s) do not offer free transportation	Mean	22.8	71.0
	N	28	26
Total	**Mean**	**31.0**	**63.5**
	N	**176**	**165**

Trends contained in this section suggest that higher percentages of magnet schools that do not providing free transportation to students are more likely to be largely one-race magnet programs. Findings regarding the relationship between transportation and parental demand are more mixed and somewhat contradictory to prior literature on this topic. Particularly given the increasing cuts to transportation due to financial costs, it is important to further study how transportation may relate to demand, access, and diversity.

At the close of this section, there are several important trends for racial integration levels in magnet schools that are worth quickly reviewing. First, many magnet programs in this sample reported declining levels of integration. Further exploration reveals that programs struggling to maintain racial diversity are associated with one or more of the following: changing or abandoned race-conscious desegregation goals; school within-a-school magnets; higher teacher turnover; and a lack of access to free transportation. Magnet schools created expressly for desegregation purposes a generation ago often had policies to make sure these structures were in place—structures designed to broaden access to these schools of choice for all students.

Parental Demand for Magnet Schools

Demand for schools and programs are important to any school choice policy. In order for magnet schools to be successful, demand from a wide variety of parents is necessary to ensure diversity. This is one reason that magnet schools often have unique educational themes— to attract a range of parents and students. There has often been considerable demand for magnet schools, which is likely a reason that contributed to their growth and popularity. For example, one analysis found that three-quarters of districts with magnet schools had more demand than available seats (Blank, Levine, & Steel, 1996).

In almost any complex choice system, there are some options that experience more demand than others. With the case of magnet schools, some programs are more "magnetic" in terms of attracting students and in creating demand for attending the school. There may also be varying levels of demand across racial and socioeconomic groups as families may have different preferences based on factors such as a school's theme, reputation, or geographic location. This variation is important to keep in mind when we look at parent demand for the schools in this sample, as the figures reported here represent an average of demand across many groups and interests as well as schools with varying degrees of success at "magnetizing."

Demand for magnet schools can become unstable once racial desegregation goals are removed. In places where there is particularly intense parent demand for a certain program(s), families from groups that are more organized – or with more resources – tend to displace those who have less access and information. When these patterns create schools that are no longer magnetic, policies should be enacted quickly to restore balance, otherwise the schools lose their ability to desegregate.

This survey sought to quantify some of these trends by drawing a distinction between demand for magnets from all groups of parents versus demand from some groups of parents. If respondents reported that parental demand was increasing among some groups of parents, which was a separate choice than increasing demand among all parents, this signaled a decline among other parent groups. We found that the vast majority of survey respondents indicated that parent demand for magnet schools had increased in the last decade. However, while almost half reported that demand had increased among all groups of parents, another 19% reported demand had increased among some groups, suggesting that some schools of respondents in this sample are having trouble attracting a broad range of parents. Only one in ten respondents reported a decline among all groups (see Table 23).

Importantly, among all schools in the sample, the highest percentages of schools experiencing increasing parental demand were schools with increasing integration. Approximately 80% of schools experiencing a gradual increase in integration also reported an increase in parent demand, including almost two-thirds reporting increased demand among all groups. The incidence of increased parental demand was lower—but still higher than for other types of schools—in schools that had been substantially integrated over the last decade. Almost half of substantially integrated schools report that demand increased among all groups of parents.

Schools with decreasing levels of integration reported the largest decline in parent demand among schools of any of the categories of integration change (18.8%). Further, less than a third of schools with decreasing integration (and/or increasing racial/ethnic isolation) reported

increased demand among all groups. By contrast, schools with increasing integration had twice the percentage of schools (61%) with increased demand among all groups.

Interestingly, among schools that remained largely comprised of one racial group, the highest percentage of respondents reported that demand remained constant. These facts together suggest that, within this sample, increasing parent demand is associated with schools experiencing increasing integration or schools that are substantially integrated. Parent demand for a more segregated context, however, remains somewhat consistent for schools in the sample, perhaps suggesting that parent groups already participating in these programs are satisfied with the current racial/ethnic composition. Yet, when schools in this sample are moving from diverse to less diverse contexts, demand seems to wane.

Table 23: Parent demand for magnet programs by changes in integration levels over the past 10 years

		Parent demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
Substantially integrated	Count	14	34	10	8	4	70
	%	20.0	48.6	14.3	11.4	5.7	100.0
Largely one race school	Count	5	7	3	2	0	17
	%	29.4	41.2	17.6	11.8	0	100.0
Increasing integration	Count	7	47	13	5	4	76
	%	9.2	61.8	17.1	6.6	5.3	100.0
Decreasing integration	Count	7	15	16	9	1	48
	%	14.6	31.3	33.3	18.8	2.1	100.1
Did Not Reply	Count	0	11	3	1	10	25
	%	0	44.0	12.0	4.0	40.0	100.0
Total	**Count**	**33**	**114**	**45**	**25**	**19**	**236**
	%	**14.0**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.6**	**8.1**	**100.0**

Next, we examined whether parental demand varied by the presence of desegregation goals. Given public opinion—among respondents of all races— valuing the importance of diverse schools for children's learning and social science evidence affirming the many ways in which students in diverse schools benefit from this racial diversity (see, e.g., Linn & Welner, 2007; Orfield, Frankenberg & Garces, 2008), how salient are magnet schools' desegregation goals to parental demand for magnet programs?

In all schools except for those never operating with desegregation goals, more than two-thirds of respondents reported that there had been increased parental demand for magnet schools in the last decade, at least among some groups. The highest percentage of respondents reported parental demand increasing among all groups were those associated with magnet schools still under desegregation goals, which in this survey could be either associated with court-ordered or voluntary desegregation (Table 24). Fifty-seven percent of schools with desegregation goals have experienced increased demand among all groups, and another 16% of these schools saw demand increase among some groups.

Schools that used to have desegregation goals that had been changed or were removed altogether had the highest shares of respondents who reported a decline in parental demand. Further, a disproportionately low percentage (38%) of schools that no longer have desegregation goals report that parental demand increased among all groups—the lowest share among schools by the

category of desegregation goals. These trends may be the result of other factors in these communities, but schools that no longer have desegregation goals and have waning demand from some or all groups in the community may find it challenging to maintain diversity.

Table 24: Schools' desegregation goal by changes in parental demand over the past 10 years[29]

		Parental demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
School(s) has desegregation goals	Count	9	42	12	7	4	74
	%	12.2	56.8	16.2	9.5	5.4	100.1
School(s) have changing/ race-neutral goals	Count	4	12	8	5	2	31
	%	12.9	38.7	25.8	16.1	6.5	100.0
School(s) dropped desegregation goals	Count	9	23	18	8	3	61
	%	14.8	37.7	29.5	13.1	4.9	100.0
School(s) never had desegregation goals	Count	10	20	5	1	4	40
	%	25.0	50.0	12.5	2.5	10.0	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	0	17	2	3	8	30
	%	0	56.7	6.7	10.0	26.7	99.9
Total	**Count**	**32**	**114**	**45**	**24**	**21**	**236**
	%	**13.6**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.2**	**8.9**	**100.0**

As discussed in a prior section, magnet programs can be either whole school magnets or magnet programs placed within a larger school. Most of the respondents to this survey were affiliated with whole school magnets, though more than one-quarter were associated with within-school magnets. Despite a lower prevalence of within-school magnets among these survey respondents, there was increased demand for such schooling options. A higher percentage of respondents associated with school-within-a-school magnets reported an increase in parental demand (see Table 25). In fact, over 60% of these within school programs reported demand increased among all groups. Further, a smaller percentage of respondents associated with school-within-a-school magnets reported a decline in parental demand compared to the share of respondents in whole school magnets. It is possible that within-school magnet programs have appeal to certain groups of parents because, as smaller programs, they are able to better maintain a focus on the magnet school's particular theme and/or may appear to have extra educational resources.

Two-thirds of respondents affiliated with whole-school magnets reported increased demand, although more than 20% of respondents said that demand only increased among some groups. The highest percentage reporting a decline in demand was from survey respondents whose districts had both a whole magnet program and a school within a school magnet (20.7%).

[29] Some respondents selected multiple answers.

Table 25: Magnet type by parental demand changes over the past ten years

		Parental demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
Whole school magnet	Count	23	75	35	17	15	165
	%	13.9	45.5	21.2	10.3	9.1	100.0
School within a school magnet	Count	5	22	5	2	2	36
	%	13.9	61.1	13.8	5.6	5.6	100.1
Both[30]	Count	4	14	4	6	1	29
	%	13.8	48.3	13.8	20.7	3.4	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	1	3	1	0	1	6
	%	16.7	50.0	16.7	0	16.7	100.1
Total	**Count**	**33**	**114**	**45**	**25**	**19**	**236**
	%	**14.0**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.6**	**8.1**	**100.0**

Also noted in a prior section, the vast majority of schools in this sample reported some type of special outreach to attract students. We next examine among this group of magnet schools whether outreach efforts are related to parental demand. Overall, considerably higher percentages of survey respondents reported that parental demand had increased for all groups in schools that employed some form of special outreach (Table 26). This pattern is not unexpected and suggests outreach among this sample is particularly strongly related to increasing demand among all groups.

For magnet schools without some form of outreach, parental demand was more likely to increase among some groups (40.0%) than all groups (20.0%). Schools not using some form of special outreach reported a decline in parental demand (15.0%) at greater rates than the percentage for the category (10.6%). These patterns suggest that outreach may be associated with greater levels of parental demand for all groups of students, while a lack of special outreach may mean that demand increases among some groups, but not others. These findings underscore the importance of equal access to information about magnet programs and affirm efforts to spread information about these programs, at least for schools in this sample.

Table 26: Schools reporting special outreach to attract students to magnet program(s) from other racial/ethnic groups by parental demand over the past ten years

		Parental demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
School(s) has some form of special outreach	Count	29	104	40	22	13	208
	%	13.9	50.0	19.2	10.6	6.2	99.9
School(s) does not have some form of special outreach	Count	4	4	8	3	1	20
	%	20.0	20.0	40.0	15.0	5.0	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	0	2	1	0	5	8
	%	0	25.0	12.5	0.0	62.5	100.0
Total	Count	33	110	49	25	19	236
	%	14.0	46.6	20.8	10.6	8.1	100.0

[30] E.g., for respondents whose answers pertained to more than one school.

Given the trends above showing higher parental demand in magnet schools with outreach, we also examined whether particular types of outreach were related to increased parental demand. Approximately 60% of schools that use publicity about magnets and other types of outreach such as websites, TV advertising, visits to feeder schools, and magnet school fairs report that parental demand has increased for magnet schools among all parents in their community. Notably, schools with parent information centers had the lowest percentage of respondents reporting that demand increased among all groups, perhaps because they might have limited hours or their existence may not be fully known to those in the community because the families may need to be sought out in their neighborhoods. However, for every type of outreach, schools had higher demand from all groups and lower percentages of respondents reporting a decline in parental demand.

Table 27: Parental Demand by Different Types of Outreach

		Parental demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased in All Groups	Increased in Some Groups	Declined		
Parent Information Center	Count	22	75	33	14	10	154
	%	14.3	48.7	21.4	9.1	6.5	100.0
Info Sessions in the Community	Count	23	78	27	13	8	149
	%	15.4	52.3	18.1	8.7	5.4	99.9
Staff Members for Recruitment	Count	17	58	19	10	10	114
	%	14.9	50.9	16.7	8.8	8.8	100.1
Publicity about magnet(s)	Count	17	77	22	14	5	135
	%	12.6	57.0	16.3	10.4	3.7	100.0
Other Type of Outreach	Count	2	13	4	2	0	21
	%	9.5	61.9	19.0	8.5	0	99.9
Total	**Count**	**33**	**114**	**45**	**25**	**19**	**236**
	%	**14.0**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.6**	**8.1**	**100.1**

An overwhelming majority of respondents reported that parental demand for magnets has risen over the last decade. Increased demand for magnet programs among all groups of parents in this sample is associated with stable or rising integration levels, as well as the presence of desegregation goals. These patterns may suggest that parents value the emphasis that many magnets have traditionally placed on creating racially diverse school environments. Additionally, types of magnets and special outreach to families and students play a role in shaping parental demand. School within a school magnets tend to be related to strong demand in this sample, and outreach also appears to boost parental demand. The viability of magnets as desegregation tools and choice options depends on family demand for these programs. Understanding and capitalizing on the above patterns may help to ensure a stable future for magnet schools.

Charter Schools: Another Type of Public School Choice

Magnet schools, of course, are far from the only educational choice option available to families. Other options include charter schools (which are allowed in most but not all states), private schools (including a few voucher programs that provide tuition for eligible students to attend private schools), and other choice options (such as controlled choice policies adopted by school districts). While there are some similarities between magnet schools and charter schools—both are public schools and schools of choice—there are a number of differences, which have important implications for diversity. Most significantly, charter schools were not begun with any intent to

desegregate, but rather as a way to allow for choice and innovation within public schools.[31] This difference in mission between the historical focus of magnet schools and the focus of new schools of choice means that many of the ways in which magnet schools were successful in creating diverse student bodies were not included in the federal legislation authorizing charter schools. Additionally, many of the states that have since allowed charter schools have not established nor enforced regulations pertaining to racial diversity (see Frankenberg & Lee, 2003).

Nevertheless, charter schools remain a popular educational alternative. Having already examined the composition and segregation of charter schools and magnet schools earlier in this report, this section explores how magnet schools are affected by the presence of other educational choice options in the surrounding area; we particularly focus on magnet schools by whether or not charters are in proximity.

Competing Choice Options: Demand and Outreach

A majority of respondents to this survey–almost two-thirds–reported that their districts or surrounding areas contain charter schools.[32] We first look at how the presence of charter schools might be affecting parental demand for magnet schools over the span of the last decade, a time period that witnessed rapid growth in the number of charter schools. Has demand for magnet schools declined in areas with more school choice options?

There are somewhat contradictory findings about how the presence of charter schools relates to demand for magnets among schools in this sample. Parental demand for magnet schools without a nearby charter school is more likely to remain constant than for magnet schools where there is a nearby charter school. By contrast, higher percentages of respondents in districts or surrounding areas containing charter schools reported fluctuations in demand for magnet schools – meaning it both increased and decreased – than respondents in districts that did not contain charter schools (see Table 28). In comparison to magnet schools without nearby charter schools, slightly higher percentages of respondents in districts with charter schools found that there was increased demand for magnets among all groups (50%) or among some groups (21%). But there were also more respondents from this same group saying that magnet demand had declined (12%). It seems that the presence of charter schools is more likely to change demand for magnet schools, but the directions of the trends are mixed, perhaps due to community factors and other schooling options. This variance in trends could also stem, in part, from factors such as outreach efforts by charter schools as well as the particular themes, locations, and reputations of magnet and charter schools in these communities.

[31] A notable exception to this trend is the concept of pilot schools – public schools that remain part of a school district, but are allowed important autonomies in certain areas (e.g. staffing and budgeting). Recent studies of pilots participating in Boston Public Schools suggest that pilot school enrollment largely mirrors the racial/ethnic and SES composition of the district (Feldman et. al., 2003; Tung & Ouimette, 2007). Many pilots control oversubscription issues by using a lottery system, which may help promote diversity. Pilots are an alternative to charters (which tend to be more segregating); they help foster autonomy and innovation, at the same time reflecting existing diversity in a district.

[32] In most instances, charter schools are not part of school districts, but are separate, single-school districts. Thus, charter schools could theoretically pull students from a number of different districts. For linguistic brevity, we will refer to "district" below, since district and surrounding area have the same meaning for our purposes.

Table 28: Parental demand over the past decade for magnet schools by charter school alternatives in the district

		Parental Demand:				Did Not Reply	Total
		Stayed the Same	Increased among all groups	Increased among some groups	Declined		
District contains charter schools	Count	17	73	31	18	7	146
	%	11.6	50.0	21.2	12.3	4.8	99.9
District does not contain charter schools	Count	16	40	14	7	6	83
	%	19.3	48.2	16.9	8.4	7.2	100.0
Did not reply	Count	0	1	0	0	6	7
	%	0	14.3	0	0	85.7	100.0
Total	**Count**	**33**	**114**	**45**	**25**	**19**	**236**
	%	**14.0**	**48.3**	**19.1**	**10.6**	**8.1**	**100.0**

While we first examined schools and districts containing a nearby charter school, private schools are actually the most the most frequent choice option in districts containing the magnet schools in this sample. Approximately two-fifths of all respondents reported that there were private schools in their district.

When comparing magnets in districts with public school choice options to all magnets or to magnets in districts with private schools, we see that a disproportionately high percentage of respondents report that demand declined. For example, in districts with charter schools nearby, 12.3% of respondents report decreasing parent demand, along with 16.4% of respondents in districts with controlled choice policies (Table 29). The lower reported decline for districts with private schools (10.4%) may reflect the cost of tuition while parental demand may decline more steeply for magnets when there are other free public school choice options. Additionally, charter schools may represent a "newer" choice option since the first charter schools began in the early 1990s.

There were slightly higher percentages of respondents in each category with additional school choice options reporting demand had increased among all parents than there were among all respondents. However, respondents from districts that contained private schools alongside magnets were the most likely to report that demand increased among all parents, which again may be indicative of the fact that private schools are not necessarily a choice option for those who would be interested in magnet schools. A slightly higher percentage of respondents in districts also containing charter schools reported that demand increased among some groups, which may suggest that charter schools are appealing to some but not all groups in these communities (see Frankenberg & Lee, 2003). A word of caution, however, as the differences discussed here are modest, and would warrant further investigation to more firmly draw conclusions.

Table 29: Parental demand over the past decade for magnet schools, by school choice options in district

		District contains charter schools	District contains private schools	District operates under controlled choice policy	All schools in sample
Parental demand stayed the same	Count	17	27	11	33
	%	11.6	14.1	9.8	14.0
Parental demand increased among all groups	Count	73	100	55	114
	%	50.0	52.1	49.1	48.3
Parental demand increased among some groups	Count	31	38	21	45
	%	21.2	19.8	18.8	19.1
Parental demand declined	Count	18	20	18	25
	%	12.3	10.4	16.4	10.6
Did not reply	Count	7	7	7	19
	%	36.8	3.7	6.3	8.1
Total	**Count**	**146**	**192**	**112**	**236**
	%	**99.9**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

In analyses not shown here, lower percentages of magnet respondents from districts containing charter schools reported specific outreach activities to attract potential families and students. While overall outreach activities were less frequent in magnet districts with charters, those that did have outreach chose multiple activities. Substantially higher percentages of magnet school respondents in districts with a charter school presence reported that they held community information sessions, had staff members responsible for parent information or recruitment, and publicized to promote the school.

Integration

Having examined how the presence of charter schools, and to some extent other educational choice options, relate to demand and outreach, we now turn to integration levels. In a system of educational choice, racial integration is dependent upon outreach to families of all backgrounds in order to ensure that there is widespread information regarding choice options like magnet and charter schools.

Respondents from magnets operating in districts that did not contain charters were more likely consider their programs integrated (37.7%) than districts containing charters (25.7%). There were similar—though less extreme—differences among schools which reported increasing levels of integration during the last decade (Table 30).

A disproportionately high percentage of magnet school respondents in districts where there were also charter school options reported that integration had declined over the last decade. In these districts with charter schools, nearly 28% of respondents believed that integration had declined, which was three times the share of schools experiencing decreasing integration among magnets in districts without charter schools. Recall from above that magnet districts with charter schools reported a higher percentage of respondents who described parental demand as declining over the last decade and a lower percentage who thought that demand had remained the same. Perhaps these differences in parental demand relate to the declining integration seen here.

It is important to note again that these findings do not prove causation and, in fact, represent a small percentage of communities and districts. However, other studies of different types of choice

plans have found that the presence of charter schools can act as a segregating mechanism (Betts et al., 2006; Frankenberg & Lee, 2003; Cobb & Glass, 1999), which may adversely affect the integration of other schools including magnets.

Table 30: Changes in integration levels over the past decade by presence of charter schools in the district

		Substantially integrated	Largely one-race school	Increasing Integration	Decreasing Integration	Did Not Reply	Total
District contains charter schools	Count	37	12	45	40	10	144
	%	25.7	8.3	31.3	27.8	6.9	100.0
District does not contain charter schools	Count	32	5	30	8	10	85
	%	37.7	5.9	35.3	9.4	11.8	100.0
Did Not Reply	Count	0	1	1	0	5	7
	%	0.0	14.3	14.3	0.0	71.4	100.0
Total	**Count**	**70**	**17**	**76**	**48**	**25**	**236**
	%	**29.7**	**7.2**	**32.2**	**20.3**	**10.6**	**100.0**

Similar to the trends above, when we compared demographic data for magnet schools in areas with charter schools to those without charter schools, magnet districts without charter schools had a higher percentage of white students in their schools, on average (Table 31). However, it is important to note that the white percentage for magnet schools—among those who reported approximate racial composition figures—was low. With that caveat, however, magnet schools in districts with charter schools appear to be less integrated than magnet schools in districts without charter schools. There is also a larger gap between school and district white percentage for magnet schools in places where the district contains charter schools, which may reflect within-district segregation. Additionally, magnet schools in districts with charter schools, on average, have a slightly lower percentage of low-income students though the differences are rather small.

Table 31: Presence of Charter Schools by School and District Racial Composition[33]

Charter schools		Self-reported by respondent		NCES Common Core	
		% school white	% school low-income	% district white	% district low-income
District contains charter schools	Mean	27.3	62.0	38.0	52.4
	N	109	104	99	98
District does not contain charter schools	Mean	36.9	65.9	42.7	53.4
	N	66	60	51	51
Did not reply	Mean	45	70	29	66
	N	1	1	1	1
Total	**Mean**	**31.0**	**63.5**	**39.5**	**52.9**
	N	**176**	**165**	**152**	**151**

In conclusion, it appears that the presence of alternative public school choice options—and this section largely focused on one type of option, charter schools—in this sample was related to changing demand (both declining and increasing) for magnet schools. Additionally, their presence was related to lower levels of integration. More investigation of these trends is needed to understand precisely how charter schools may be affecting existing magnet schools' efforts at

[33] School-level student composition figures are taken from respondents' self-reporting, while district-level figures are taken from the 2005-06 NCES Common Core of Data. For both school and district composition, the N is lower than the entire sample (N=236).

creating racially diverse schools, especially with the recent restrictions on creating diversity by the Supreme Court.

Knowledge of Supreme Court decision

Finally, we turn to the recent Supreme Court decision, *Parents Involved*, which examined two race-conscious student assignment plans that were adopted by Jefferson County, Kentucky (metropolitan Louisville) and Seattle, Washington in an effort to create racially diverse schools. Although these plans applied to the entire district, the intent of the two plans was similar to that of magnet schools aiming to create racially diverse student bodies.

The 2007 Supreme Court decision garnered significant attention from educators around the country because it threatened the viability of many school districts' student assignment plans, which also included the way in which magnet schools selected their students. The decision itself was lengthy, with five separate decisions being written by differing combinations of Justices, creating considerable confusion as to what was or was not still permitted. Justice Kennedy wrote the controlling opinion, siding with Justice Breyer (and three other members who joined his dissent) about the compelling governmental interest in establishing and maintaining racially diverse schools and preventing schools of racial isolation. At the same time, Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Roberts' opinion that the two school districts' voluntary integration plans were unconstitutional. While it is certain that specific race-conscious policies like those in question are no longer allowed, in his opinion, Kennedy outlined several promising options that he thought might be permissible (i.e., siting & zoning schools, recruitment of teachers and students). It is not yet known, however, whether a majority of Justices would endorse such options and what they might look like if implemented.

The survey of magnet school personnel was administered slightly less than a year after the Supreme Court decision was released. One of the questions asked respondents about their district's understanding of the effects of the Supreme Court decision. We have chosen to analyze the responses of those who identified as a school or district leader, and have removed teachers and those for whom a job title was not specified. Among these 82 respondents, nearly 40% reported either somewhat low or low knowledge about the decision's effect. Only one-third rated their understanding at high or very high.[34] Thus, among this sample of magnet school leaders there is considerable lack of understanding the decision's effect.

Table 32: Understanding of Supreme Court Decision's Effect

		Understanding of Decision's Effect:					Did Not Reply	All
		Very high	High	Moderate	Somewhat low	Low		
School or District administrators	Count	9	18	20	11	21	3	82
	%	11.0	22.0	24.4	13.4	25.6	3.7	100.1

Following the query concerning the recent Supreme Court decision, the survey also included an open-ended response question regarding current discussions about changes to magnet school policies in respondents' districts. Over half of all participants took the time to answer this

[34] Among all who answered this question—including teachers—an even higher percentage of respondents thought their district had relatively low understanding of the voluntary integration decision.

question, suggesting that change is afoot in many of the communities represented by the survey participants.

Approximately ten percent of the open-ended responses dealt directly with racial desegregation issues. Some participants indicated that their districts were in the process of considering socioeconomic status as a factor in magnet admissions. Several more participants indicated that they were committed to maintaining racial balance in the magnet system. Finally, the potential impact of the recent *PICS* decision was noted in some responses, along with the Connecticut court's decision in *Sheff v. O'Neill*, which mandated an increase in inter-district magnet options as a way to expand integrated educational opportunities for children in Hartford.

The open-ended responses regarding current discussions of changes in magnet school policies also revealed that many districts participating in this sample are interested in expanding their magnet programs. Twenty-seven respondents – almost 20% of those answering the question - mentioned that their district has a renewed interest in increasing magnet opportunities. Of course, some survey participants may be reporting on discussions occurring in the same district described by other participants, making it difficult to calculate an exact estimate of districts considering magnet expansion.

On a less positive note, a few responses expressed concern regarding the overall impact of budget cuts on magnet programs – with several more referencing the impending impact of proposed budget cuts on transportation for magnets. It is unknown, however, whether respondents from non-magnet schools might also report similar concern. Others reported increased scrutiny from local and state officials regarding the effectiveness and/or impact of district magnet programs. With states and local communities being affected by the nationwide economic downturn, it will be important to continue to monitor how this affects support for magnet schools and their ability to try to attract diverse groups of students.

Discussion and Policy Recommendations

The Supreme Court in *Parents Involved* declared that school districts have a compelling interest in creating and maintaining diverse schools and in preventing racial isolation. While the Court reaffirmed its commitment to integrated schooling, it also took away important tools that districts have traditionally used to try to accomplish these compelling interests and goals. Given these restrictions and the growth of educational choice, it is important to ponder how choice can be used to further racial diversity in this new legal context. After decades of existence and millions of alumni later, magnet schools are a prime example of harnessing school choice in a manner that fosters diverse schools. Yet the experiences of magnet schools are now largely being ignored as the number of charter schools rises dramatically. Despite their success, magnet schools are the forgotten choice of the 21st century.

Promoting school choice has been the educational mantra of politicians on both sides of the aisle. During this election year, for example, both political parties prioritized school choice—almost entirely in the form of charter schools, but also with vouchers—in their education platforms. Furthermore, No Child Left Behind legislation, signed into law in January 2002, endorsed choice as a major mechanism to pressure underperforming schools to improve, although the ability of students to use the choice provision as a way to transfer to successful schools remains limited (Center for Education Policy, 2006; Sunderman, Kim, and Orfield, 2005). Countless non-governmental groups support the spread of school choice, and school districts across the country

have stepped up efforts to create alternatives to traditional public schools in recent years, even though all of these efforts may be harmful to racial diversity or promote isolation within a district.

Although the federal courts have never recognized the right of parents to choose one's school, plaintiffs in the Seattle integration case (*Parents Involved*) argued that their right to do so was being violated by district policies. This contention is reminiscent of stances taken a generation ago by groups arguing for neighborhood schools, even though in both instances unfettered school choice and neighborhood schools are likely to lead to further segregation. Freedom of choice is one such policy that the Supreme Court ultimately ruled was not effective enough to remedy segregation. While choice plans may result in some families being able to choose which schools their children attend, these options may unfairly disadvantage those with fewer resources or connections. Furthermore, in exacerbating segregation, choice plans may disadvantage the wishes of many community members who might desire diverse schools.

In contrast to the growth of charters and vouchers, magnet schools were born as part of a strategy to accommodate parents' school preferences, at the same time accomplishing district goals of remedying segregation and promoting racial diversity. Given separate, racially identifiable city and suburban districts and judicial decisions limiting the extent of desegregation remedies, magnet schools grew rapidly as a way to attract white students to schools with unique educational themes. In addition to admissions processes designed to select a diverse group of students according to districts' desegregation goals, schools engaged in other efforts (many of which are not race-conscious in nature) to attract students from all groups: providing free transportation for students accepted to magnet schools; extensive outreach efforts to attract people of all backgrounds; and often, selecting and training a diverse teaching staff. Unfortunately, increasing judicial reluctance over the last two decades to support race-conscious desegregation efforts—even when adopted voluntarily by school boards—along with the growth of other forms of public school choice and the continued persistence of residential segregation creates a difficult climate for today's magnet schools to grow and flourish. This report underlines some of the key challenges facing magnet programs, but it also provides insight into the strengths of the magnet model, suggesting that these programs have continued relevance for the national education agenda. As the country transitions to a new administration, it becomes ever more critical to understand the implications of choice without appropriate civil rights considerations.

This report has begun to explore the role of magnet schools in this new legal, policy, and demographic landscape, analyzing the responses of several hundred magnet school practitioners. While largely descriptive and not generalizable, this report extends upon earlier studies of magnet schools in terms of examining parent demand and factors that might relate to racial diversity, such as the presence of desegregation goals or the provision of free transportation. Research has suggested that magnet schools with unique educational offerings can provide enhanced academic outcomes for students—in addition to the educational and social benefits for students attending magnet or non-magnet schools that are racially diverse. Promoting the development of magnet schools, along with sustaining and improving existing programs, should be one of the most popular strategies on the school choice agenda, not one that has been largely forgotten.

One of this report's findings was that magnet schools, with their historical emphasis on providing quality education for diverse groups of students, struggle to maintain racial diversity in districts that also contain charter schools. Parental demand for magnet schools was also slightly more likely to decrease in districts where charters were also an alternative to public schools. Perhaps

fueled by this trend, charter schools were more likely to enroll student populations of higher average socioeconomic status—a trend seen among nationwide data as well. The impact of opening a new charter school on the racial diversity efforts of surrounding schools and districts should be an important consideration for state governments before granting a charter. Once opened, continued monitoring should assess the charter school's impact.

As noted previously, a key difference between charter schools and magnet schools is the lack of civil rights provisions and structures that were part of the original design of many magnet schools. Some magnet schools, perhaps those that have been more recently established or those without a particular desegregative intent, no longer have these provisions as well. This analysis finds, however, that certain conditions were more likely to produce higher levels of integration for the magnet schools in this sample. One such condition, the presence of desegregation goals, was disproportionately linked to more integrated school environments. Yet this study suggests that magnet programs are increasingly less likely to operate under such goals and a number of schools are in the process of changing their goals to meet race-neutral criteria. Integration levels were also linked to admissions criteria, special outreach to racially diverse communities and the provision of free transportation. Magnet programs employing competitive admissions criteria, especially auditions, test scores and grade point averages, were less likely to be integrated than schools using interviews and essays. On the other hand, magnet schools controlling admission through lotteries or open enrollment procedures reported the highest levels of integration. Programs conducting outreach to diverse communities were more strongly associated with higher levels of racial integration, as were schools providing free transportation to all students. The type of magnet – whole school versus school-within-a-school – also appears to be associated with integration levels. More whole school magnets in this sample were experiencing increasing integration or maintaining substantially integrated environments than their "school within a school" counterparts.

In addition, the aftermath of the *Parents Involved* decision appears to be largely characterized by confusion regarding the legality of race-conscious policies. Just over one-tenth of respondents in the sample reported high levels of understanding of the recent Supreme Court decision that limited the use of race in student assignment policies.

This analysis also demonstrates the importance of maintaining racially diverse schools, finding that lower teacher turnover and higher rates of parent demand among all groups are associated with the sample's integrated magnet programs. Teachers play a critical role in creating a stable and positive school climate and despite the fact that many magnet schools were begun as a way to further integration and may be among the most diverse schools in their district, we find trends that mirror the teacher population at large. This study found that, on the whole, magnet programs in this sample are providing teachers with little-to-no training for racially diverse classrooms. Largely one-race schools were associated with the highest number of respondents reporting no training. In terms of teacher turnover rates at the magnets sampled (compared to schools in the surrounding areas), lower levels of turnover were disproportionately found in more integrated schools. While these trends are certainly of concern to magnet schools, which may be bringing together students from a wide range of backgrounds who are experiencing diversity for the first time, this is emblematic of a nationwide lack of preparation of teachers for any diverse schools despite demographic trends showing a rising percentage of nonwhite students.

Several policy recommendations follow from these findings to suggest that districts build a comprehensive magnet school strategy to design admissions criteria, outreach, and other aspects that together will help create equitable and diverse access to magnet schools:

1. Renewed commitment to creating magnet schools with guidelines for racial diversity that fall within the bounds of the recent Supreme Court decision. Support for magnet programs that emphasize non-competitive admissions policies like open enrollment (with the important caveat that all racial/ethnic groups are receiving equal information, otherwise groups with more information are privileged under a first-come, first-served system) and lottery systems. For magnets that retain competitive criteria, interviews and essays could be included to offset the segregating effects associated with the consideration of test scores, GPAs, and audition performances. The addition of race, geography (e.g., neighborhood residence), and/or socioeconomic status as one or more factors in these competitive admissions processes would also be worth considering to attain the district's diversity goals.
2. Increased funding for Magnet School Assistance Program. Current funding levels have not even been adjusted for inflation, and the most recent cycle of grants only went to magnet schools in 41 school districts, a number which has decreased in recent funding cycles. In the 2008 fiscal year, magnet school funding was just over $100 million. By contrast, President-elect Obama has proposed doubling charter school funding to $400 million. Increasing magnet school funding can help to enhance school choice options while also helping schools and districts reduce minority isolation.
3. Continued funding for districts to provide free transportation to magnet school students, even in the face of rising fuel costs. In an effort to help minimize the impact of rising fuel costs, districts should begin thinking about alternate ways of transporting students to increase efficiency (e.g., the use of geo-coding, consolidating bus routes, or using public transit options where available).
4. Continued and increased use of special outreach to attract students from a variety of backgrounds. Parent information centers should be accompanied by more comprehensive publicity efforts, such as directly mailing brochures (in English as well as other languages if applicable), advertisements in a variety of media outlets, or community presentations.
5. Increased support for the creation of whole school magnet programs as opposed to school-within-a-school magnets. Though it may be logistically easier to establish the latter, research shows that these school-within-a-school programs tend to be segregating mechanisms, racially sorting students into two schools sharing the same roof.
6. An increasing emphasis on teacher training for racially diverse learning environments. This is a vital strategy in ensuring that teachers are prepared for existing integration at magnet schools. Magnet schools may even serve as a model for more comprehensive training at other area schools. On-going training is important so that faculty transfers, retirements, and new hires will not diminish the focus on preparedness to educate a diverse group of students.
7. This report has emphasized the complex group of schools referred to as "magnet schools." In this changing environment, an updated federal evaluation of the racially integrative impact of magnet schools is needed to deepen our understanding about which conditions

in schools of choice should operate under in order to be "magnetic" and attract a diverse group of students. These findings should inform subsequent reauthorizations of federal education policy, such as NCLB and/or the Magnet School Assistance Program, to make sure that educational choice does not make it more difficult to create racially diverse schools. Targeted funding should go to successful magnet schools identified by the evaluation, and to help design new magnet schools effectively since some studies suggest the initial set-up of magnet schools is 10% more costly than traditional schools (e.g., selecting and training teachers, publicity, etc). The research discussed at the beginning of this report suggests that in addition to the benefits of increased integration, magnet schools help improve the academic outcomes of students, which indicates that they may be wise investments as we aim to dramatically decrease the dropout rates for all students.

8. As the growth of charter schools continues, federal and state charter school legislation should contain some recognition and enforcement of equity provisions from magnet school history.
9. Recent studies from Boston have indicated that pilot schools may serve as an innovative twist on the traditional magnet model. Pilot schools have been in existence for over a decade and in Boston educate more than 10% of district students. They offer parents extended school choices, but, due to lottery admissions policies, tend to enroll student populations reflective of the district as a whole. Like charter schools, pilots promote innovation and autonomy, but unlike charters, they do so within the public school system and with a commitment to equity.
10. Interdistrict magnet schools, established with the intent of bringing students together across district lines, offer a solution in segregated metropolitan areas where there may be school districts of vastly different demographics in close proximity. Since much of existing school segregation occurs between districts (instead of within a single district), interdistrict magnets may help alleviate those patterns. Interdistrict magnet schools are relatively infrequent, but there have been a number of such schools established in Connecticut as part of the remedy in a statewide desegregation case. Several examples of statewide magnet schools also exist (such as Illinois, North Carolina, and Alabama) though these schools often have competitive admissions criteria.

In sum, the role that magnet schools have had in creating innovative, racially diverse schools and in combining parental choice with explicit goals and structures to attain that diversity, has waned in both policy discussions and in financial support for such schools. In this age of ever-growing educational choice, magnet schools and, perhaps more specifically, their desegregation objectives, are the forgotten choice, symptomatic of the movement away from desegregation among all public schools. Schools and districts have many competing objectives in an era of tightening budgets, which may make many of the civil rights provisions in the design of successful magnet schools appear to be to be a luxury rather than an essential component of these schools. However, in the long term, this research and related studies suggest getting rid of civil rights provisions for magnet schools that have been extremely popular in many communities would be a mistake. Particularly now, with the changing demographics of the student population, the increasing importance of attending integrated schools for the life opportunities of students, and the challenging legal climate for some race-conscious school policies, magnet schools with appropriate civil rights structures may be one of the few opportunities to meet these challenges.

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Appendix

Further analysis of NCES Common Core Data, 2005-06, finds important differences in racial composition and segregation among public, magnet, and charter schools at the regional and state level.

Racial Composition of Students in Public, Magnet & Charter Schools

In each region of the country, magnet school students out-number charter school students. The gap is particularly large in the South. Further, the percentage of white magnet schools students in the South most closely approximates the percentage of white students among all public school students (excluding Alaska). In the West and the Northeast, the percentage of white charter school students is higher than the percentage of white magnet school students. In fact, charter schools in the West have a higher percentage of white students than all public schools, which is contrary to the nation-wide trend in racial composition.

Table A-1: Public School Enrollments by Race/Ethnicity and Region, 2005-06

Region	% White	% Black	% Latino	% Asian	% American Indian	Total (by Region)
West	45.3	6.5	37.8	8.3	2.1	11,356,210
Border	67.6	21.2	5.3	2.3	3.7	3,530,810
Midwest	73.3	14.9	8.1	2.7	0.9	9,756,674
South	49.6	26.8	20.6	2.5	0.4	15,382,983
Northeast	64.5	15.6	14.4	5.2	0.3	8,240,086
Alaska	57.7	4.6	4.2	6.9	26.6	133,292
Hawaii	19.8	2.3	4.5	72.7	0.6	184,925
Total	57.1	17.2	19.8	4.6	1.2	48,584,980

Table adapted from Orfield & Lee, 2007.

Table A-2: Magnet School Students, 2005-06, by Race/Ethnicity and Region

Region		White	Black	Latino	Asian	American Indian	Total
West	Number	129,578	80,744	370,544	75,011	5,159	661,036
	%	19.6	12.2	56.1	11.3	1.0	100.0
Border	Number	29,889	26,411	2,474	1,690	146	60,610
	%	49.3	43.6	4.1	2.8	.02	100.0
Midwest	Number	185,841	165,238	97,924	20,610	3,841	473,454
	%	39.3	34.9	20.7	4.4	.1	100.0
South	Number	273,694	323,080	99,778	28,798	1,943	727,293
	%	37.6	44.4	13.7	4.0	.03	100.0
Northeast	Number	39,603	69,677	39,508	6,710	980	156,478
	%	25.3	44.5	25.2	4.3	.1	100.0
Alaska	Number	2,662	341	392	327	687	4,409
	%	60.4	7.7	8.9	7.4	15.6	100.0
Total	Number	661,267	665,491	610,620	133,146	12,756	2,083,280
	%	31.7	31.9	29.3	6.4	0.6	

Table A-3: Charter School Students, 2005-06, by Race/Ethnicity and Region

Region		White	Black	Latino	Asian	American Indian	Total
West	Number	180,151	35,154	121,173	17,020	9,190	362,688
	%	49.7	9.7	33.4	4.7	2.5	100.0
Border	Number	6,749	30,441	4,086	641	325	42,242
	%	16.0	72.1	9.7	1.5	1.0	100.0
Midwest	Number	87,255	118,773	17,183	6,512	2,057	231,780
	%	37.6	51.2	7.4	2.8	1.0	100.0
South	Number	88,778	77,981	62,457	4,564	1,016	234,796
	%	37.8	33.2	26.7	1.9	.04	100.0
Northeast	Number	37,960	59,229	18,653	2,818	312	118,972
	%	32.0	49.8	15.7	2.4	.03	100.0
Alaska	Number	3,183	191	187	193	906	4,660
	%	68.3	4.1	4.1	4.1	19.4	100.0
Hawaii	Number	1,924	104	257	4,123	90	6,498
	%	29.6	1.6	4.0	63.5	1.4	100.0
Total	Number	406,000	321,873	223,996	35,871	13,896	1,001,637
	%	40.5	32.1	22.4	3.6	1.4	

Table A-4: Enrollment & Racial Composition of Students in Magnet Schools by State, 2005-06

State	White	Black	Latino	Asian	American Indian	Total
Alabama	33.3	62.7	1.2	2.5	0.3	19,002
Alaska	60.4	7.7	8.9	7.4	15.6	4,409
Arkansas	28.9	65.6	2.8	2.2	0.4	7,104
Arizona	54.3	6.4	31.9	2.7	4.8	33,845
California	17.2	12.6	57.8	11.9	0.6	621,020
Colorado	69.8	5.1	18	6	1.1	3,384
Connecticut	29.9	44.9	22.5	2.3	0.4	15,527
District of Columbia	11.3	79.3	5.7	3.7	0.1	1,149
Delaware	80.6	14	3.9	1	0.5	1,188
Florida	37.7	38.6	20.8	2.6	0.2	312,900
Georgia	25.5	67.3	4.6	2.4	0.2	57,933
Illinois	15.1	45.4	34.9	4.4	0.2	237,366
Indiana	39.6	51.2	8	0.9	0.3	13,178
Kansas	49.4	25.4	17.9	5.3	2	9,878
Kentucky	62.9	30.7	3.4	2.9	0.1	39,067
Louisiana	26.6	70.2	1	2.1	0.2	39,451
Massachusetts	40.3	11.7	44.4	3.6	0	1,156
Maine	94.3	0	1.9	3.8	0	105
Michigan	70.7	21.7	4.1	2.2	1.3	181,496
Minnesota	35.6	28.3	15.5	18	2.7	29,707
Missouri	22	69.5	5.3	2.6	0.5	19,206
Mississippi	26.9	70.5	1.2	1.3	0.2	4,658
North Carolina	37.6	48.3	9.4	4.3	0.4	106,453
New Mexico	43.3	1.5	45.5	2.2	7.5	134
New York	21.8	43.1	30.2	4.1	0.8	112,985
Pennsylvania	36.6	51.8	5	6.4	0.2	26,705
South Carolina	38.2	55.6	3.4	2.7	0.2	18,758
Tennessee	36	59	2.3	2.6	0.2	16,592
Utah	76	2.5	14.8	5.3	1.5	2,653
Virginia	46.7	30.5	13.9	8.6	0.3	144,442
Wisconsin	59.3	21.9	14.3	3.9	0.6	1,829

Table A-5: Enrollment & Racial Composition of Students in Charter Schools by State, 2005-06

State	White	Black	Latino	Asian	American Indian	Total
Alaska	68.3	4.1	4	4.1	19.4	4,660
Arkansas	65.6	30.2	2.5	1.3	0.4	4,006
Arizona	53.1	6.7	32.4	2.4	5.5	90,597
California	39.9	12.5	39.7	6.6	1.3	189,552
Colorado	64.5	8.7	22.2	3.4	1.2	44,254
Connecticut	20.4	57.3	20.7	1.2	0.4	2,927
District of Columbia	1.6	84.8	12.9	0.5	0.2	17,260
Delaware	52.1	40.6	2.6	4.2	0.4	6,566
Florida	44.9	24.2	28.9	1.6	0.3	92,335
Georgia	47.2	37.9	10.1	4.6	0.2	25,484
Hawaii	29.6	1.6	4	63.5	1.4	6,498
Iowa	58.5	26.3	13.7	1.3	0.2	520
Idaho	93.4	1	3.3	1.5	0.8	8,003
Illinois	7.5	65.1	25.6	1.7	0.1	16,637
Indiana	35.8	58.6	4.9	0.5	0.2	7,409
Kansas	82.5	5.9	7.8	1.5	2.2	1,886
Louisiana	25.2	70.5	2.2	1.7	0.4	8,315
Massachusetts	47.7	26.5	21	4.4	0.4	21,168
Maryland	21.3	71.9	5.1	0.8	1	3,363
Michigan	35.4	55.7	5.4	2.6	0.9	91,145
Minnesota	47.6	30.3	7.4	11	3.6	20,603
Missouri	9.4	83.7	5.1	1.6	0.2	10,972
Mississippi	56.1	39.3	1.9	2.7	0	374
North Carolina	58.9	34.7	3.5	1.5	1.3	27,441
New Hampshire	97.5	1.5	0.5	0.5	0	200
New Jersey	9.9	66.7	20.9	2.5	0.1	14,937
New Mexico	35.1	3	53.5	1.6	6.8	8,595
Nevada	60.6	15.1	18.4	3.9	2	4,818
New York	12.7	67.7	17.9	1.4	0.3	21,539
Ohio	41.9	54.7	2.8	0.4	0.2	66,130
Oklahoma	31.9	37.6	23.3	2.1	5.1	4,081
Oregon	82.1	4.6	5.8	2.9	4.6	5,192
Pennsylvania	39.7	48.2	9.9	2	0.2	55,630
Rhode Island	29.9	23.6	42.5	3.1	0.9	2,571
South Carolina	57.1	40.3	1.4	0.8	0.3	4,051
Tennessee	1.5	97.6	0.9	0.1	0	1,685
Texas	16.5	36.5	44.9	1.7	0.3	70,895
Utah	87.6	1.6	6.3	3.1	1.4	11,439
Virginia	66.7	31.4	0.5	1	0.5	210
Wisconsin	42.7	37	14.8	4.5	1	27,450
Wyoming	52.1	1.7	6.3	0	39.9	238

Racial Segregation of Students in Public, Magnet & Charter Schools

Table A-6: Percentage of Latino students in 90-100% minority schools by state & type of school, 2005-06

State	% of Latino students in Public Schools (excluding magnets & charters)	% of Latino Magnet Students	% of Latino Charter Students
Nation	38.4	51.8	47.5
Alabama	8.2	12.7	n/a
Alaska	1.6	0.3	0.0
Arkansas	2.2	16.3	1.0
Arizona	34.6	10.0	33.0
California	48.4	58.2	51.7
Colorado	17.7	0.0	18.5
Connecticut	25.5	21.2	63.6
District of Columbia	81.7	66.2	93.2
Delaware	4.8	0.0	33.1
Florida	25.3	48.5	25.3
Georgia	23.4	10.4	32.9
Hawaii	11.3	n/a	9.7
Iowa	0.0	n/a	0.0
Idaho	0.1	n/a	0.0
Illinois	38.9	61.7	93.2
Indiana	7.4	16.4	29.1
Kansas	6.7	0.0	0.0
Kentucky	0.0	0.0	n/a
Louisiana	6.7	10.1	36.4
Massachusetts	21.1	0.0	37.7
Maryland	28.5	n/a	56.5
Maine	0.0	0.0	n/a
Michigan	9.7	18.5	45.6
Minnesota	4.4	31.2	57.3
Missouri	6.6	8.6	68.1
Mississippi	9.4	11.1	0.0
Montana	0.3	n/a	n/a
North Carolina	9.1	28.0	44.8
North Dakota	0.8	n/a	n/a
Nebraska	2.1	n/a	n/a
New Hampshire	0.0	n/a	0.0
New Jersey	40.9	n/a	83.5
New Mexico	30.4	39.3	35.3
Nevada	14.5	n/a	21.2
New York	59.8	43.5	73.3
Ohio	4.1	n/a	16.0
Oklahoma	4.4	n/a	2.5
Oregon	0.3	n/a	1.3
Pennsylvania	26.1	15.2	60.2
Rhode Island	31.9	n/a	12.3
South Carolina	2.9	22.7	15.5
South Dakota	0.1	n/a	n/a
Tennessee	9.0	22.1	100.0
Texas	50.4	n/a	72.0
Utah	0.7	18.6	0.0
Virginia	2.9	5.7	0.0
Vermont	0.0	n/a	n/a
Washington	10.3	n/a	n/a
Wisconsin	14.4	0.0	49.4
West Virginia	0.0	n/a	n/a
Wyoming	0.1	n/a	26.7

Table A-7: Latino Exposure to White Students by State and Type of Public School, 2005-06

State	% White in School of Average Latino Student in Public Schools (excluding magnets & charters)	% White in School of the Average Latino Magnet Student	% White in School of the Average Latino Charter Student
Nation	31.2	16.8	23.6
Alabama	61.8	44.4	n/a
Alaska	56.8	48.4	68.3
Arkansas	57.9	29.8	55.3
Arizona	28.7	40.2	30.5
California	18.9	12.1	22.1
Colorado	41.1	56.2	39.9
Connecticut	35.7	29.5	16.1
District of Columbia	5.7	12.6	2.3
Delaware	45.2	79.1	51.8
Florida	33.1	24.0	29.2
Georgia	39.0	33.4	32.2
Hawaii	22.8	n/a	33.8
Iowa	68.0	n/a	23.8
Idaho	70.7	n/a	91.8
Illinois	31.9	13.3	4.3
Indiana	58.7	39.2	45.0
Kansas	48.3	39.9	56.4
Kentucky	71.9	55.7	n/a
Louisiana	48.7	40.8	30.9
Massachusetts	39.7	37.0	22.7
Maryland	30.6	n/a	28.8
Maine	89.9	94.3	n/a
Michigan	58.4	51.7	32.5
Minnesota	65.2	24.9	21.5
Missouri	65.5	23.2	11.5
Mississippi	54.6	36.6	56.1
Montana	83.7	n/a	n/a
North Carolina	47.5	31.0	36.1
North Dakota	84.8	n/a	n/a
Nebraska	53.9	n/a	n/a
New Hampshire	81.9	n/a	93.8
New Jersey	28.2	n/a	8.1
New Mexico	24.4	36.5	25.9
Nevada	33.0	n/a	53.2
New York	19.3	17.5	9.5
Ohio	62.6	n/a	44.7
Oklahoma	46.9	n/a	30.0
Oregon	59.8	n/a	75.9
Pennsylvania	40.1	28.1	19.9
Rhode Island	28.8	n/a	16.9
South Carolina	53.3	32.5	60.5
South Dakota	82.0	n/a	n/a
Tennessee	56.4	33.9	1.9
Texas	20.2	n/a	11.0
Utah	64.5	62.2	80.9
Virginia	48.1	37.5	94.4
Vermont	93.6	n/a	n/a
Washington	48.7	n/a	n/a
Wisconsin	54.8	54.1	25.4
West Virginia	86.3	n/a	n/a
Wyoming	79.5	n/a	65.6

Table A-8: Percentage of Black Students in 90-100% Minority Schools, by State & Type of School, 2005-06

State	% of Black students in Public Schools (excluding magnets & charters)	% of Black Magnet Students	% of Black Charter Students
Nation	36.1	47.3	69.1
Alabama	44.6	56.4	n/a
Alaska	2.2	0.3	2.6
Arkansas	21.1	29.7	20.2
Arizona	15.4	4.3	18.5
California	35.2	57.4	54.3
Colorado	14.3	0.0	25.4
Connecticut	29.9	31.0	82.6
District of Columbia	90.7	77.5	97.6
Delaware	3.1	0.0	77.4
Florida	29.2	41.1	39.7
Georgia	38.5	57.2	44.0
Hawaii	8.0	n/a	8.7
Iowa	1.4	n/a	0.0
Idaho	0.0	n/a	0.0
Illinois	54.1	81.7	96.1
Indiana	21.2	45.7	75.4
Kansas	6.9	0.0	0.0
Kentucky	0.0	0.0	n/a
Louisiana	29.2	58.3	74.3
Massachusetts	24.3	0.0	56.9
Maryland	52.3	n/a	83.1
Maine	0.0	n/a	77.5
Michigan	56.7	50.4	n/a
Minnesota	10.2	26.9	73.9
Missouri	40.3	33.9	87.1
Mississippi	45.2	49.5	0.0
Montana	0.2	n/a	n/a
North Carolina	13.4	31.0	51.7
North Dakota	0.5	n/a	n/a
Nebraska	6.4	n/a	n/a
New Hampshire	0.0	n/a	0.0
New Jersey	46.4	n/a	93.5
New Mexico	8.8	0.0	26.1
Nevada	9.9	n/a	56.1
New York	62.9	44.6	83.0
Ohio	35.6	n/a	62.6
Oklahoma	13.5	n/a	50.5
Oregon	4.5	n/a	35.4
Pennsylvania	46.3	22.5	71.5
Rhode Island	18.8	n/a	3.6
South Carolina	18.2	19.1	32.5
South Dakota	0.1	n/a	n/a
Tennessee	44.3	33.0	100.0
Texas	36.7	n/a	82.5
Utah	0.1	4.6	0.0
Virginia	15.4	11.7	86.4
Vermont	0.0	n/a	n/a
Washington	7.3	n/a	n/a
Wisconsin	36.9	0.0	78.6
West Virginia	0.0	n/a	n/a
Wyoming	0.0	n/a	0.0

Table A-9: Black Student Exposure to White Students by State & Type of Public School, 2005-06

State	% White in School of Average Black Student in Public Schools (excluding magnets & charters)	% White in School of the Average Black Magnet Student	% White in School of the Average Black Charter Student
Nation	28.0	20.1	14.4
Alabama	30.0	22.0	n/a
Alaska	53.9	57.1	66.3
Arkansas	36.8	24.8	25.8
Arizona	40.8	42.7	40.7
California	22.8	12.9	21.2
Colorado	43.3	61.0	31.8
Connecticut	33.8	21.9	8.2
District of Columbia	2.5	9.9	1.2
Delaware	48.0	77.7	18.1
Florida	34.2	24.7	26.6
Georgia	28.8	14.3	24.3
Hawaii	29.9	n/a	37.4
Iowa	69.2	n/a	43.6
Idaho	82.9	n/a	91.8
Illinois	23.3	6.0	4.2
Indiana	41.4	26.3	12.5
Kansas	51.3	42.8	61.4
Kentucky	65.3	56.0	n/a
Louisiana	32.6	15.5	11.1
Massachusetts	38.6	40.7	19.6
Maryland	22.3	n/a	8.0
Maine	83.4	n/a	n/a
Michigan	24.9	21.9	10.2
Minnesota	51.8	24.3	13.4
Missouri	36.2	19.1	6.8
Mississippi	25.8	18.7	56.1
Montana	84.6	n/a	n/a
North Carolina	40.6	28.3	25.3
North Dakota	86.6	n/a	n/a
Nebraska	49.1	n/a	n/a
New Hampshire	85.0	n/a	93.6
New Jersey	26.0	n/a	3.6
New Mexico	36.8	44.3	31.1
Nevada	35.5	n/a	30.3
New York	18.3	17.1	6.7
Ohio	34.1	n/a	16.2
Oklahoma	41.9	n/a	16.2
Oregon	56.2	n/a	50.8
Pennsylvania	31.1	27.6	14.1
Rhode Island	39.4	n/a	16.9
South Carolina	38.8	31.0	38.3
South Dakota	81.3	n/a	n/a
Tennessee	29.9	23.0	1.5
Texas	26.6	n/a	8.0
Utah	70.4	72.9	84.7
Virginia	40.5	33.1	20.2
Vermont	90.2	n/a	n/a
Washington	52.9	n/a	n/a
Wisconsin	33.0	45.2	10.5
West Virginia	78.6	n/a	89.0
Wyoming	79.3	n/a	66.3

Table A-10: Relationship between Racial and Socioeconomic Composition of Students in Charter Schools, 2005-06

Percentage of students who are low-income	Percentage of students who are black & Latino:										
	0-10%	10-20%	20-30%	30-40%	40-50%	50-60%	60-70%	70-80%	80-90%	90-100%	Total
0-25%	404	203	121	84	55	54	39	42	52	204	1,258
	54.4	**46.9**	**40.5**	**35.2**	**26.8**	**33.8**	**25.8**	**21.2**	**21.7**	**20.4**	**34.3**
25-50%	110	82	59	33	25	6	8	11	10	13	357
	14.8	**18.9**	**19.7**	**13.8**	**12.2**	**3.8**	**5.3**	**5.6**	**4.2**	**1.3**	**9.7**
50-75%	121	93	70	65	50	35	25	23	27	61	570
	16.3	**21.5**	**23.4**	**27.2**	**24.4**	**21.9**	**16.6**	**11.6**	**11.3**	**6.1**	**15.5**
75-100%	108	55	49	57	75	65	79	122	151	723	1,484
	14.5	**12.7**	**16.4**	**23.9**	**36.6**	**40.6**	**52.3**	**61.6**	**62.9**	**72.2**	**40.5**
Total	743	433	299	239	205	160	151	198	240	1,001	3,669
	20.3	11.8	8.2	6.5	5.59	4.4	4.1	5.4	6.5	27.3	100
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A-11: Relationship between Racial and Socioeconomic Composition of Students in Magnet Schools, 2005-06

Percentage of students who are low-income	Percentage of Students who are black & Latino										
	0-10%	10-20%	20-30%	30-40%	40-50%	50-60%	60-70%	70-80%	80-90%	90-100%	Total
0-25%	104	56	30	17	13	12	9	9	9	16	275
	32.4	**35.9**	**16.0**	**8.4**	**6.0**	**5.0**	**3.5**	**3.7**	**3.3**	**2.7**	**10.3**
25-50%	64	48	73	54	26	11	6	3	0	1	286
	19.9	**30.8**	**38.8**	**26.7**	**11.9**	**4.6**	**2.3**	**1.2**	**0**	**0.2**	**10.7**
50-75%	106	31	61	100	105	94	68	35	18	29	647
	33.0	**19.9**	**32.5**	**49.5**	**48.2**	**39.5**	**26.5**	**14.5**	**6.7**	**4.9**	**24.1**
75-100%	47	21	24	31	74	121	174	195	243	545	1,475
	14.6	**13.5**	**12.8**	**15.4**	**33.9**	**50.8**	**67.7**	**80.6**	**90.0**	**92.2**	**55.0**
Total	321	156	188	202	218	238	257	242	270	591	2,683
	12.0	5.8	7.0	7.5	8.1	8.9	9.6	9.0	10.1	22.0	100
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Mountain View Whisman School District

Agenda Item for Board Meeting of 1/8/2022

Agenda Category: FUTURE BOARD MEETING DATES

Agenda Item Title: Future Board Meeting Dates

Estimated Time:

Person Responsible:

Background:
January 13, 2022 Special Meeting
January 20, 2022
February 10, 2022
March 10, 2022

Fiscal Implication:

Recommended Action: